Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2016

Fur Breeders Agricultural Cooperative, (Employer No. 002612-0).
Petitioner/Appellant, vs. Department of Workforce Services,
Workforce Appeals Board, Respondent/Appelle. : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Scott Rawlings; attorney for appellant.
Nathan R. White; attorney for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Fur Breeders Agricultural v. Workforce Services, No. 20161064 (Utah Court of Appeals,
2016).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/4131

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APEALS

Fur Breeders Agricultural Cooperative, :
(Employer No. 002612-0).
:
Petitioner/Appellant,

..

vs.

Department of Workforce Services,
Workforce Appeals Board,

..
..

Appellate Case No •
20161064-CA

Respondent/Appelle.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
" ADDENDUM"

APPEAL
Appeal from De-ctsion of Workforce Aweals Board
Department of Workforce Services

NATHAN R. WHITE
Workforce Appeals Board
Department of Workforce Services
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45244
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0244
Attorney for Respondent/Appelle

R. SCOTT RAWLINGS
3441 Decker Lake Drive
Suite 201
Salt Lake City, UT 84119

Attorney for Petitioner/
Appellant
f\LE.0
URiS
UiAH APPELLAiE CO

\.A~~ \ O20\7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APEALS

Fur Breeders Agricultural Cooperative, :
(Employer No. 002612-0).
:
Petitioner/Appellant,

.•
••
••

vs.

.•
.•

Department of Work.force Services,

..

Work.force Appeals Board,
Respondent/Appelle.

Appellate Case No.
20161064-CA

••
••

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
"ADDENDUM"

APPEAL
Appeal from Decision of Workforce Appeals Board
Department of Workforce Services

(ii

NATHAN R. WHITE
Workforce Appeals Board
Department of Workforce Services
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45244
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0244
Attorney for Respondent/Appelle

R. SCOTT RAWLINGS
3441 Decker Lake Drive
Suite 201
Salt Lake City, UT 84119

Attorney for Petitioner/
Appellant

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES:
Adams v. Board of Review ofIndus. Comm'n, 821 P,2d 1, 4 ... 1-6
Department of the Airforce v. Swider, 824 P.2d 448, 451
(Utah App. 1991) ............................................................ 7-11
Drake v. Industrial Comm 'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997).. 12-16
Evolocity Inc. v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2015 UT
App 61, 374 P.3d 406 ... .................................................... 17-22
First National Bank ofBoston v. County Board of
Equalization, 199 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990) ......................... 22-25
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67
(Utah App 1989) ............................................................. 26-31
LaSal Oil Co. v. Department ofEnvtl. Quality, 843 P.2d
1045, 1047 (Utah App 1992) ....................................... .32-34
Leach v. Board of Review Indus. Comm 'n, 123 Utah 423,
260 P.2d 744, 7 48 (Utah 1953) ..................................... .35-40
Martinez v. Media Paymaster Plus, 207 UT 42, 164
P.3d 3 84 ................................................................. 41-50
Needle Inc. v. Dept 't pf Workforce Servs., 2016 UT
App 84 (Utah Ct. App. 216) ......................................... 51-61
Petro-Hunt, LLC v. Dep 't pf Workforce Servs., 197
P.3d 107, 114 (Utah App 2008) ...................................... 62-68

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i)

Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 811
P.2d 665, 669 (Utah 1991) ............................................ 69-75
Tasters Ltd., v. Department of Employment Sec., 863
P.2d 12 (Utah 1993) ................................................... 76-87
Cd

STATE STATUTES:

Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-204 ........................................ 88-94
Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-204(1 ) ..................................... 88-94
Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-204(3) .................................... 88-94
Utah Code Ann. § 3 SA-4-208 ....................................... 95-96
Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-508(4)(5) ................................. 97-99
Utah Code Ann. §630-4-401 ........................................ 100
Utah Code Ann.{formerly) §63G-4616(4);
(currently) §630-4-404 .............................................. 101

RULES:

Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303 .................................. 101-104
Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(1)(b) ........................... 101-102
Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303{l)(b)(iii) ....................... 102
Utah Admin Code R994-204-303(1)(iv) ........................... 102
Utah Admin Code R994-204-303(l)(b)(iii) ....................... 102
~

Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(1 )(b )(v) ....................... 102
Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(2)(b ) ........................... 102-104
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FIELD AUDIT DETERMINATION: (07/20/2016)......... 105-111
ALJ ADJUDICATION: (10/05/2016) ...... ...................... 112-149
WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD
DECISION: (12/07/2016) ................................. ... 150-164

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

developed gradually as a result of her employment. In
general, Adams now claims that the repetitive motion of
calling on a manual phone and holding the phone to her
mouth and ear caused her neck pain, neck stiffness, muscle
spasm, pain in her right ann and shoulder, a "pins and
needles" sensation and numbness in her right shoulder and
arm, and fatigue.

Pagel
821 P.ld 1 (Utah App.1991)
Roberta N. ADAMS, Petitioner,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW
COMMISSION, Workers'

Compensation
Respondents.

Fund

OF

of

the

Utah,

INDUSTRIAL

and

Unicorp,

No. 900597-CA.

When Adams informed her supervisor of her pain, he
referred her to his chiropractor, Dr. Robert Pope, for
treabllenl Dr. Pope examined her and diagnosed .her as
having "cervico-brachial syndrome, carpal tunnel
syndrome, myofascitis, and brachia! neuralgia." Adams's
condition was subsequently described by Dr. Pope as
"repetitive motion syndrome." Dr. Pope also indicated that
he believed there was a very high probability that Adams's
condition resulted from her job duties.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

November S, 1991

Pagel
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Pagel
Linda M. Barclay (argued), Howard, Lewis & Petersen,
Provo, for petitioner.
Richard Sumsion (argued), Salt Lake City, for Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah.
Benjamin J. Simms, Salt Lake City, for Industrial Com'n of
Utah.
Before BENCH, P.J., and GREENWOOD, and ORME, JJ.
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Petitioner Robena Adams seeks review of the Industrial
Commission's decision to deny her benefits under the Utah
Occupational Disease Disability Law, Utah Code Ann. §§
3S-2-1 to -65 (1988). We vacate the Commission's order.
FACTS
Adams worked as a telemarketer for Unicorp. Her duties
consisted primarily of dialing telephone numbers and
talking on the telephone while sitting at a desk. She was not
equipped with a headset or any type of automatic dialing
equipment. She was required to dial manually and hold the
receiver to her ear and mouth. After working at Unicorp for
approximately one year, Adams left Unicorp to seek
medical attention for debilitating pain she claimed had

Adams then began to see another chiropractor, Dr. Arnold
Otterson, whose office was closer to her home. Dr. Otterson
diagnosed Adams as having acute traumatic
cervico-brachial syndrome with associated brachia!
neuralgia. Dr. Otterson likewise described Adams's
condition as repetitive motion syndrome. He treated her for
several months and her condition improved. Dr. Otterson
indicated to the Industrial Commission that in his
professional opinion, Adams's 11 condition was directly
related to her employment due to repetitive use of the
phone."
Adams was next seen and evaluated by Dr. Richard
Jackson, an orthopedic surgeon. His evaluation indicated
that Adams was suffering from a degenerative C5-6 disc.
Inasmuch as Dr. Jackson did not deal with head and neck
problems, he referred Adams to Dr. Joseph R. Watkins, a
neurologist. Dr. Watkins diagnosed Adams as having "work
related cervical strain with some head discomfort and right
shoulder discomfort'' and "stress syndrome with multiple
other symptoms, essentially resolved with resolution of
work."

The Workers' Compensation Fund (the Fund) required
Adams to undergo an independent medical evaluation by
Dr. Edward Spencer. Dr. Spencer observed from the
medical records that Adams had spondylosis of the C4-5
and C5-6 disc with narrowing at the CS-6 level. He also
observed a narrowed L4-S and LS-SI disc with osteophyte
formation from L5 at the L5-S 1 level. Dr. Spencer
diagnosed Adams as having probable "conversion
disorder," "chronic ceIVical and lumbar disc disease,"
"chondromalacia of the patello-femoral joint," and "obesity
and poor conditioning. 11 He further found that her major
problem was psychological and did not require any
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additional medical or surgical treatment for her condition.
The Fund then required Adams to be examined by Dr.
Leonard W. Jarcho, the

(h) the agency action is ... (iv) otherwise arbitrary or
capricious.
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1990).

former head of the Neurology Department at the University
of Utah. Dr. Jarcho concluded that Adams did not have any
neurological problem that he could identify. He also
indicated that he believed that the minimal orthopedic
problem was not connected to Adams's complaints or her
prior employment Dr. Jarcho described Adams's reactions,
activities and movements during the examination as
"strange," and concluded that Adams was in need of
psychiatric diagnosis and treatment.

Adams claims that she is entitled to relief under subsection
(h). [1] The question of whether the Commission's action
constitutes arbitrary action for want of adequate findings is
governed by our determination of whether this court is able
to conduct a meaningful review. Whether the findings are
adequate is therefore a legal determination that requires no
deference to the Commission.

As directed by the Fund, Adams was then examined by Dr.
David L. M ~ a psychiatrist, who was assisted by Dr.
Leslie M. Cooper, a clinical psychologist. Dr. Mccann
concluded that Adams suffered from a personality disorder
and did not have any physical impairment or other problems
associated with her employment, but that her complaints
were motivated by a desire to obtain compensation.

An administrative agency must make findings of fact and
conclusions of law that arc adequately detailed so as to
permit meaningful appellate review.

A bearing was then held where the foregoing conflicting
diagnoses were presented to an administrative law judge
(A.L.J.). The A.LJ. denied benefits. Adams appealed the
A.L.J.'s decision to the Commission, which affirmed the
decision and adopted the findings and conclusions of the
A.L.J. as its own. Adams now seeks review of the
Commission's decision.
Adams presents three claims for our determination: (1) the
Commission's findings and conclusions should be reversed
because they are insufficient as a matter of law, (2) the
Commission's factual findings are not supported by
substantial evidence, and (3) her condition constitutes a
compensable condition under Nyrehn v. Industrial
Commission, 800 P.2d 330 (Utah App.1990) (interpreting
Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986)).
Inasmuch as we find that the Commission's findings are
insufficient and order additional findings, we do not address
points (2) and (3).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our review of the Commission1s denial of benefits is
governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
(UAPA). UAPA provides, in relevant part:

The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of
the agencyts record, it detennines that a person seeking
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of
the following:

ADEQUACY OF FINDINGS

In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of the
Commission, the findings must be "sufficiently detailed and
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached." Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)
(quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979))....

Pages
[T]he failure of an agency to make adequate findings of
fact in material issues renders its findings "arbitrary and
capricious " unless the evidence is "clear, uncontroverted
and capable of only one conclusion. 11 Id. (quoting Kinkella
v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)).

Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm'n, 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah
App.1990), cert. denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991)
(emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly described the detail
required in administrative findings in order for findings to
be deemed adequate.

[ An administrative agency] cannot discharge its statutory
responsibilities without making findings of fact on all
necessary ultimate issues under the governing statutory
standards. It is also essential that [an administrative agency]
make subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that the critical
subordinate factual issues are highlighted and resolved in
such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is a logical and
legal basis for the ultimate conclusions. The importance of
complete, accurate, and consistent fmdings of fact is
essential to a proper determination by an administrative
agency. To that end, findings should be sufficiently detailed
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual
conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and law, are
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reached. See generally, Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336,
1338 (Utah 1979). Without such fmdings, this Court cannot
perform its duty of reviewing [an administrative agency's]
order in accordance with established legal principles and of
protecting the parties and the public from arbitrary and
capricious administrative action.

Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d
1373, 1378 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added).

If agency findings reveal the steps taken by the agency in
reaching its decision, the failure to disclose a specific
subsidiary finding may or may not be fatal to the agency's
decision. A finding may be implied if it is clear from the
record, and therefore apparent upon review, that the finding
was actually made as part of the tribunal's decision. See
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-788, (Utah 1991). [2]
We may not merely assume, however, that an undisclosed
finding was in fact made. The party wishing to defend an
agency decision must carry its burden of showing that the
undisclosed finding was actually made.
For this Court to sustain an order, the findings must be
sufficiently detailed to demonstrate that the Commission
bas properly arrived at the ultimate factual fmdings and has
properly applied the governing rules of law to those
fmdings .... It is not the prerogative of this Court to search
the record to determine whether findings could have been
made by the Commission to support its order, for to do so
would be to usurp the fimction with which the Commission
is charged.

Mountain States Legal Found. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 636
P.2d 1047, 1052 (Utah 1981).
The findings made by the A.L.J. and adopted by the
Commission in the present case are inadequate in that they
do not disclose the steps taken by the Commission in
reaching its decision to deny Adams benefits. The
Commission's "fmdings" amount to the following single
conclusory statement as to causation: "The preponderance
of medical evidence in this case establishes that the
applicant's various listed symptoms are not related to her
work as a telemarketer at Unicorp."
Because the Commission concluded that Adams failed to
prove causation, the Commission denied her benefits. The
Commission correctly indicated in its adopted conclusions
of law that causation is one of the ultimate factual
conclusions that must
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be proven by a claimant. See, e.g., Allen v. Industrial
1986). However, the
Commission's conclusion that Adams failed to prove
causation, without supporting findings, is arbitrary.

Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah

"Administrative bodies may not rely upon findings that
contain only ultimate conclusions." Tolman v. Salt Lake
County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 31 (Utah App.1991). See
also Vali Convalescent &: Care Insts. v. Division of Health
Care Financing, 191 P.2d 438, 448 (Utah App.1990)
(statement of ultimate facts alone was essentially pro
forma). Cf. Mountain States Legal Found, 636 P.2d at 1052
("Ultimate findings ... must be sustained if there are
adequate subordinate findings to support them"). Given the
numerous legal and factual questions regarding causation in
this case, [3] the Commission's solitary finding that Adams
failed to prove causation does not give the parties any real
indication as to the bases for its decision and the steps taken
to reach it, nor does it give a reviewing court anything to
review.
While the purported "Findings of Fact" written by the
A.L.J. contain an infonnative summary of the evidence
presente~ such a rehearsal of contradictory evidence does
not constitute findings of fact. In order for a finding to truly
constitute a "fmding of fact." it must indicate what the
A.L.J. determines in fact occurred, not merely what the
contradictory evidence indicates might have occurred. "[l]t
is the responsibility of the administrative law judge to
resolve factual conflicts." Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736
P.2d 237,241 (Utah 1987).
As is apparent in the recitation of the various diagnoses
presented to the A.L.J., the doctors each had differing
explanations for Adams's medical condition and whether it
was caused by her employment The evidence did not
merely indicate two possible versions of a fact whereby we
could conclude that the denial of benefits necessarily
indicates that the Commission accepted one version over
another.
The evidence shows several possible
configurations and degrees of injury and/or disease, if any,
and the causes, if any, thereby creating a matrix of possible
factual findings. A mere summary of the conflicting
evidence in this case therefore does not give a clear
indication of the A.L.J. 's or the Commission's view as to
what in fact occurred. Since we cannot even determine why
the Commission found there was no causation shown, we
clearly cannot assume that the Commission actually made
any of the possible subsidiary findings. The findings are
therefore inadequate.
In order for this court to address the errors claimed by
Adams, we must have findings that indicate respectively ( 1)
the issues decide~ see section 63-46b-l6(4)(c); (2) the legal
intetpretations and applications made, see section
63-46b-16(4)(d); and (3) the subsidiary factual findings in
support of the decision, see section 63-46b-16(4)(g). A
simple conclusion that Adams failed to prove medical
causation does not contain any of the foregoing
information.
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At a minimwn, there should have been a finding in the
present case identifying the occupational disease or injmy,
if any, suffered by Adams. The Commission could not
logically conclude that Adams's medical condition, if any,
was not caused by her employment without first
establishing what her medical condition was. [4] This it
failed to do. The Commission's findings of fact simply do
not "resolve all issues of material fact necessary to justify
the conclusions of law and judgment entered thereon."
Parks v. Zions First Nat'/ Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 601 (Utah
1983) (footnote omitted).
The Commission should have also given some explanation,
factual or legal, as to how Adams failed to prove causation.
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An applicant with a pre-existing condition must prove both
legal and medical causation. See Allen, 729 P.2d at 25-27.
The Commission relied upon Allen, but its findings do not
make it clear whether it believed that Adams failed to prove
medical or legal causation. Both issues were apparently
involved in this matter. Inasmuch as our standard of review
varies depending upon whether Adams failed to prove legal
or medical causation, the Commission•s failure to identify
whether Adams failed to prove legal or medical causation
prevents us from reviewing that conclusion.
When multiple conflicting versions of the facts create a

matrix of possible factual fmdings, we are unable on appeal
to assume that any given finding was in fact made. See,
e.g., Carlton v. Carlton, 156 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah App.1988)
(finding giving only a lump sum total valuation of all
marital property was inadequate to permit review of
disputed valuations of individual marital assets). Because of
the matrix of factual possibilities in the present case, we are
unable to conduct a meaningful review. We therefore hold
that the Commission's denial of benefits based upon a
solitary fmding regarding the ultimate issue of causation
fails "to disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual
conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and law, are
reached," id., and therefore renders the action arbitrary.

PREJUDICE
Our conclusion that the Commission acted arbitrarily by
failing to enter adequate findings and legal conclusions
does not end our inquiry, however. As required by section
63-46b-l 6(4), the agency's error must 11substantially
prejudice" the petitioner before we may grant relief. The
Utah Supreme Court recently indicated in Morton
International, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d
581, 584-585 (Utah 1991), that the substantial prejudice
language in section 63-46b-16(4) prevents an appellate
court from granting relief if an agency error is hannless.
The supreme court defined harmless error as being an error

"sufficiently inconsequential that ... there is no reasonable
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings." Id. We aJso note that when considering an
error that is strictly of the agency's own making, such as
failing to make adequate findings, any doubt about whether
a petitioner was prejudiced is resolved in the petitioner's
favor. Angell v. Board of Review ofIndus. Comm'n. 750
P.2d 611,613 (Utah App.1988).
We recognize as a matter of law the substantial prejudice
inherent in the failure to make adequate findings when the
evidence is not clear and uncontroverted. Nyrehn, 800 P.2d
at 335. "The importance of complete, accurate, and
consistent findings of fact is essential to a proper
determination by an administrative agency." Milne Truck
Lines, 720 P.2d at 1378. The findings are an integral part of
the logical process a tribunal must go through in reaching a
decision. See, e.g., Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1114
(Utah App.1990) (final determination to be supported by
adequate findings "made in the cowse of employing" the
anaJytical approach established by the court on appeal). Cf.
Noble v. Noble. 161 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1988) ("trial
court must make adequate findings and conclusions
demonstrating that it has considered [relevant] factors"
(emphasis added)). Once an administrative agency attempts
to state its findings, identify the applicable law, and
articulate its logic, it may discover that critical facts are not
properly before it. [5] that the law is other
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than anticipated, or that its initial logic is flawed. In such
situations, a result contrary to the initial conclusions of the
body may be dictated. The process of articulation clearly
enhances agency self-discipline and protects against
arbitrary and capricious decisions. Without the safeguard of
adequate findings, there is no guarantee that the agency
followed a logical process in reaching its decision. If, on the
other hand, the agency identifies the facts, law, and
reasoning supporting its decision, it reveals its logical
process and the parties can be assured that a logical process
occured, even if it is in some manner flawed.
If an agency's logical process is flawed, its shortcomings
can be corrected on review, but only if the agency creates
findings revealing the evidence upon which it relies, the law
upon which it relies, and its interpretation of the law.
Absent adequate findings, a petitioner wishing to challenge
an agency's factual findings will not be able to marshal the
evidence in support of the findings. See generally Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm'n, 776
P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App.1989) (party challenging factual
findings of agency mu.c;t marshal evidence in support of
such finding and show that it is not substantial). Nor will a
petitioner be able to challenge the agency's undeclared
interpretation of the law or its undisclosed logic. See, e.g.,
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State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 771 n. 11 (Utah App.1990)
(trial court's failure to make adequate findings "placed
appellate counsel at a disadvantage in framing and
developing their arguments on appeal").
If findings are inadequate, this court will also be unable to
effectively and efficiently perform its duty of review. "To
enable this Court to determine whether an order is arbitrary
and capricious, the Commission must make findings of fact
that are sufficiently detailed to apprise the parties and the
Court of the basis for the Commission's decision."
Mountain States Legal Found., 636 P.2d at 1051 (citations
omitted). While these disadvantages may not be reflected in
the initial outcome of the hearing below, they directly affect
the ultimate outcome of the matter on review and are
therefore relevant to the question of prejudice. It is
axiomatic that the denial of Adams's claim without the
possibility of meaningful review by this court, as provided
for by UAPA, is clearly prejudicial.
The Fund has not established that the Commission's failure
to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law
was hannless as defined in Morton International, at
584-585. [6] We therefore resolve any doubt inAdams's
favor and hold that Adams was prejudiced by the
Commission's failure to make adequate factual findings and
legal conclusions.

RELIEF
As a general rule, the appropriate relief for an agency's
failure to make adequate findings is to vacate the order
complained of and to order the agency to "make more
adequate fmdings in support of, and more fully articulate
[the] reasons for, the detennination ... made." Vali
Convalescent & Care Insts., 797 P.2d at 450. However, as
we have aclmowledged herein, absent adequate findings
there is no presumption that the Commission's decision is
correct. The process of articulation may or may not cause
the Commission to reach a different decision. Since we
vacate the Commission's order denying benefits, it is free to
deny benefits or grant benefits as may be dictated by its
new findings of fact and conclusions of law. [7]
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CONCLUSION
We vacate the Commission's order denying Adams benefits
and direct the Commission to produce adequate findings of
fact and conclusions of law and enter a new order.
GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ .• concur.

Notes:

[l] Adams also claims the following subsections of section
63-46b-16(4) constitute grounds for relief:
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring
resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the
law;

(g) the agency action is based upon a detennination of fact,
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
Inasmuch as we reverse the Commission's order because its
failure to make adequate findings constituted arbitrary
action warranting relief under subsection (h), we need not
address the standards of review for subsections (c), (d), and
(g).
[2) In so stating, we acknowledge that our ruling in
Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 335, a pre-UAPA case, that material
subsidiary findings may not be implied is limited under
UAPA and the supreme court's language in Ramirez. UAPA
recognizes the possibility of implied factual fmdings. See
section 63-46b-16(4)(g). An agency decision may therefore
be upheld under UAPA despite the absence of express
written findings regarding a material fact if the reviewing
court can determine that the material finding was in fact
made, although not expressly written.
[3] See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-27(28) (1988); Allen
v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
(4] See, e.g., Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 335 (error for A.L.J. to
apply higher standard required of applicants with
pre-existing conditions that contributed to the injwy
without first finding that the applicant had a pre-existing
condition which contributed to the injwy).
[ 5] We recognize that an administrative agency may hear
evidence that is legally inadmissible under the technical
rules of evidence; under the "residuum rule," however, its
findings of fact cannot be based exclusively on such
inadmissible evidence. "They must be supported by a
residuum oflegal evidence competent in a court oflaw."
Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Comm'n. 681 P.2d 1224, 1226
(Utah 1984). See also Mayes v. Department of Employment
Sec .• 754 P.2d 989, 992 n. 1 (Utah App.1988) (explaining
inconsistent standards for admitting evidence and relying
upon evidence admitted). The process of articulating the
critical facts gives an administrative agency pause to
ascertain what evidence it may properly rely upon to make
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such findings in light of the residuum rule. See, e.g.,
Tolman, at 31-32 (at a minimum, issues regarding
admissibility of evidence should have been addressed in the
findings).
[6] It is possible in some cases that the failure to make
adequate findings is nevertheless harmless. See, e.g.,
Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 335 (failure to make findings necessary
to determine whether a higher legal standard should be
applied before applying the higher standard was harmless
error when the undisputed facts of the case satisfied the
higher standard). Cf. Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566-67
(Utah 1985) (even though findings were inadequate as to
financial needs of wife, no remand was necessary because
even accepting the wife's evidence as true, there was no
abuse of discretion by trial court).
[7] We express no opinion on the merits of Adams's
remaining claims inasmuch as they may be resolved by the
Commission's entry of adequate findings. Her remaining
claims are best left for another day.

~
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DEPARTMENT OF the AIR FORCE, Petitioner,

v.
Robert J. SWIDER and Department of Employment
Security, Respondents.
No. 91006~CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
December 6, 1991
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Dee V. Benson, Robert H. Wilde and Clare A. Jones,
Midvale, for petitioner.
R. Paul Van Dam and Emma R. Thomas, Salt Lake City,
for respondents.
Before JACKSON, ORME and RUSSON, JJ.
ORME, Judge;
Petitioner, the United States Air Force, challenges a
decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission granting unemployment benefits to an Air
Force employee terminated for drug use. We affinn.
FACTS
In 1986, the United States Air Force adopted a "zero
tolerance" anti-drug policy for its workforce, and informed
employees they could be discharged for possessing or using
illegal drugs on base, or working under the effects of such
drugs. In May of 1990, the Air Force announced plans to
supplement the policy with a comprehensive drug testing
program for all civilian employees.
From December of 1970 until May of 1990, respondent
Robert J. Swider was employed by the Air Force as an
aircraft mechanic at Hill Air Force Base. In July of 1989,
Swider spoke to Vicky Brown, a fellow employee at the
base, about frequent on-base cocaine use Swider had
observed
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among bis co-workers. Brown asked Swider if she could

pass the information along to his supervisor, a Mr.
Stevenson, and Swider agreed. Brown then engaged in a
series of conversations with Stevenson, in which she
relayed Swider's observations. As a result of his contact
with Brown, Stevenson contacted the Air Force Office of
Special Investigations (OSI) and informed them of possible
on-base drug use among employees.

OSI subsequently installed surveillance cameras in
Swider's work area. and several of Swider's co-employees
were filmed inhaling cocaine. These co-workers were
eventually arrested and interviewed by OSI personnel, at
which time one of them identified Swider, who had not
been shown on the videotape using drugs, as also having
used cocaine on base. In November of 1989, Swider
received death threats, allegedly from individuals who had
discovered it was he who leaked information about their
drug use to OSI. Swider asked his supervisor what
protection the Air Force could offer him. and his supervisor
directed him to OSI.
Swider met with OSI agents in December of 1989. During
the course of their discussion, Swider admitted to the agents
that he had smoked marijuana while on a rafting trip in May
of 1989. He also informed them that, subsequent to that
incident, he had been completely drug-free for eight
months. In January of 1990, Swider enrolled himself in a
30-day drug rehabilitation program. With full disclosure of
his intention to do so, he was given time off by the Air
Force to enter the program, and successfully completed it.

[l]
In February of 1990, an OSI report was issued, concluding
that Swider's employment should be terminated because of
his off-base drug use in May of 1989. Swider was
discharged from Hill Air Force Base a full year after the
instance of drug use, in May of 1990. The next month, he
applied to the Department of Employment Security for
unemployment benefits. He was initially denied all benefits
on the ground that he had been discharged for '1ust cause. 11
[2] Swider appealed the decision to an Administrative Law
Judge (AU), who reversed the initial denial. The Air Force
then appealed to the Industrial Commission's Board of
Review, which affirmed the ALJ's decision to grant
benefits.
The Air Force now seeks our review, challenging the
Board's decision on two grounds. First, the Air Force assails
the Board's factual findings that Swider ( 1) voluntarily
reported his drug use to the OSI and (2) was insulated from
discipline because he voluntarily entered a drug
rehabilitation program. [3} Further, the Air Force challenges
the Board's determination that Swider's actions were not
"culpable" for purposes of establishing a "just cause"
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termination.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This court's review of decisions of the Board of Review is
governed by provisions
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of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). That
act controls judicial review of formal adjudicative
proceedings, and requires reversal of a Board decision
when:
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the
law;

(g) the agency action is based on a determination of fact,
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) ( 1989).
Petitioner Air Force first challenges the correctness of the
Board's findings of fact. In accordance with the mandate
just quoted, this court grants great deference to an agency's
findings, and will uphold them if they are "supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court. 11 Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16{4)(g)
(1989). See Grace Drilling Co. v. Board ofReview, 776
P.2d 63, 67 (Utah App.1989). "Substantial evidence" has
been defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id.
at 68 (quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110
Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985)). In applying the
substantial evidence test, we review the "whole record"
before the court, and consider both evidence that supports
the Board's findings and evidence that fairly detracts from
them. Id. It is the petitioner's duty to properly present the
record, by marshaling all of the evidence supporting the
findings and showing that, despite that evidence and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Id See
Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464
(Utah App.1991); Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002
(Utah App.), cert. denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989).

conduct "affects the continuance of the employment
relationship." Utah Admin.Code R475•5b-102 (1990)
(defming "culpability"). In Morton Int'/, Inc. v. Utah State
Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme
Court held that where "there is a grant of discretion to the
agency concerning the language in question, either
expressly made in the statute or implied from the statutory
language," id at 589, the agency is entitled to a degree of
deference such that it should be affirmed if its decision is
reasonable and rational. Id We conclude the requisite grant
of discretion was made by the Legislature to the Board, as
evidenced by the statutory language permitting a denial of
benefits where a termination is for "just cause ... if so found
by the commission." Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-S(b)(l) (1991
Supp.) (emphasis added). See Tasters Ltd. v. Department of
Employment Sec.. 819 P.2d 361, 364-66 (Utah App.1991)
(recognizing similar language to constitute express grant of
discretion); Johnson-Bowles Co. v. Department of
Commerce, No. 900558, slip op. at 15-16, (Utah CtApp.
Nov. 29, 1991) (same). [4]
ANALYSIS
This court has previously recognized the Air Force's
legitimate interest in maintaining a drug-free work
environment, and its right to enforce its "zero tolerance"
drug policy. See, e.g., Department of Air Force v.
Department ofEmployment Sec.,
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786 P.2d 1361, 1364 n. 3 (Utah App.), cert. denied, United
States v. Industrial Comm'n, 195 P2d 1138 (1990). [5]
However, the question before us is not whether the Air
Force was, as a matter of basic employment law, within its
rights when it discharged Swider. Instead, we are asked to
decide the completely separate issue of whether the Board
could reasonably conclude Swider was not discharged for
•~ust cause" under the state's unemployment scheme, as
would warrant his deprivation of a terminated employee's
usual right to collect unemployment benefits. See Utah
Admin.Code R475-Sb-101 (1990). Accordingly, our
analysis is limited to a consideration of ( 1) whether the
Board of Review's factual findings concerning Swider's
activities while employed are supported by substantial
evidence in the record as a whole and (2) whether those
findings reasonably support the Board's conclusion that
Swider's discharge was not for "just cause," due to a lack of
culpability.
I. Findings Were Supported By Substantial Evidence

The Air Force's second claim--that the Board erred in
concluding Swider was not "culpable"-•tums to a
significant degree on factual findings concerning Swiders
conduct while employed, and on the extent to which we
should defer to the Board's determination of how that

In concluding Swider was discharged without just cause for
purposes of his entitlement to unemployment benefits, the
Board first compared Swider's conduct with that of the
claimant in an earlier case, in which the Board had atfrrmed
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a denial of unemployment benefits to one of Swider's
co-workers, Dennis L. Wagstaff. The Board in the instant
proceeding found that, in the Wagstaff matter, "the
employer had presented adequate evidence to support the
conclusion that the claimant voluntarily abused drugs while
on the Air Base, in violation of known rules which
prohibited such abuse." Further, Wagstaff "did not report
his drug usage or seek assistance to overcome the problem
of drug abuse."
The Board then distinguished between the instant case and
the Wagstaff case on two grounds, concluding that those
differences suggested a different result. First, the Board
found that while Wagstaff bad not voluntarily admitted bis
drug use to his employer, "the [Air Force] learned of
[Swider's] problem with drugs because the claimant himself
brought the matter to the attention of the proper
authorities." Second, the Board determined Swider bad
''volunteered for and was accepted into a drug rehabilitation
program approved by the Air Force," while Wagstaff had
not, and stated that "Air Force policy provides that
employees who seek the assistance of such a rehabilitation
program and remain drug free thereafter 'will not be subject
to disciplinary action.' " Given these distinguishing facts,
the Board concluded that Swider was eligible for
unemployment benefits even though it had determined his
co-worker, Wagstaff, was not. The Air Force now
challenges these two findings.
With regard to the first finding--that Swider brought his
drug use to the attention of Air Force investigators-the Air
Force expressly acknowledges that "on December 1, 1989,
Mr. Swider 'brought himself to the attention of the
authorities.' 11 Nonetheless, the Air Force attempts to
diminish the significance of Swider's admission by pointing
out that the admission occurred in December of
1989--several months after the OSI investigation had begun
bearing fruit, and one month after a co-employee bad
identified Swider as an on-base cocaine user. The Air Force
speculates that, given the timing of his confession to OSI
officials, Swider only turned himself in to speed the
inevitable. Be that as it may, the Board of Review could,
nonetheless, have been impressed by the simple fact that
Swider turned himself in at all, and an admission of any
kind does distinguish Swider's conduct from that of
Wagstaff. [6] Further, the Air Force's explanation
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for Swider's admission is wholly unsubstantiated in the
record. There is no evidence to suggest Swider came
forward simply to hasten the inevitable. In fact, there was
no evidence presented that Swider even knew he had been
implicated. The Board was entitled to find that Swider came
forward to gain Air Force protection after receiving the
death threats. Because it is uncontroverted that Swider

volm1tarily confessed his past drug use to OSI agents, we
uphold the Board's finding on that issue.
Second, the Air Force claims the Board wrongly
interpreted Air Force policy in finding that Swider's
voluntary enrollment in a drug rehabilitation program
protected him from disciplinary action. In making its
finding of disciplinary immunity, the Board relied on a May
1989 notice circulated by the Air Force to all civilian
employees at Hill Air Force Base. The notice informed
employees that a drug testing program would be
implemented no sooner than sixty days from the date of the
letter, and continued, with our emphasis:
While the Air Force cannot tolerate the use of illegal drugs,
we encourage any employee who has a substance abuse
problem to seek appropriate counseling and rehabilitation
assistance. Employees who voluntarily identify themselves
as having an illegal drug problem within the timeftames
established by the program, seek counseling, or
rehabilitation, agree to a last chance agreement and refrain
from using illegal drugs will not be subject to disciplinary
action.
The Air Force claims that the phrase "timeframes
established by the program" refers to the sixty-day period
between the date of the notice and the commencement of
the drug testing program. Since Swider did not come
forward m1til some eight months after the date of the letter,
the Air Force asserts, he did not fall within the sixty-day
"window" and could therefore be disciplined. That assertion
is incorrect The letter stated only that the program would
be implemented in a minimum of sixty days; it made no
reference to the sixty-day period being a "window" of
immunity, after which period an employee could be
tenninated regardless. [7] Further, it is impossible to
reconcile the Air Force's position with the letter's statement
that the program, which was being announced
prospectively, was to establish the time frame for
disciplinary immunity. We do not understand how, when
the program was to establish the time frame, the Air Force
can plausibly contend that the time frame ended before the
program was implemented. Accordingly, we reject the
challenge to the Board's finding in this regard.
For the above-mentioned reasons, we hold that there is
substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the
Board's findings which are challenged by the Air Force in
this appeal.
II. Respondent Was Not Culpable

Rule 475-Sb-101 of the Utah Administrative Code states
that an employee is ineligible to receive unemployment
benefits when the employee has been terminated for "just
cause," i.e., when the "job separation ... is necessary due to
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the seriousness of actual or potential hann to the employer."
Rule 475-Sb-102 then sets forth the three factors which
establish just cause, and which are necessary for a
determination of ineligibility for unemployment

continued or repeated. He caused the on-base drug use of
his co-workers to be called to the attention of the proper
authorities. He also entered and completed a voluntary drug
rehabilitation program.

Pag:e4S4

Given Swider's exemplary work history, his demonstrated
desire to distance himself from drugs, and evidence
indicating Swider's past drug use was an isolated incident, it
was reasonable and rational for the Board to conclude
Swider's conduct was not sufficiently culpable to render his
termination one for "just cause" for purposes of
adjudicating his entitlement to unemployment benefits.

insurance benefits. Those factors are: ( 1) knowledge on the
part of the employee as to the conduct the employer
expected, (2) conduct that was within the employee's power
and capacity to control, and (3) culpability. It is
uncontrovcrted that Swider's conduct satisfied the clements
of knowledge and control. Therefore, we consider only
whether he was culpable.
Culpability is defined in Rule 475-Sb-102 as
the seriousness of the conduct or the severity of the offense
as it affects continuance of the employment relationship.
The discharge must have been necessary to avoid actual or
potential harm to the employers rightful interests. A
discharge would not be considered 11necessary" if it is not
consistent with reasonable employment practices.

CONCLUSION
There was substantial evidence in the record to support the
Board's findings of fact. Further, it was reasonable for the
Board to conclude that Swider's conduct lacked culpability,
as the tenn is used in the regulations of the Department of
Employment Security. Accordingly, we affirm the Board's
decision.

~

JACKSON and RUSSON, JJ., concur.

Utah Admin.Code R475-5b-102 (1990). In determining if
certain conduct is culpable, Rule 475-Sb-102 states:
Notes:
The wrongness of the conduct must be considered in the
context of the particular employment and how it affects the
employer's rights. If the conduct was an isolated incident of
poor judgment and there is no expectation that the conduct
will be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be
shown and therefore it is not necessary to discharge the
employee.
Id. Further, the rule emphasizes that "longevity and prior
work record are important in determining if the act or
omission is an isolated incident or a good faith error in
judgment." Id.
Swider was employed by the Air Force for almost twenty
years. During that time he received twenty awards and
commendations for his work performance, consistently
received laudatory appraisals from his superiors, and was
never subjected to discipline prior to bis termination. He
acted in important additional capacities at the base, serving
as an alternate supervisor and a Hazardous Waste Site
Monitor. Swider's supervisor testified that he was unaware
of any specific problem resulting from Swider's work, much
less from his smoking marijuana on vacation. The
supervisor also testified that Swider's work was dependable,
and that Swider had always seemed quite capable of
performing his duties. The Board believed that, with the
exception of an isolated incident of marijuana use in May of
1989, he had been completely drug free for eight months. It
was reasonable for the Board to have concluded there was
no expectation that Swider's drug use would have been

[ 1] It is not altogether clear why. if he had been drug-free
for so long, Swider elected to enter a drug rehabilitation
program at this time.
[2] Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-S(b)(l) (1991 Supp.) disallows
unemployment benefits to those "discharged for just cause
. .. if so found by the commission."

[3] The Air Force also refers repeatedly to evidence of
on-base cocaine use by Swider, and questions why both the
AU and the Board of Review failed to aclmowledge Swider
had used cocaine while on base. The Air Force presumes
the incriminating evidence was improperly excluded as
hearsay, and claims it should have been admitted as an
admission by a party opponent under Utah R.Evid.
80l(d)(2). We agree that at least some of the inculpatory
evidence falls within the scope of Rule 801(d)(2), but do
not agree it was excluded for evidentiary reasons. Instead, it
appears the ALJ and Board decided not to believe it. The
AU stated that 11 [t]hc evidence in this case is in dispute as
to whether or not the claimant actually used a controlled
substance on Hill Air Force Base premises. The Air Force
Office of Special Investigations Report contained some
discrepancies as far as dates and informational data. The
claimant emphatically denies using cocaine on the
employer's premises." The AU and Board were not
obligated to credit the OSI report or third-person testimony
over Swider's own testimony; they were free to believe
Swider, as they apparently did. See Hurley v. Board of
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Review, 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 1988) (an agency's
findings of fact are accorded substantial deference, and
"will not be overturned if based on substantial evidence,
even if another conclusion from the evidence is

permissible").
[4] Prior to Morton Int'l, we would also have concluded the
Board's decision was entitled to this same degree of
deference but would have reached that conclusion by
focusing more on the Board's expertise and experience than
on the nature of the Legislature's grant of authority to the
Board. See, e.g., Taylor v. Utah State Training School, 775
P.2d 432, 434 (Utah App.1989) (when an agency decision
involves application of the relevant rules oflaw to the facts,
"a [reviewing] court should afford great deference to the
technical expertise or more extensive experience of the
responsible agency11) ( quoting Department of Admin. Servs.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 1983)).

Go

~

(5) The Air Force's interest has been deemed "especially
imperative" where its employees are engaged in sensitive,
highly technical tasks, such as assembling or repairing jet
aircraft. See Department of Air Force, 786 P.2d at 1364.
See also Johnson v. Department of Employment Sec., 782
P.2d 965, 972 (Utah App.1989) (Orme, J., concurring) (a
government contractor constructing national defense
products "is entitled to insist, in an aggressive and
uncompromising way, on an absolutely drug-free workforce
and not merely a drug~free workplace ").

[6] Moreover, the Board may have been impressed by
Swider's prior disclosure to Brown of cocaine use in his
work area, and his express authorization that she pass the
information along to his supervisor. Although, by
emphasizing that Swider turned himself in, the Board's
finding does not appear to place any significance on his
"whistle-blowing," the clear causal link would not have
escaped the Board's attention. The "whistle-blowing" led to
the death threats, which led to Swider's referral to OSI,
which led to his disclosure to OSI that he had smoked
marijuana while on vacation some months previous.
[7] Additional language in the letter supports this position:
However, if an employee is otherwise determined to use
illegal drugs, he or she will be subject to disciplinary action,
including possible removal from Federal service. Once this
program is implemented, removal action will be proposed
for any employee receiving a second positive [urine] test,
refusing to obtain counseling or rehabilitation after being
found to use illegal drugs, or adulterating or substituting a
[urine] specimen.
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939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997)
Barbara DRAKE, Respondent,

v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Utah, and Transamerica

OF UTAH, FHP of

Insurance Company, Petitioners.

No. 950475.
Supreme Court of Utah.

accident, FHP began to experience delays with its normal
courier in the delivery of referrals to Salt Lake from various
offices around the state. Because Drake lived in Ogden,
Drake's supervisor asked her to pick up the referrals from
the Ogden office two or three days a week on her way
home. At the same time, she was also directed to deliver
any completed referrals going to Ogden. On the days she
made deliveries, Drake took a five- to six-mile detour from
her nonnal route home. Drake was never compensated for
her mileage in making these deliveries, nor was she given
any extra compensation when the deliveries required her to
work more than her eight-hour work day. [2]
On August 14, 1991, shortly after Drake bad dropped off
the referrals at the Ogden office, as she was on her way to
pick up her children at their child-care center, Drake was
involved in an automobile accident, causing her substantial
injuries. Upon denial of coverage
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by her automobile insurance carrier, Drake applied to the
Industrial Commission for workers' compensation benefits
under Utah Code Ann.§ 35-1-45. [3]
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James R Hasenyager, Ogden, for Drake.

Alan Hennebold. Salt Lake City, for Industrial
Commission.
Theodore E. Kanell, Todd N. Hallock, Salt Lake City, for
Transamerica Insurance and FHP.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

After a hearing, the administrative law judge (AU) for the
Industrial Commission found that Drake's injuries arose out
of and in the course of her employment. The AU found that
although workers' compensation benefits are generally
denied for injuries sustained on the way to or from work,
Drake was on a "special errand" and had deviated from her
normal route home for the benefit of her employer;
therefore, she was still within the course of her employment
at the time of her accident. Accordingly, the AU granted
Drake's claim for benefits.

DURHAM, Justice:
We granted certiorari in this case to review the Utah Court
of Appeals' decision in Drake v. Industrial Commission,
904 P.2d 203 (Ct.App.1995), cert. granted, 913 P.2d 749
(Utah 1996), reversing the Industrial Commission and
granting workers' compensation benefits to Barbara Drake
for injuries she sustained in an automobile accident.
Petitioners Industrial Commission of Utah, FHP of Utah,
and Transamerica Insurance Company (collectively referred
to as FHP) contend that the court of appeals applied the
wrong standard when it reviewed the Commission's
decision and erred in awarding benefits. We agree and

reverse.
The facts in this case are undisputed. At the time of her
accident, Drake was employed by FHP as a referral
coordinator [ 1] in its Salt Lake City office. At some point
during her employment, but several months before Drake's

Upon motion for review, the Industrial Commission
reversed the decision of the AU. Although the Commission
adopted the .AL.rs findings of fact, it detennined that Drake
was not on a special errand when she delivered the referrals.
It concluded that the deliveries were part of Drake's regular
duties because they were "according to routine." It thus
denied benefits pursuant to the recognized "going and
coming rule, 11 finding that once Drake left the Ogden office,
her activities no longer took place in the course of her

employment [4]
On petition for review, the court of appeals reversed. The
court began its analysis by stating, "Whether petitioner was
injured in the scope and course of her employment presents
a question of law which, absent a grant of discretion, this
court reviews for correctness." Drake, 904 P .2d at 205
(citing Morton Int'/, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of State Tax
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991)). The court then
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relied specifically upon Stokes v. Industrial Commission,
832 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah.Ct.App.1992), which found that the
Commission did not have any discretion to interpret or
apply the Workers' Compensation Act. [S] The court then
concluded from the facts of the case that Drake's accident
did occur while she was still on a special errand. The court
relied upon the following facts: (1) Drake "undertook the
delivery of referrals between Ogden and Salt Lake City at
the request of FHP solely to remedy a problem with FHP's
shuttle system"; (2) these deliveries often required Drake to
work beyond her regularly scheduled hours; (3) the
deliveries required Drake to "make a five-to six-mile detour
from her normal route home"; and (4) "FHP •.• benefitted by
having a referral system that operated in a timely manner. 11
Drake, 904 P.2d at 206-07. The court found insubstantial
the fact that Drake had been delivering these referrals
regularly two or three times a week for several months
before her accident Id. at 207. It specifically stated that
whether the deliveries were part of Drake's regular job
duties was 11 a conclusion of law" and found that the special
errand exception 11does not require [one-time occurrences]
in order for the injured employee to recover." Id.
On certiorari, FHP does not argue that the court of appeals
failed to apply the correct legal principles, but contends that
it applied the wrong standard of review when it reviewed
the Co~ion's detennination that Drake's delivery was
not special but was part

Page 181

~

of her normal job duties. The Commission argues that this
determination is a fmding of fact and thus the court of
appeals erred in applying a "correction of error" standard
applicable to questions of law rather than "the absence of
substantial evidence" standard employed for the review of
questions of fact. Moreover, because Drake did not
challenge any of the Commission's findings of fact, FHP
argues that the court of appeals was required to accept the
Commission's finding that the deliveries were part of
Drake's normal job duties as conclusive and erred when it
reviewed it de novo.
Essential to any determination of the appropriate standard
of review for an issue on appeal is the characterization of
that issue as either a question of fact, a question of law, or a
mixed question requiring application of the law to the facts.
Where the issue is purely factual, appellate review is highly
deferential, requiring reversal only if a finding is clearly
erroneous. See State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah
1996). When reviewing the factual findings made by an
administrative agency, an appellate court will generally
reverse only if the findings are not supported by substantial
evidence. See Olsen v. Industrial Comm'n, 191 P.2d 1098,
1099 (Utah 1990); Helf v. Industrial Comm'n, 901 P.2d
l024, 1026 (Utah.Ct.App.1995); see also Utah Code Ann. §

63-46b-16(4)(g). We give deference to the initial decision
maker on questions of fact because it stands in a superior
position from which to evaluate and weigh the evidence and
assess the credibility and accuracy of witnesses'
recollections. See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah
1994). Where the issue is a question of law, however,
appellate review gives no deference to the trial judge's or
agencys determination, because the appellate court has "the
power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it
is uniform throughout the jurisdiction." Id. (citation
omitted). The reviewing court therefore applies a
"correctness" standard, deciding the matter for itself. Id.
However, not all issues fall clearly at one end of the
spectrum or the other. Some issues involve mixed questions
of "whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a
given rule of law .11 Id. Although we review the underlying
empirical facts under a deferential clear error standard, we
have recently stated that the legal effect of those facts 11is
the province of the appellate courts, and no deference need
be given a trial court's resolution of such questions of law."
State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 1994).
Nevertheless, in view of our analysis in Pena, policy
considerations and other factors may "lead this court to
define a legal standard so that it actually grants some
operational discretion to the trial courts applying it" Id. at
282 (citing Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36). As a result, a trial
court's or agency's application of the law to the facts may,
depending on the issue, be reviewed by an appellate court
"with varying degrees of strictness, falling anywhere
between a review for 'correctness' and a broad 'abuse of
discretion' standard." Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc.,
307 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4, --- P.2d --, ---- (Utah Dec. 31,
1996) (citing Pena, 869 P.2d at 936-39). (6]

In applying these principles to the instant case, although
the empirical facts of Drake's case are reviewable for clear
error, the conclusion as to whether those facts qualify Drake
for workers' compensation benefits under the special errand
rule is reviewable for correctness. Because the underlying
and historical facts of this case were undisputed, [7]
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our inquiry focuses on the degree of discretion that the
legal standard for the special errand rule bestows upon the
Commission. In other words, how closely should this court
review the Commission's conclusion that a given set of facts
does or does not constitute a "special errand"? Given the
nature of the legal issue, we conclude that the legal standard
is one that "conveys a measure of discretion to [the
Commission} when applying that standard to a given set of
facts. 11 Pena, 869 P.2d at 939.
Scope-of-employment issues are in general highly
fact-dependent. Indeed, our prior case law recognizes that
nwhether or not the injury arises out of or within the scope
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of employment depends upon the particular facts of each
case." State Tax Comm'n, 685 P.2d at 1053. Whether an
employee was injured while on a special errand is also
highly fact-sensitive. As a result, we arc less inclined to
formulate and impose a fact-specific rule of law because of
the likelihood that no rule can be formulated that wil1
adequately address all potential facts in these cases. See
P~ 869 P.2d at 939. Thus,' this is a question that "we
cannot profitably review de novo in every case because we
cannot hope to work out a coherent statement of the law
through a course of such decisions." Id. at 938 (describing
why deference needs to be given to trial court when
applying highly fact-dependent doctrine of waiver to set of
facts); see also Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d
61, 65 (Utah.ClApp.1994) (holding that broadened grant of
discretion should be given to trial court on application of
equitable estoppel doctrine to varying facts).

In addition, this court bas had few occasions to address
particular fact situations to which the special errand rule
arguably applies. It is therefore even more unlikely that we
could "spell out in detail a legal rule that will adequately
anticipate the facts that should be outcome determinative if
the policy of the legal rule is to be served." Vincent, 883
P.2d at 282 (citing Pena, 869 P.2d at 939). This
consideration should not, however, preclude an appellate
court from narrowing the deference given to the
Commission once a serviceable standard has emerged.
While we are therefore disposed to give heightened
deference to the Commission, policy considerations compel
us to exercise some scrutiny. The Workers' Compensation
Act was enacted to provide economic protection for
employees who sustain injuries arising out of thc:ir
employment, therefore "alleviat[ing] hardship upon workers
and their families." Bakerv. lndustrial Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d
141, 405 P.2d 613, 614 (1965). We have held that "[t]o give
effect to that purpose, the Act should be liberally construed
and applied to provide coverage" and that 11 [ a]ny doubt
respecting the right of compensation will be resolved in
favor of the injured employee. 11 State Tar Comm 'n v.
Industrial Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984).
With this standard in mind, we now tum to the instant case
and determine whether the court of appeals, despite
enunciating the wrong standard of review, nevertheless
anived at the correct result.
As noted previously, this court has had few occasions to

review the special errand exception; only one decision
offers any lengthy discussion. That case, State Tax
Commission v. Industrial Commission, 685 P .2d 1OS 1 {Utah
1984), concerned an employee who was injured on her way
to a two-month training seminar. The issue was whether her
travel was excepted from the general rule that injuries
suffered while going to or from work are not within the

co\U'Se of employment and thus not compensable under
workers' compensation laws. See Higgins v. Industrial
Comm'n, 700 P.2d 704, 707 (Utah 1985). This general
"coming and going" rule arose because, "in most instances,
such an injury is suffered as a consequence of risks and
hazards to which all members of the traveling public are
subject rather than risks and hazards having to do with and
originating in the worlc or business of the employer." 82
Am.Jur.2d Workers'

~
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Compensation § 296 (1992). [8] We noted in State Tax
Commission, however, that the emergent trend in cases
dealing with injuries that occur during an employee's travel
to employment-related educational seminars or training
programs is to find an employment connection if the travel
can be deemed an "act outside an employee's regular duties
which is undertaken in good faith to advance the employer's
interests, whether or not the employee's own assigned work
is thereby furthered.'' 685 P.2d at 1054 (citing IA Arthur
Larson, Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law § 27.00
(1982)). We also cited to the rule set forth in Dimmig v.
Workmen~ Compensation Appeals Board, 6 Cal.3d 860,
101 Cal.Rptr. 10S, 111, 495 P.2d 433, 439 (1972), which
dealt with a similar situation:
The rule which emerges ... is that when the employee
engages in a special activity which is within the COW'Se of
his employment, and which is reasonably undertaken at the
request or invitation of the employer, any injury suffered
while traveling to and from the place of such activity is also
within the course of employment and is compensable.
The instant case, however, presents a different situation
than traveling to a training program or educational seminar,

which is more appropriately labeled a ''special activity" or
an "outside activity at employer's request." Although an
employee should still show that the activity was incidental
to the employment and that it was undertaken for the
benefit and under the direction of the employer, we think
more legal guidance must be given when considering
whether an actual errand, which has been undertaken two or
three times a week for several months, may still be deemed
"special."
Other jurisdictions, in determining whether an errand on
the way to or from work was a "special errand," have
focused on the language in section 16.11 of Larson's
treatise:
When an employee, having identifiable time and space
limits on his employment, makes an off-premises journey
which would nonnally not be covered under the usual going
and coming rule, the journey may be brought within the
course of employment by the fact that the trouble and time
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of making the journey, or the special inconvenience, hazard,
or urgency of making it in the particular circumstances, is
itself sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an integral part
of the service itself.
1 Arthur Larson, Larson's Law of Workmen's
Compensation§ 16.11, at 4-204 (1996) (citations omitted).

Larson goes on to explain several variables that the case
law indicates may be useful in resolving difficult cases. Id.
§ 16.13, at 4-208.23 to 4-208.27. First, the court must
consider the "relative regularity or unusualness of the
particular journey." Larson explains that "if [the journey] is
relatively regular, whether every day, ... or at frequent
intervals, ... the case begins with a strong presumption that
the employee's going and coming trip is expected to be no
different from that of any other employee with reasonably
regular hours and place of work." Id. at 4-208.24 to
4-208.26.
Indeed,
in
Lundberg
v.
Cream
O'Weber/Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 16, 465
P.2d 175, 176 ( 1970), we declined to find that an employee
had engaged in a special errand where the activity, travel to
an early morning meeting, was not an 11 unusual occurrence."
Second, the relative burden or "onerousness11 of the journey
on the employee should be compared with the extent of the
task to be perfonned at the end of the journey. Larson,
supra, § 16.13, at 4-208.26. Larson provides the following
example:
If a janitor walks five blocks to spend two hours working at
a church in the evening, it would be difficult to conclude

that the journey is a significant part of the total service. But
if a janitor makes a longer
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journey merely to spend one instant turning on the lights, it
is easier to say that the essence of the service was the
making of the journey.
Id. The "onerousness" of the journey takes into account not
only the length of the journey, but also any other
circumstances under which it is made, e.g., conditions of
travel, time of day, or day of week.
Third, although not present in this case, the suddenness of
the assignment from the employer should also be
considered. Id. For example, if an employee must suddenly
drop everything to travel at the employer's request, then that
indicates that the travel itself could be part of the service
rendered. Id. Although the urgency of the travel is not
decisive on its own, all these factors are to be considered in
the overall analysis of "whether the journey was itself a
substantial part of the service for which the claimant was
employed and compensated." Id.

FHP contends, and the Commission agreed, that Drake's
delivery of the referrals was insufficiently "special." The
Commission, without elaboration, found that the deliveries
were performed according to routine and thus had become a
regular part of her work activities. Under the standard
enunciated above, we defer to the Commission's decision
and accord a strong presumption that the deliveries were not

"special."
The court of appeals held, however, that the regularity of
the travel was not a conclusive factor. It relied on State Tax
Commission, 685 P.2d at 1054-SS, where we granted
benefits to an employee who had been traveling the same
journey every day for two months. However, the employee
in State Tax Commission was traveling to a one-time
training seminar. Without any evidence that FHP planned to
change its existing delivecy system in the near future and
thus relieve Drake of delivery duty, we do not regard State
Tax Commission as controlling on this issue. The court of
appeals also cited Avila v. Pleasuretime Soda, Inc., 90 N.M.
707, 568 P.2d 233 (App.1977), wherein the New Mexico
Court of Appeals granted compensation to an employee
who was injured on her way home from making a night
deposit, a task she performed every workday, finding that it
constituted a special errand. Although this case is helpful,
we do not find its rationale to be dispositive. Even though
the Avila court noted that the night deposits were an
everyday occurrence. it was persuaded by other factors.
mainly that the employee had to make a deviation from her
personal route home to make the deposits. In citing sections
19.36 and 19.37 of Larson's treatise, dealing with business
detours from personal trips and the return from business
detours, the court found that because the employee was
injured while making her way back from the business
detour to her personal route, the injuries were incurred
within the nscope and course of her employer's business.n
Id.• 568 P.2d at 234, 236.
The parties in this case have not referenced these sections
of Larson's treatise on deviations, and it is not clear that this
issue was a central one for the Commission. In any event,
we are persuaded on balance that we should defer to the
Commission's decision that the deliveries were not "special
errands" at all but were part of Drake's regular duties. As a
result, she did not "deviate" from her normal route home
when she drove to the Ogden office, but rather, on two or
three days a week, her normal route home started from
there. Moreover, we cannot say that the five or six miles
added to the journey were substantial enough to make the
journey a significant part of the service. As a result, the
injuries that Drake suffered after she left the Ogden offices
were those to which any member of the traveling public
was subject "rather than any risks or hazards having to do
with and originating in the work or business of the
employer." The court of appeals' decision is therefore
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reversed.
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., and HOWE and RUSSON, JJ.,
concur.
STEWART, Associate C.J., dissents.

Notes:

[I] Referrals are documents that authorize clients ofFHP's
health care system to seek treatment from physicians
outside the FHP system.
(2) The record is silent as to whether FHP anticipated that
Drake would continue to make these deliveries indefinitely
or whether it would eventually correct the problem with its
existing courier and no longer need her help.
[3] Section 35-1-45 of the Workers' Compensation Act
provides in part:
Each employee ... who is injured ... by accident arising out
of and in the course ofhis [orher) employment, wherever
such injury occurred, if the accident was not pwposely
self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained
on account of the injury, ... and such amount for medical,
nurse, and hospital services and medicines ... as provided in
this chapter.
[4] The Commission also held that even if the deliveries
did constitute a "special errand,11 her travel to her children's

In determining whether the Commission correctly applied
the findings of basic facts to the legal rules governing the
case, we will uphold the Commission, so long as its
decision was reasonable in light of the language of the
statute, the purpose it aims to achieve and the public policy
behind it.

However, we believe the Pena standard is a more accurate
measure of the degree of deference to be given to an
agency, taking into account factors such as policy concerns
and an agency's expertise rather than using undefinable
labels such as "reasonableness."
[7] We are unpersuaded by FHP's arguments that whether
Drake's errands were part of her ordinary job duties is a
pure question of fact. The detennination in this case is not,
as FHP argues, what Drake did each day, for it is
undisputed that Drake actually delivered the referrals two to
three times a week. The Commission had to decide whether
these activities fall under the legal rule termed 11special
errands," which requires some legal analysis.
(8) We stated in Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life
Insurance Co., 801 P.2d 934, 937 (Utah 1989), that 11 the
major focus in determining whether or not the general
[coming and going] rule should apply ... is on the benefit
the employer receives and his control over the conduct.11
However, that case dealt with the liability of the employer
in tort for his employee's acts. Although the control the
employer exercises and the benefit the employer receives
are factors, we do not think that either is necessarily
decisive.

~

child care constituted a personal deviation from this errand
and therefore would also exempt her from benefits. On
review, the court of appeals also reversed this finding. FHP
correctly contends, however, that the only issue on
certiorari is whether the court of appeals applied the correct
standard of review, and we do not address any other issues.
[5] The court of appeals did recognize, however, that it had
recently stated in VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Commission,
901 P.2d 281 (CtApp.), cert. denied, 910 P.2d 426 (Utah
1995), that an agency's application of the law to the facts
should be upheld " 'unless its determination exceeds the
bounds of reasonableness and rationality.' " The court,
however, refused to resolve the apparent conflict between
the standards but indicated instead that the result in this
case would be the same under either standard. Drake, 904
P.2d at 205 n. 2.
[6] We recognize that the standard enunciated in Pena as
applied to an agency's application of the law to a particular
set of facts is a departure from our prior decisions. For
example, in State Tax Commission v. Industrial
Commi.rsion, 685 P.2d 1051, 1052 (Utah 1984), we stated:
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a " go between" or intermediary between Evolocitys clients
and its website designers and website-marketing workers.
Colbert was a teacher at the time and had no previous
experience working with website services.
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Vincent C. Rampton. Attorney for Petitioner.

Kathleen Bounous, Attorney for Respondent, Department
of Workforce Services.
David J. Holdsworth, Attorney for Respondent, Deabra C.
Colbert.

[13] When Colbert began working for Evolocity, she signed
a contract indicating that she was an independent
contractor. She received training from Evolocity on the
operation of its " Steel Jaws" software, which Evolocity's
workers were required to use to communicate with and
track the worlc: performed for Evolocitys clients. After her
training, Colbert worked from her own home office. Colbert
used her own computer, but Evolocity provided access to
the Steel Jaws software and other software Colbert needed.
Colbert received payment from Evolocity in the form of a
biweekly retainer, which was akin to a set salary. Colbert's
payments from Evolocity did not vary based on the quantity
or quality of work she performed unless she was penalized
by Evolocity for poor work performance.

[,r4] During the time she worked for Evolocity, Colbert
never fonned a business, though she did keep records of her
business expenses for tax purposes. Colbert worked
full-time for Evolocity and did not perform website
marketing or other similar services for other clients during
this time.

Original Proceeding in this Court

[15] After a number of years, Colbert's working relationship
with Evolocity came to an end. Colbert filed for
unemployment benefits with the Department. Evolocity
challenged Colbert's entitlement to unemployment benefits,
arguing that Colbert was an independent contractor, not an
employee. An administrative law judge determined that,
notwithstanding the form of Colbert's employment contract,
she was Evolocity's employee. Evolocity appealed that
decision to the Department's appeals board, which affmned
the administrative law judge's decision. Evolocity now
seeks judicial review of the Department's final decision.

CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this
Opinion, in which SENIOR JUDGES RUSSELL W.
BENCH and JUDITH M. BILLINGS concurred.[l]
OPINION
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[11 Evolocity, Inc. challenges the Department of
Workforce Services' detennination that Deabra C. Colbert
was an employee ofEvolocity rather than an independent
contractor. We decline to disturb the Department's decision.
BACKGROUND
[12] Evolocity provides website design and marketing
services for healthcare providers.[2] Evolocity operates
largely through a system of what it terms independent
contractors. who perform the company's programming and
website-marketing work. Colbert was approached by her
neighbor-Evolocity's owner•-who offered her a position as

Evolocity first argues that the Department's
determination that Colbert was not an independent
contractor is unsupported by the evidence in the record. The
determination whether a claimant is an independent
contractor involves a fact-sensitive inquiry into the unique
facts of a particular employment relationship. SeeBMS Ltd.
/999, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2014 UT
App 111, 'ti 13, 327 P.3d 578. Because

[16]
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this inquiry " will differ in every case due to the
individuality of fact patterns and the vagaries of various

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11-

vocations," we grant deference to the Department in its
weighing of the relevant factors to anive at its ultimate
decision. Id. And we will disturb that decision only if it is
clearly erroneous or falls outside the scope of the afforded
deference. SeeCarbon County v. Workforce Appeals Bd.,
2013 UT 41, 'ti 1 22-23, 308 P.3d 477; see alsoln re
adoption of Baby B., 2012 UT 35, 1 46, 308 P.3d 382
(explaining that a " fact-like" mixed finding is " entitled to
deference and would be properly affirmed on appeal if not
clearly erroneous" ). " To establish clear error, the
challenging party must show that a finding is not supported
by legally sufficient evidence even when the evidence is
viewed in a light most favorable to the fmding. 1' State v.
Cater, 2014 UT App 207, 1 10, 336 P.3d 32. We do not
reweigh the evidence or substitute our decision for that of
the Department but instead will uphold its determinations if
they are supported by the record evidence. Cf.Migliaccio v.
Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT App 51, 17,298 P.3d 676.

[17) In addressing this issue, we review the Department's
subsidiary legal conclusions for correctness and its
underlying factual findings for the support of substantial
evidence. Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181
(Utah 1997); seeMu"ay v. I.Abor Comm'n, 2013 UT 38, 1 ,I
19, 21,308 P.3d461.

[18)

Evolocity also argues that the Department's
governing an
interpretation of the regulations
independent-contractor determination rendered those
regulations unconstitutionally vague and thereby violated
Evolocitys right to due process. 11 Constitutional issues,
including questions regarding due process, are questions of
law .... " Summerhaze Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
2014 UT 28, 'ii 8, 332 P.3d 908 {citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). We therefore decide Evolocity's
constitutional challenge as a matter oflaw. Jd.[3]
ANALYSIS
I. The Department1s Determination Is Supported by the
Evidence and Entitled to Deference.

['119) Evolocity first argues that the Department's
detennination that Colbert was an employee, rather than an
independent contractor, is not supported by the record
evidence. Under Utah's Employment Security Act, "
[f]onner
employees
are generally eligible for
unemployment benefits while independent contractors are
not" BMS Ltd. 1999, Inc. v. Department of Workforce
Servs., 2014 TIT App 111, ,i 6, 327 P.3d 578. For purposes
of establishing entitlement to unemployment benefits, "
Utah law presumes that a paid or contracted worker is an
employee unless the putative employer can demonstrate that
the worker (I) is independently established in work of the
same nature and (2) has been free from control or direction
over the means of performing the work." Id. (citing Utah

Code Ann. § 35A-4-204{3) (LexisNexis 2011) and Utah
Admin. Code R994-204-303)." Special scrutiny of the facts
is required to assure that the form of a service relationship
does not obscure its substance .•.." Utah Ad.min. Code
R994-204-303. If an employer fails to demonstrate either
independent establishment or freedom from control, the
worker is considered an employee and may be entitled to
unemployment benefits. Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-204(3).
We first address the Department's determination that
Colbert was not independently established in work of the
same nature as she performed for Evolocity.

[11 O]

1
'

An independent contractor is a worker who is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, profession, or business of the same nature as
the
services
perfonned."
Utah
Admin.
Code
R994-204-301(1). " [A]n independently established trade,
occupation, profession, or business is created and exists
apart from a relationship with a particular employer and
does not depend on a relationship with any one employer
for its continued existence." Id. R994-204-303(1)(a). In
evaluating whether a claimant is independently established,
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the Utah Administrative Code sets forth seven factors to be
used by the Department as " aids in the analysis of the facts
of each case." Id. R994-204-303.[4] However, the
regulations also recognize that " [t]he degree of importance
of each factor varies depending on" the nature of the work
performed and that " some factors do not apply to certain
services and ... should not be considered." Id.

['1'11] Here, the Department detennined that two of the
factors-whether the claimant had a separate place of
business and maintained records for business-tax
purposes--were established by the evidence. And the
Department determined that a third factor--whether the
claimant had obtained required or customary business
licenses-was not applicable under these circumstances.
Evolocity has not challenged these determinations, and we
therefore consider Evolocity's challenges to the remaining
four factors.[5]

<iJ

A. Tools and Equipment

[112] Evolocity first argues that the Department
erroneously determined that Colbert did not provide her
own tools and equipment.[6) This factor asks whether the
claimant " has a substantial investment in the tools,
equipment, or facilities customarily required to perform the
services." Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(l)(b)(ii).
Evolocity notes that II for the most part, Ms. Colbert used
her own computer, used her own telephone service, used
her own internet service, and used her own other related
equipment." Evolocity concedes, however, that it had
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furnished some equipment and software to Colbert, most
notably access to the company's Steel Jaws software, which
Colbert was required to use to communicate with
Evolocitys clients and track the work she had performed
each day. The Department detennined that Colbert's
purchase of a computer, telephone service, and internet
service did not constitute a " substantial investment'' in the
tools required to do her work, because those purchases were
"typical household expenses," the costs of which were "
quite low." The Department found, moreover, that these
purchases did not constitute all of the tools Colbert needed
for her job and that the balance of those tools-a headset,
the Steel Jaws software, and other business software--wcre
provided to her by Evolocity.
['tfl3] Evolocity has not demonstrated that the Department's
detennination on this point lacks evidentiary support when
the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the
Department's determination. Evolocity does not address the
Department's determination that Colbert's purchase of a
computer and telecommunications services are merely "
household expenses." And Evolocity has not explained how
the Department's detennination is clearly C1TOneous in light
of the evidence that Evolocity supplied the software
necessary for Colbert to perform her work. Accordingly, we
conclude that Evolocity has failed to demonstrate error in
the Department's determination on this point.

B. Other Clients

C. Advertising

['tf l 6] Evolocity also argues that the Department erred in
determining that Colbert did not advertise her services to
generate business. This factor is satisfied if the claimant ti
advertises services" by any method ti clearly demonstrating
an effort to generate business. ti Utah Admin. Code
R994-204-303(l)(b)(v). Evolocity asserts that Colbert
advertised through interpersonal " networking" by speaking
to friends and neighbors about her work and inviting several
of them to work for Evolocity. However, evidence that she
solicited others to work for Evolocity does not demonstrate
" an effort to generate business" of her own. Id. Evolocity
has identified no evidence that Colbert advertised in any
medium in an effort to generate business for herself.
[117] Evolocity faults the Department for focusing on
whether Colbert actually advertised rather than whether she
could have advertised her services. However, again, the
plain language of the rule dictates precisely the inquiry
undertaken by the Department: whether the claimant "
advertises services," not whether the claimant is free to
advertise her services. Id. Thus, we see no error in the
Department's determination on this factor.

D. Profit or Loss

[114] Evolocity next argues that the Department erred in
determining that Colbert

~

determination is neither contrary to law nor contrary to the
record evidence, and Evolocity bas not demonstrated error
on this point.
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did not perform work for clients other than Evolocity. This
factor asks whether the claimant " regularly perfonns
services of the same nature for other customers or clients
and is not required to work exclusively for one employer."
Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(1 )(b)(iii). Evolocity ftrst
observes that Colbert worked part-time for the United States
Census Bureau for three months. However, Evolocity bas
directed us to no record evidence that Colbert's work for the
census bureau was " of the same nature" as the work she
performed for Evolocity. Id. Accordingly, the fact that
Colbert worked part-time for the census bureau does not
undermine the Department's determination.
[115] Evolocity also asserts that Colbert was free to work
for other clients and argues that requiring an employer to
demonstrate that a claimant has actually worked for other
clients is " an unreasonable requirement" that is " clearly
outside the law." However, the plain language of the
regulation asks not whether a claimant is free to perform
work for other clients but whether the claimant " regularly
performs" work for other clients. Id. Thus, the Department's

['ill 8] Last, Evolocity challenges the Department's
determination that Colbert could not realize a profit or loss
through her work for Evolocity. To prevail on this factor, an
employer must demonstrate that the claimant " can realize a
profit or risks a loss from expenses and debts incurred
through an independently established business activity. 11
Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(1)(b)(iv).
Evolocity
argues that the Department inappropriately considered
whether Colbert was" invested" in Evolocity.
['IJ19] In making this argument, Evolocity attacks the
analysis conducted by the administrative law judge in this
matter, not the analysis conducted by the Department's
appeals board. However, our review is limited to the final,
operative order of the Department as rendered by its appeals
board.[7] See Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-403 (LexisNexis
2011 ). Toe appeals board did not consider whether Colbert
was invested in Evolocity but instead determined that
Colbert's 91 expenses incurred to provide services for
[Evolocity] . . . were not substantial enough to feasibly
exceed [her] set salary." Not only has Evolocity failed to
articulate a challenge to the appeals board's determination,
but the appeals board's reasoning is consistent with this
court's decision in Petro-Hunt, UC v. Department of
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Worliforce Services, 2008 UT App 391,

App 111, 16,327 P.3d S78.
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11 The Department's Decision Does Not Render the
Governing Regulations Unconstitutionally Vague.

197 P.3d 107. In Petro-Hunt, this court concluded that a
claimant could not realize a profit or loss where her
overhead was limited and " all the money she received was
pure profit with no accompanying risk of loss." Id.,i 28.
Colbert was paid a set salary every two weeks. She could
not increase the amount she was paid by perfonning more
work, and she was not exposed to any risk of loss through
incurring debts or expenses in performing her work. Thus,
we are not convinced that the Department erred in
determining that Colbert could not realize a profit or loss
through her work for Evolocity.

[120) In SUIJ¼ Evolocity has failed to demonstrate error in
the Department's determinations on the factors relevant to a
decision whether Colbert was independently established in
work similar to that she performed for Evolocity. The
ultimate inquiry for the Department was whether, in light of
these factors, Evolocity had proved that Colbert was "
regularly engaged" in a business " established
independently of the alleged employer" --that is, one that
Colbert" created and [that] exists apart from a relationship
with [Evolocity] and does not depend on a relationship with
[Evolocity] for its continued existence." See Utah Admin.
Code R994-204-303(1)(a).
[121] As the Department found, Colbert was a teacher
before she was approached by Evolocity to perfonn work
for them and had never before worked in website
marketing. Evolocity did not " call upon persons who were
already in that trade or business as one would when in need
of a barber, physician, or plumber. 11 New Sleep, Inc. v.
Department of Emp't Sec., 703 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1985).
Evolocity trained Colbert to perform the work using
software Evolocity provided. During her tenure with
Evolocity, Colbert never performed website-marketing
work for other clients. As Evolocity itself declares in
discussing whether Colbert worked exclusively for
Evolocity, " Ms. Colbert chose not to establish a separate
business entity, despite having been shown bow to do so on
multiple occasions." (Emphasis omitted.)
['i122] Given the balance of the relevant factors and the
record evidence, we cannot conclude that the Department
clearly erred in determining that Colbert was not engaged in
an independently established business. Seel11 re adoption of
Baby B., 2012 UT 35, ,I 46, 308 P.3d 382. Because
Evolocity has not demonstrated that Colbert was
independently established, we need not consider whether
she was subject to Evolocity's direction and control. See
Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-204(3) (LexisNexis 2011); BMS
Ltd. 1999, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2014 UT

[123] Finally, Evolocity argues that the Department's
decision " applied governing legal standards in a vague,
subjective, and unpredictable manner, in violation of void
for vagueness restrictions imposed by the due process
clause. 11 11 The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a
statute or ordinance define an 'offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement'"
Greenwood v. City ofNorth Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819
(Utah 1991) (quoting Ko/ender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,
357, 103 S.Cl 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)).[8] Evolocity
takes issue principally with a statement made by the
administrative law judge summarizing the standard applied
to an independent-contractor detennination:
A status determination requires an assessment or evaluation
of the total employment situation. It is not simply a matter
of adding up the number of factors indicating
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employment status and those that indicate independent
contractor status. The entire employment relationship is
reviewed, considering the factors, to discover whether the
Claimant was more like an employee or more like an
independent contractor.
Evolocity asserts that this " impressionistic approach"
improperly treats the statutory and regulatory standards as 11
simply 'points to ponder' when an administrative law judge
is faced with the question whether, in his/her personal
estimation, a given claimant looks more like a contractor or
more like an employee." Evolocity accordingly argues that
this approach renders the governing law unconstitutionally
vague.

.

~

[124) We first conclude that the administrative law judge's
explanation of the governing standard is consistent with the
law. The Employment Security Act provides that
independent-contractor status must be proven " to the
satisfaction of the [Unemployment Insurance Division]11 of
the Department. Utah Code Ann. § 3SA-4-204(3)
(LexisNexis 2011). The act's implementing regulations
provide the procedure to be followed by the Department in
making such a determination, setting forth the factors
discussed above but cautioning that they are only " aids in
the analysis of the facts of each case." Utah Admin. Code
R994-204-303. Most importantly, the regulations give the
Department discretion to consider the " degree of
importance of each factor" in a particular case and whether
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a given factor may apply at all. Id. Accordingly, the
administrative law judge correctly observed that the
Department is empowered to evaluate " the total
employment situation," including the relevant factors, 11 to
discover whether the Claimant was more like an employee
or more like an independent contractor!' [9]

(125] Evolocity's concern is therefore properly with the
statutory scheme and the implementing regulations, not
with the Department's decision. However, Evolocity bas not
identified the statute or regulation it believes fails to "
define an offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited"
Greenwood, 817 P.2d at 819 ( citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). And while Evolocity's argument could be
read as a challenge to the Department's statutory discretion
to evaluate and weigh the factors under rule R994-204-303
of the Utah Administrative Code, Evolocity has not shown
that the ultimate standard applied by the Department under
rule R994-204-301-whether the claimant is II engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession, or
business of the same nature as the services performed1' -is
so vague that " ordinary people" cannot understand what
conduct falls within the reach of the provision. See Utah
Admin. CodeR994-204-301(1); Greenwood, 817 P.2d at
819. Evolocity has therefore failed to demonstrate that the
law as applied by the Department is unconstitutionally
vague.
CONCLUSION

[126] The record evidence supports the Department's
finding that Colbert was not engaged in an independently
established business and was therefore not an independent
contractor. Evolocity has failed to demonstrate that the
Department's application of the law rendered it
unconstitutionally vague. We therefore decline to disturb
the Department's determination that Colbert was Evolocity's
employee.

0,
Notes:
[ 1]The Honorable Russell W. Bench and the Honorable
Judith M. Billings, Senior Judges. sat by special assignment
as authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin.
11-201(6).
[2] In reviewing an agency's adjudicative decision, we
view the facts in the light most favorable to the agency's
findings. SeeSwift Transp. v. Labor Comm'n, 2014 UT App
104, 12 n.l, 326 P.3d 678.
[3]Evolocity raised its constitutional claim before the
Department, but the Department did not rule on it. We

therefore address this argument for the first time on appeal.

[4] In short, those factors direct the department to consider
whether the claimant has a separate place of business, has "
a substantial investment" in the tools required to perform
the services, regularly performs services of the same nature
for other customers, can realize a profit or risks a loss from
the independent business activity, advertises in an effort to
generate business, has obtained required or customary
licenses, and maintains records or documents for
business-tax
purposes.
Utah
Admin.
Code
R994-204-303(1 )(b).
[S]Evolocity does argue that the Department improperly
weighed Colbert's use of a home office in considering
whether Colbert was subject to Evolocity's " control and
direction11 under rule R994-204-303(2) of the Utah
Administrative Code. However, because we do not reach
the question of whether Colbert was subject to Evolocitys
control and direction, we do not address this claim.
[6]Evolocity incorrectly identifies this factor as one of
those the Department found in Evolocity's favor. However,
the Department's final order states that the tools and
equipment factor II does not support a finding the Claimant
was independently established." Nevertheless, because
Evolocity bas set forth the evidence and reasoning it
believes demonstrate that Colbert provided her own tools
and equipment, we address this argument as a challenge to
the Department's determination.
[7]Evolocity asserts that, because the appeals board
adopted the administrative law judge's findings, this court
must review those findings rather than those of the appeals
board. However, the appeals board conducted its own
analysis of each relevant factor. Accordingly, it is the
reasoning of the appeals board that controls, and Evolocity
must demonstrate error in that reasoning to prevail.

[S]We note that it is not entirely clear whether the
void-for-vagueness doctrine applies to a statutory
unemployment-inswance program such as the Employment
Security Act. Generally, the doctrine is applied to penal
statutes or legislative enactments that impose civil fines.
SeeKolenderv. Lawson,461 U.S. 352,357, 103 S.Ct. 1855,
7S L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S.
399,402, 86 S.Ct. 518, 15 L.Ed.2d 447 (1966). However,
because Evolocity has not demonstrated that the regulations
are impermissibly vague, we need not decide whether the
doctrine is applicable here.
[9]1n its reply brief, Evolocity relies on this court's decision
in Tasters Ltd. v. Department ofEmployment Security for
the proposition that the legislature intended the
independent-contractor factors to be a " precise framework
to be meticulously followed," 863 P.2d 12, 27 (Utah Ct.
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App. 1993), and argues that the Department therefore lacks
the discretion apparently afforded it by the statute and
regulations. " It is well settled that issues raised by an
appellant in the reply brief that were not presented in the
opening brief are considered waived and will not be
considered by the appellate court." Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT
56, 18, 194 P.3d 903 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Because Evolocity did not argue in its opening
brief that the Department lacked the discretion or authority
to apply the factors as it did, this argument is waived

€&)
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market value was $4.7 million. On April 28, 1989, the Tax
Commission entered its findings of fact and conclusions of
law, detennining that the fair market value of the property
was $4,200,000.
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799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990)

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON, Petitioner,
v.

COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF SALT
LAKE COUNTY, State of
Utah; Utah State Tax Commhsion, Respondents.

The Tax Commission calculated the fair market assessment
value of the property by using the income approach to value
method. Elements of the income approach to value included
the following formula and data presented at the formal
hearing:
1. $14 per square foot less an adjustment for free rent, or

Sl 1.67 per square foot;
2. capitalization rate of 10.9 percent;

No.890278.
Supreme Court of Utah.

3. an expense ratio of 25 percent; [ 1]

4. a stabilized vacancy rate of 10 percent; and

October 16, 1990

S. the area size of the building, which is 58,252 square feet.
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J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Salt Lake City, for petitioner.
Bill Thomas Peters, Salt Lake City, for County Bd. of
Equali7.ation.

R. Paul Van Dam, Brian L. Tarbe~ Salt Lake City, for Tax
Com'n.
HALL, Chief Justice:
This case is a review of an order of the Utah State Tax
Commission ("Tax Commission") setting the assessment on
property owned by First National Bank of Boston ("First
National") and from a denial of First National's request for
reconsideration. First National challenges the accuracy of
the Tax Commission's finding that the expense ratio on the
property is 25 percent.
The property at issue in this case is an office building
located in Salt Lake City, Utah, and subject to assessment
by Salt Lake County pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
59-2-301 (1987). Salt Lake County assessed the property at
$5,176,440 for the year 1987. First National appealed the
assessment to the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization
("Board of Equalization"), which adjusted the value of the
property to $4,580,850 based on evidence presented at the
hearing.
First National appealed the decision of the Board of
Equalization to the Tax Commission. At a fonnal hearing
before the Tax Commission, First National asserted that the
fair market value of the property was approximately $3.7
million. Salt Lake County contended that the property's fair

Although the expense ratio is disputed, the formula for the
calculation of the assessment is not in dispute: 58,252 total
sq. ft. X 11.67 effective rent - 10% vacancy rate - $170,095
expenses (25% expense ratio)(disputed figure) / 10.9%
capitalization rate = $4,200,000 taxable amount The Tax
Commission arrived at a final taxable
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amount of $4,200,000 by using the 25 percent expense
ratio. [2] First National calculated the taxable amount to be
$3,690,429 by using a 31 percent expense ratio. (3]
The only issue for review is the accuracy of the Tax
Commissions findings of fact, specifically, whether the Tax
Commission erred in calculating the expense ratio portion
of the formula at 25 percent. The other elements of the
formula are not in dispute.

The Administrative Procedures Act [4] governs our review
ofthe Tax Commission's assessment. Section 63-46b-16(4)
states:
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person
seeking judicial review bas been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:

(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact,
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
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record before the court

Section 63-46b-16(4)(g) requires an appellate court to
review the "whole record" to determine whether the
agency's action is "supported by substantial evidence."
"Substantial evidence" is that quantum and quality of
relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable
mind to support a conclusion. [SJ An appellate court
applying the 11substantial evidence test11 must consider both
the evidence that supports the Tax Commission's factual
findings and the evidence that detracts from the findings.
[6) Nevertheless, the party challenging the findings-in tliis
case, the taxpayer-must marshal all of the evidence
supporting the findings and show that despite the
supporting facts, the Tax Commission's findings are not
supported by substantial evidence. [7]

Nothing in the record indicates how the Tax Commission
aaived at the figures for expenses and the 25 percent
expense ratio. First National has presented expense figures
that were entered into evidence and has explained how
those figures fit into the formula to anive at the $3,690,429
fair market value.
Despite the fact that both parties presented evidence of
expense figures significantly higher than the Tax
Commission's findings, the Board of Equalization and the
Tax Commission argue that the Tax Commission is not
bound by the evidence presented by either party but may
make findings of its own. They base their argument upon
the broad grant of authority bestowed upon the Tax
Commission in the Utah Constitution [8] and Utah Code
Annotated. [9]
Page 1166

Nowhere in the Utah Constitution or Utah Code Annotated
does the legislatme give the Tax Commission the unbridled
discretion to make findings of fact beyond the scope of
what is presented in the hearings or inferences to be drawn
therefrom. Although it is a "universally recognized rule11
that this court must "take some cogni:zance of the expertise
of the agency in its particular field and accordingly to give
some deference to its determination," [10] the agency's
decision must rest upon some sound evidentiary basis, not a
creation offiat ( 11)
It is unclear from the record how the Tax Commission
arrived at the figures it used in calculating the fair market
value of petitioner's property. First National has upheld its
burden to marshal all of the evidence in support of the Tax
Commission's findings and has shown that on the record
before us those findings are inconsistent with the evidence

presented.

We remand for the pwpose of reqwnng the Tax
Commission to more fully articulate the basis for its
findings and determination of fair market value in light of
the evidence presented in the hearing.
HOWE, Associate C.J.. and STEWART, DURHAM and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

Notes:
[1] The expense ratio is calculated by dividing the square
foot expense figure, in this case, $3.47 per square foot, by
the income from rental rates, $14 per square foot face rate
($11.67 per square foot when adjusted for free rent given as
inducements or incentives to tenants).
[2] The method the Tax Commission used to arrive at the
$4,200,000 figure is unclear; however, if some of the
figures contained in the findings of fact are used, the
calculation would be as follows: 58,252 sq. ft. X $11.67
(679,800.84) - 10% vacancy rate (67,980.08) - $170,095
expenses / 10.9% capitalization rate = $4,052,529.9.
Nevertheless, the Tax Commission valued the property at
$4,200,000.
[3] The figures used by First National are as follows:
58,252 X $11.67 (679,800.84) - 10% vacancy rate
(67,980.08) - $209,564 expenses (31% expense ratio) /
10.9% capitalization rate :a: $3,690,429 taxable amount.

~

[4] Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-1 to -22 (1989).

(SJ See Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018,
1026-27, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966); Idaho State Ins. Fund v.
Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927, 930-3 I (1985);
Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah
Ct.App.1989).

[6] See Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68. We note that prior
to the repeal ofUtah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 (1953) and the
enactment of section 63-46b-16 (1989), an appellate court's
review of an agency's findings of fact was limited to
reversing only when the findings were arbitrary and
capricious and "without foundation in fact." The agency's
findings would be upheld if there was evidence of any
substance whatever which could reasonably be regarded as
supporting the finding. See, e.g., Utah Dep't of Admin.
Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P2d 601, 608-09 (Utah
1983).
[7] See Comish Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah
1988); Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68.
[8] Article XIII, section 11 states in pertinent part:
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The State Tax Commission shall administer and supervise
the tax laws of the State. It shall assess mines and public
utilities and adjust and equalize the valuation and
assessment of property among the several counties. It shall
have such other powers of original assessment as the
Legislature may provide. Under such regulations in such
cases and within such limitations as the Legislature may
prescribe, it shall review proposed bond issues, revise the
tax levies of local governmental units, and equalize the
assessment and valuation of property within the counties.
The duties imposed upon the State Board of Equalization by
the Constitution and Laws of this State shall be performed
by the State Tax Commission.

[10] Utah Power & Light Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 590
P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1979).

[11] Hurley v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 767
P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 1988); Utah Power & Light, 590
P.2dat 335.

In each county of this State there shall be a County Board
of Equali2ation consisting of the Board of County
Commissioners of said county. The County Boards of
Equalization shall adjust and equalize the valuation and
assessment of the real and personal property within their
respective counties, subject to such regulation and control
by the State Tax Commission as may be prescribed by law.
The State Tax Commission and the County Boards of
Equalization shall each have such other powers as may be
prescribed by the Legislature.
[9) Section 59-1-210 states in pertinent part:
~

The powers and duties of the commission are as follows:

(7) to exercise supervision over assessors and county
boards of equalization, and over other county officers in the
perfonnance of their duties relating to the assessment of
property and collection of taxes, so that all assessments of
property are just and equal, according to fair market value,
and that the tax burden is distributed with.out favor or
discrimination;

(23) to coITCCt any error in any assessment made by it at
any time before the tax is due and report the correction to
the county auditor, who shall enter the corrected assessment
upon the assessment roll;

(25) to perform any further duties imposed by law, and
exercise all powers necessary in the performance of its
duties;

(27) to comply with the procedures and requirements of
Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its adjudicative proceedings.
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manual and the consent forms signed by Mr. Goodale
clearly stated that testing positive on a drug screen while on
duty was cause for discharge. Mr. Goodale acknowledged
that he had read and understood the manual, drug policy,
and consent fonn.
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776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989)
GRACE DRILLING COMPANY, Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW OF
COMMISSION OF UTAH,

the

INDUSTRIAL

Department of Employment Security, and Gordon E.
Goodale, Respondents.
No. 880572-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.

June 2, 1989
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Frederick M. MacDonald, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.
R. Paul Van Dam and Alan Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for

respondents.
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Before BILLINGS, GARFF, and JACKSON, JJ.

OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Petitioner Grace Drilling Company appeals from the
decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission ("Board") awarding Gordon E. Goodale
unemployment compensation benefits. The Board
concluded Mr. Goodale was not discharged from his
employment for disqualifying conduct under Utah Code
Ann. § 35-4-S(b)(l) (1988). We affirm the Board1s
determination.

FACTS
We review only those facts relevant to the issues presented.
In January 1988, Mr. Goodale was hired by Grace Drilling
to work as a foreman on two of its oil drilling rigs in Uintah
County, Utah. As a condition of employment, Mr. Goodale
agreed to abide by Grace Drilling's safety manual, work
rules, and regulations. Mr. Goodale also consented to
submit to random drug testing. Both Grace Drilling's safety

While at work on March 17, 1988, Mr. Goodale was
randomly selected for drug testing. He volmttarily
submitted a urine sample and executed another consent
form. On the form, Mr. Goodale disclosed that he had been
taking Advil within the past seven days. Mr. Goodale also
verbally informed his supervisor that he had been taking
two prescription drugs for lower back pain, the names of
which he could not recaU. He offered to go home to retrieve
the names of the drugs, but Mr. Good.ale's supervisor
informed him that it was unnecessary. Instead, the
supervisor informed Mr. Goodale that if the test results
were positive, he would be given an opportunity to present
the names of the other two drugs for Grace Drilling to
consider. The drug test was conducted and Mr. Good.ale's
urine sample tested positive for marijuana Mr. Goodale
was discharged on March 24, 1988, without being given an
opportunity to provide the names of the two prescription
drugs he told bis supervisor he had been using prior to the

~

drug test
Mr. Goodale tiled for and was awarded unemployment
benefits. Grace Drilling appealed the Department of
Employment Security's initial determination by notice dated
May 12, 1988. At the administrative hearing, Grace
Drilling's representative had no personal knowledge of Mr.
Goodale's drug test or the circumstances surromtding his
discharge. Furthermore, the written test results were not
offered into evidence, and Grace Drilling failed to call any
witness who had administered the test or who was
otherwise familiar with the testing procedures. Instead,
Grace Drillings representative merely testified as to what
she had been told by others about Mr. Goodale's test results.

(iJ

At the conclusion of the hearing, the appeal referee

requested further information, including a copy of the test
results which Grace Drilling agreed to provide. The record
was left open for this purpose. However, Grace Drilling
later advised the appeal referee that it would not provide the
test report. Accordingly, the appeal referee affirmed the
Department of Employment Security's initial disposition
awarding Mr. Goodale benefits based on the available
evidence in the record. Specifically, the appeal referee
fomtd that Grace Drilling failed to provide sufficient
foundation to support the validity of a positive test result,
and its hearsay testimony that Mr. Goodale tested positive
was contested by sworn testimony. The appeal referee also
found that Grace Drilling refused to verify the positive test
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result or offer evidence negating the possibility that the
prescription drugs reportedly taken by Mr. Goodale could
have affected the outcome of the test Accordingly, since no
other reasons were given by Grace Drilling for terminating
Mr. Goodale, the appeal referee concluded that be was
entitled to unemployment benefits.
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Following the appeal referee's decision, Grace Drilling
filed its appeal and submitted to the Board the written test
report originally requested by the appeal referee. The Board
refused to accept the proffered report stating that "[t]o
consider such evidence would deny the claimant due
process by depriving him of the right to challenge and rebut
the information contained therein." The Board further
concluded the appeal referee's decision was a correct
application of the Utah Employment Security Act,
supported by competent evidence, and therefore, affirmed
the award of unemployment compensation benefits to Mr.
Goodale.
Grace Drilling raises two issues in this appeal claiming. (1)
there is substantial evidence that Mr. Goodale was
terminated for just cause because he tested positive for drug
use while on duty, and (2) the Board abused its discretion in
refusing to consider the proffered test results.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW UNDER 11IB UTAH
ADMINISTRATNEPROCEDURESACT
These proceedings were commenced after January 1, 1988,
and thus our review is governed by Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-16(4) (1988) of the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act ("UAPAj. (1) Section 63-46b-16(4) governs judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings and provides:
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of
the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of
the following:

procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to
disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact,
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by
statute;

(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the
agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and
reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency; or ·

(iv) otherwise: arbitrary or capricious.
Grace Drilling claims the Board's findings of fact are not
supported by substantial evidence as required under §
63-46b-16(4)(g). No reported Utah case to date has directly
addressed whether the UAPA modifies the standard for
reviewing the Board's findings of fact previously utilized
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by Utah courts. Thus, the issue is one of first impression.
Standard for Reviewing the Board's Factual Findings Prior
totheUAPA

(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the
agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as
applied;

Prior to the UAPA, the standards for reviewing
administrative agency proceedings on appeal were a
combination of specific statutory provisions governing
judicial review of particular agency determinations,
interpreted in light of"established principles governing
judicial review of administrative agencies generally. 11 See
Utah Dep't ofAdmin. Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658
P.2d 601, 607 (Utah 1983).

(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred
by any statute;

Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-IO(i) (1988) (superseded by §
63-46b- l 6(4)(g)) set forth the standard for reviewing the

(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring
resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the
law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or
decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed

Board's findings of fact and provided in relevant part:

In any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings
of the commission and the board of review as to the facts if

supported by evidence, are conclusive and the jurisdiction
of the court is confined to questions oflaw.
One of the earlier Utah Supreme Court decisions
interpreting this provision held the Board's findings of fact

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

will be affinncd "if there is evidence of any substance
whatever which can reasonably be regarded as supporting
the determination made...." Kennecott Copper Corp.
Employees v. Department of Employment Sec., 13 Utah 2d
262, 372 P.2d 987, 989 (1962). This standard has been
followed on a number of occasions, including the Utah
Supreme Court's landmark pronouncements concerning
judicial review of administrative proceedings in Utah Dep't
ofAdmin. Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm 'n, 658 P.2d 601,
607-12 (Utah 1983). In Administrative Services, the court
stated in dicta, 11in reviewing decisions on unemployment
compensation ... we have declared that we will sustain the
findings of the Board if 'there is evidence of any substance
whatever which can reasonably be regarded as supporting
the determination made....' 11 Id. at 609 (quoting Kennecott
Copper, 372 P.2d at 989) (emphasis in original). [2]
However, there are also a number of Utah decisions that,
without elaboration, have used different terminology in
discussing the applicable standard for reviewing the Board's
findings offact. For example, in Northwest Foods Ltd. v.
Board of Review, 731 P.2d 470,471 (Utah 1986), the Utah
Supreme Court declared that the Board's findings of fact
"are conclusive and binding, and are to be sustained if
supported by competent and substantial evidence in the
record." [3]
Notwithstanding these variations in terminology, under the
UAPA, it is clear that the Board's findings of fact will be
affirmed only if they are "supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court."
Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b--16(4)(g) (1988). This "substantial
evidence test" grants appellate courts greater latitude in
reviewing the record than was previously granted under the
Utah Employment Security Act's "any evidence of
substance test."
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UAPA's "Substantial Evidence" Test [4]
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 'scintilla' of
evidence ... though 'something less than the weight of the
evidence.' " Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho
257, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985) (quoting Consolo v. FMC,
383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026, 16 L.Ed2d 131
(1966)). "Substantial evidence is 'such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.' " Id. [ 5]
In applying the "substantial evidence test." we review the
"whole record" before the court, and this review is
distinguishable "from both a de novo review and the 'any
competent evidence' standard of review." [6] Moreover,
under the "whole record test," a court must consider not
only the evidence supporting the Board's factual findings,

but also the evidence that "fairly detracts from the weight of
the [Board's] evidence." [7] It is also important to note that
the ''whole record test" necessarily requires that a party
challenging the Board's findings of fact must marshall all of
the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite
the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence. Cf. Cornish Town v. Koller, 158 P.2d
919, 922 (Utah 1988) (to mount an attack on a trial court's
findings of fact "an appellant must marshall the evidence
supporting the trial court•s tindingslt). See also Sampson v.
Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
In undertaking such a review, this court will not substitute
its judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views,
even though we may have come to a different conclusion
had the case come before us for de novo review. See
Thompson v. Wake County Bd. ofEduc., 292 N.C. 406, 233
S.E.2d 538, 541 (1977). Cf. Stegen v. Department of
Employment Sec., 751 P.2d 1160, 1163 (Utah
Ct.App.1988). It is the province of the Board, not appellate
courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where
inconsistent inferences can be drawn :from the same
evidence, it is for the Board to draw the inferences. Board
ofEduc. ofMontgomery County v. Paynter, 303 Md 22,
491 A.2d 1186, 1193 (1985).

(i&J

TERMINATION FOR CAUSE
The Board concluded Grace Drilling failed to meet its
burden of establishing
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Mr. Goodale was tenninated from bis employment for just
cause as it did not establish he tested positive for drug use
while on duty. Grace Drilling argues it met its burden
through the proper application of Utah Code Ann. §
34-38-10(2)(a) (1988), which creates a rebuttable
presumption in favor of the employer that drug test results
are valid so long as certain testing procedure criteria are met
as specified in § 34-38-6. [8] For pwposes of discussion,
we assume without deciding that the Utah Drug and
Alcohol Testing statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-38-1 to -15
( 1988), applies to administrative hearings such as the one
before us, but nevertheless, we find Grace Drilling's
reliance on its provisions misguided.

Grace Drilling argues that it complied with the statutory
requirements and therefore, Mr. Goodale was terminated for
cause because he failed to rebut the presumption that he
tested positive for marijuana while on duty. However, based
on the Board's findings of fact, Grace Drilling failed to
demonstrate that its testing procedures met the enumerated
criteria set forth in§ 34-38-6. For example, § 34-38-6(3)(b)
requires that an employee be given an opportunity to
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provide information concerning any prescription drugs
presently or previously taken. The Board found that at the
time Mr. Goodale was test~ he was using two unidentified
prescription drugs and was not given an opportunity to
identify the drugs before he was discharged.

More importantly, Grace Drilling failed to demonstrate that
testing procedures "confonn[ed] to scientifically
accepted analytical methods and procedures." See §
its

34-38-6(5). The only testimony offered by Grace Drilling to
meet the statutory requirement was the hearsay testimony of
its office manager who admitted she had no personal
knowledge of the testing procedures or test results, and
who, therefore, clearly was not qualified to provide the
necessary foundation for receiving the positive test results
into evidence. Conversely, Mr. Good.ale's sworn testimony
states that he had not used marijuana while working for
Grace Drilling and that he had been taking two unknown
prescription drugs which conceivably could have affected
the test results.

In sum, there was simply no competent evidence before the
Board entitling Grace Drilling to the statutory presumption.
Neither was there competent evidence demonstrating that
Mr. Goodale tested positive for marijuana while on duty.
The office manager's hearsay testimony, standing alone,
could not provide a basis to establish Mr. Goodale tested
positive. See, e.g., Mayes v. Department ofEmployment
Sec., 754 P.2d 989, 992 (Utah CLApp.1988) (findings
cannot be based entirely on hearsay evidence).
Accordingly, we find no error in refusing to grant Grace
Drilling the statutory presumption set forth in §
34-38-10(2)(a). In the absence of any

First, it is undisputed that Mr. Goodale was discharged
solely because he tested positive for illegal drugs while on
duty. It reasonably follows that the test results were crucial
to Grace Drilling's burden of establishing that Mr. Goodale
was discharged for "just cause." Grace Drilling was given
two opportunities to present the results and lay the
appropriate foundation for receiving them into evidence.
Grace Drilling declined on both occasions, and its
post-hearing confidentiality justification simply is not
persuasive as the appeal referee could have taken the
appropriate precautions to protect the confidentiality of the
report.

In short, the test results were clearly available at the time of
the hearing and the Board so noted. The Board declined to
consider the test results stating to do so would have
deprived Mr. Goodale of the opportunity to rebut or
cross-examine. We agree. Elementary fairness in
unemployment compensation adjudications includes a
party's right to see adverse evidence and be afforded an
opportunity to rebut such evidence. See, e.g., Lanier-Brugh,
Inc. v. lndustrial Comm'n, 761 P.2d 572, 575-76 (Utah
CtApp.1988). Grace Drilling argues that Mr. Goodale
could be given an opportunity to challenge the results if the
matter were merely remanded to the appeal referee to take
additional evidence. However, we do not believe granting
parties "three bites at the apple11 is consonant with efficient
administrative procedure. Grace Drilling had ample
opportunity to present its case and failed to meet its burden.
We hold the Board did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
consider the test results.
Based on the foregoing, the Board1s order granting Mr.
Goodale unemployment compensation benefits is affumed.
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GARFF and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
competent evidence demonstrating that Mr. Goodale tested
positive for marijuana while on duty, and in light of Mr.
Goodale's sworn testimony to the contrary, the Board's
conclusion that Mr. Goodale was not terminated for
disqualifying conduct under the Employment Security Act
is supported by substantial evidence in the record.

COMMISSION'S

REFUSAL

TO

CONSIDER

PROFFERED TEST RESULTS
We next address Grace Drilling's claim the Board abused
its discretion (9) in refusing to reopen the record to consider
the proffered test results which allegedly demonstrated that
Mr. Goodale had tested positive for marijuana. Grace
Drilling concedes it refused to submit the test results at the
administrative hearing but claims it was trying to avoid
confidentiality problems and protect Mr. Goodale's privacy
interests. We are not persuaded by Grace Drilling's
argument.

Notes:
[I] See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to -22 (1988 Supp.).
Section 63-46b-22(1) provides that the UAPA applies to
11
all agency adjudicative proceedings commenced by or
before an agency on or after January 1, 1988.... "
Additionally,§ 63-46b-l(l)(b) provides, with our emphasis,
that the UAPA governs judicial review of agency actions
"[e)xcept as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as
otherwise provided by a statute superseding provisions of
[UAPA] by explicit reference to [UAPA]. ... " The Utah
Employment Security Act has no such superseding
provisions concerning judicial review, and therefore our
review is governed by§ 63-46b-16(4). We also note that the
UAPA is substantially similar to the Uniform Model State
Administrative Procedure Act (1981), 14 U.L.A. 69 (1988)
("MSAPA"). See Utah A.P.A. 1988-89, comments of the
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Utah Administrative Law Advisory Committee at 10 (April
25, 1988). Specifically, § 63-46b--16(4)(a)-(h) "are
patterned after the comparable provisions in the MSAPA
(Sections 5-116(c)(l) through S-116(c)(8))." Utah
A.P.A.1988-89, supra, at 15.

[2] See also, e.g., West Jordan v. Department of
Employment Sec., 6S6 P.2d 411, 413 (Utah 1982) (findings
of fact are conclusive "if supported by evidence of any
substance"); Taylor v. Department of Employment Sec.,
647 P.2d 1, l (Utah 1982). Accord Grinnell v. Board of
Review, 732 P.2d 113, 115 (Utah 1987) (per curiam);
Tenninal Serv. Co. v. Board of Review, 714 P.2d 298, 299
(Utah 1986) (per curiam); Mayes v. Department of
Employment Sec., 754 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah ClApp.1988);
Jim Whetton Buick v. Department of Employment Sec.,
152 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah ClApp.1988); Stegen v.
Department ofEmployment Sec., 751 P.2d 1160, 1162
(Utah Ct.App.1988).
(3) See also, e.g., Covington v. Board of Review, 737 P.2d
207, 209 (Utah 1987) (findings must be supported by
"substantial evidence"); Salt Lake City Corp. v. Department
ofEmployment Sec., 657 P.2d 1312, 1315 (Utah 1982);
Stegen v. Department of Employment Sec., 151 P.2d 1160,
1163 (Utah CtApp.1988) (we affirm Board's findings if
they have "substantial support in the record," citing
Northwest Foods, 731 P.2d at 471); Chrysler Dodge
Country v. Department of Employment Sec., 751 P.2d 278,
281 (Utah CtApp.1988).
[4] See, supra, note 1. In the absence of Utah authority
interpreting provisions of the MSAPA, we tum to those
jurisdictions with similar provisions for guidance.
[5] See also Hockaday v. D.C. Dep't of Employment
Servs., 443 A.2d 8, 12 (D.C.1982); Board of Educ. of
Montgomery County v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22, 491 A.2d
1186, 1193 (1985); Wright v. State Real Estate Comm'n,
208 Neb. 467, 304 N.W.2d 39, 44 (1981); Cook v.
Employment Div., 47 Or.App. 437, 614 P.2d 1193, 1195
(1980); Sweet v. State Technical Inst. at Memphis, 617
S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tenn.Ct.App.1981); Roberts v.
Employment Sec. Comm'n ofWyoming, 745 P.2d 1355,
1357 (Wyo.1987).
[6] Thompson v. Wake County Bd. of Educ.. 292 N.C.
406,233 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1977) (citing Universal Camera
Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed.
456 (1951)). Accord Guntharp v. Cobb County, Georgia,
168 Ga.App. 33, 307 S.E.2d 925, 927 (1983)(decision
supported by some or any evidence rule does not mean the
decision was supported by "substantial evidence"); Midstate
Oil Co. v. Missouri Comm'n on Human Rights, 679 S.W.2d
842, 846 (Mo.1984) (substantial evidence test is different

than "some" evidence test).
[7] Thompson, 233 S.E.2d at 541. See also, e.g., Seven
Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n,
450 A.2d 475, 479 (Me.1982); Beebee v. Haslett Pub.
Schools, 406 Mich. 224, 278 N.W.2d 37, 39-40 (1979);
Lackey v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 306
N.C. 231, 293 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1982).
This requirement most distinguishes the "substantial
evidence test" from the "any evidence rule." Under the
latter test, a court's limited review was qualitative in that it
only considered whether there was any competent evidence
in the record supporting the Board's determination. In
essence, courts reviewed only that portion of the record
supporting the Board's findings. In contrast, the "substantial
evidence test" is both a qualitative and "quantitative"
inquiry. We now review both sides of the record to
detemtlne whether the Board's findings are supported by
substantial evidence. See generally In re Southview
Presbyterian Church, 62 N.C.App. 45,302 S.E.2d 298,299
(1983) (substantial evidence test requires court to consider
contradictory evidence, and the evidence rcquin:d to
support agency determination "is greater than that required
under the 'any competent evidence' standard of review").
(8] Section 34-38-6, entitled "Requirements for collection
and testing," provides as follows:
All sample collection and testing for drugs and alcohol
under this chapter shall be performed in accordance with
the following conditions:

( l) The collection of samples shall be performed under
reasonable and sanitary conditions;
(2) Samples shall be collected and tested with due regard to
the privacy of the individual being tested, and in a manner
reasonably calculated to prevent substitutions or
interference with the collection or testing of reliable
samples;

(3) Sample collection shall be documented; and the
documentation procedures shall include:
(a) labeling of samples so as reasonably to preclude the
probability of erroneous identification of test results; and
(b) an opportunity for the employee or prospective
employee to provide notification of any information which
he considers relevant to the test, including identification of
currently or recently used prescription or nonprescription
drugs, or other relevant medical information.

(4) Sample collection, storage, and transportation to the
place of testing shall be performed so as reasonably to
preclude the probability of sample contamination or
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adulteration; and
(S) Sample testing shall conform to scientifically accepted
analytical methods and procedures. Testing shall include
verification or confirmation of any positive test result by
gas
chromatography,
gas
chromotography-mass
spectroscopy, or other comparably reliable analytical
method, before the result of any test may be used as a basis
for any action by an employer under Section 34-38-8.
[9] Compare Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) (1988)
with Utah Adm.in R. 475-l0d-3(2) (1987-88).
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addition, the State argues that "[i]f there is any deficiency in
the detail of the findings of fact recited in the DEQ order,
this is made up in the hearing officer's Recommended
Decision." Essentially, the State argues
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LaSAL Oll. COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
v.

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Respondent.
No. 910687-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
December 18, 1992
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J. Michael Hansen and Claudia F. Berry, Salt Lake City,
for petitioner.
R. Paul Van Dam and Richard K. Rathbun, Salt Lake City,
for respondent.
H. James Clegg, Salt Lake City, for Rio Vista Oil, Ltd.,
Appearing Specially.
Before BENCH, JACKSON and ORME, JJ.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Appellant, LaSaJ Oil Co., Inc., appeals from a final order of
the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) upholding
an Order to Abate issued by the Utah Division of
Environmental Health and the Utah Solid and Hazardous
Waste Committee. We reverse the final order of DEQ's
Executive Director and remand.
On appeal, LaSal contends the Executive Director, in his
final order, failed to make findings of fact sufficient to
support his ultimate conclusions that ( 1) LaSal's release of
petroleum product from its facility in Moab, Utah
contributed to the contamination of subsoil and
groundwater in the Moab area. and (2) the Order to Abate
was legally correct and should therefore be affirmed. LaSal
argues primarily that the Executive Director's findings of
fact are not sufficiently detailed and thus do not allow
meaningful judicial review. The State argues in tum that the
Executive Director's findings of fact are legally sufficient
and adequately detailed under the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act so as to afford meaningful review. In

that the hearing officer's findings in the Recommended
Decision must be considered supplemental to the Executive
Director's findings, even though DEQ's final order did not
explicitly adopt the hearing officer's findings as its own.
We note at the outset that the question of whether DEQ's
decision "constitutes arbitrary action [under the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-16(4) (1989) ] for want ofadequate findings is
governed by our determination of whether this court is able
to conduct a meaningful review." Adams v. Board of
Review. 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App.1991). Determining
whether the Executive Director•s findings are adequate
presents a legal question requiring no deference to DEQ.
See id.

In his Recommended Decision, the hearing officer
fashioned particularized findings of fact which addressed in
great detail the complex scientific evidence presented in the
fonn of data from soil studies, data from monitoring wells,
and testimony of expert witnesses who analyzed the data to
determine the source of the contamination. The hearing
officer's findings clearly indicated the steps by which the
recommended decision was made by expressly referring to
evidence supporting each finding. The findings of fact made
explicit reference to specific exhibits relied upon and to
specific data from testing wells and subsoil studies the
hearing officer found to be persuasive. The section entitled
"Reasons for Hearing Officer's Decision" makes it
abundantly apparent that the bearing officer painstakingly
considered all the conflicting evidence surrounding the
presence of free product at various monitoring wells. For
example, the hearing officer explained:
The free product found consistently at MW-16 on the north
edge ofLaSal's property coincided with the high soil gas
readings along that part of the street. The trench detennined
that this contamination did not come from Rio Vista, and
helped establish a "neutral zone" between the two plumes.
The water table was usually about IO feet below the ground
level, and therefore a spill 9 feet or so above the water table
would spread laterally along subsoil shelves some distance
before reaching the water table. Once on the water, the
petroleum products will always flow down-gradient.
Because of the close proximity of the free product in
MW-16 to the LaSal property, it is inescapable that it
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originated at LaSal.
The hearing officer's findings, in combination with
explanations like the one quoted above, clearly show the
steps by which he moved from the voluminous evidence he
heard to the conclusions be reached.
By contrast, the Executive Director made vague,
conclusory findings of fact which lack detail and explicit
reference to specific evidence or exlnbits found to be
pivotal to the ultimate decision. The Executive Director's
three pivotal findings exemplify the conclusory nature of
his findings throughout These findings are as follows:

11. Based on the results of soil gas testing, analysis of soil
samples, information of a leak, and monitoring well results,
release of petroleum product occurred at some time in the
past at the LaSal property.
12. As a result of testing, a leak of petroleum product was
identified in early 1986 from the LaSal facilities.

13. Releases of petroleum products from the LaSal
facilities have contributed to contamination of soils and
groundwater in the Moab area.
"An administrative agency must make findings of fact and
conclusions of law that are adequately detailed so as to
permit meaningful appellate review." Adams, 821 P.2d at 4.
In Milne Truck Lines v. Public Service Commission, 720
P.2d 1373 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
It is also essential that the [agency] make subsidiary
findings in sufficient detail that the critical subordinate
factual issues are highlighted and resolved in such a fashion
as to demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis for
the ultimate conclusions. The importance of complete,
accurate, and consistent fmdings of fact is essential to a
proper detennination
Page 1048

by an administrative agency. To that end, findings should
be sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate factual conclusions ... are reached.

~

Id. at 1378. Absent such detailed findings, this court
"cannot perform its duty ofreviewing the [agency's] order
in accordance with established legal principles and of
protecting the parties and the public from arbitrary and
capricious administrative action." Id. See also Vali
Convalescent & Care Inst. v. Division of Health Care Fin.,
797 P.2d 438, 448 (Utah App.1990) (noting "the importance
of adequate findings supporting agency decisions").
Because the findings entered by the Executive Director are
vague and conclusory, and because the Executive Director

wholly failed to "make subsidiary fmdings in sufficient
detail" so as to highlight and resolve "critical subordinate
factual issues ... in such a fashion as to demonstrate ... a
logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions," id. at
448 (quoting Milne, 720 P.2d at 1378) (emphasis added in
V ali), we are unable to meaningfully review those findings.
Accordingly, we remand to DEQ for the limited purpose of
providing the Executive Director an opportunity to
formulate more adequate :findings in support of, and to more
fully articulate the reasons for his decision.
The State argues that this court should review the
Executive Director's decision and the hearing officer's
Recommended Decision together, and look to the hearing
officer's findings in any area where DEQ's findings are
inadequate. However, a hearing officer's decision is "merely
a proposal which the ultimate agency decision maker [may]
accept or reject." Vali, 797 P.2d at 449. This court reviews
the "ultimate agency decision"-in this case the Executive
Director's order-and not the hearing officer's
Recommended Decision. See id; Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2
(1989). The administrative reviewing authority is "not
limited by the examiner's findings." United States Steel
Corp. v. lndustrial Comm'n, 607 P.2d 807, 810 (Utah
1980). Rath.er, the reviewing authority may, in its review of
the record, make its own findings. See Vali, 797 P.2d at
448-49. Therefore, any reading of the Executive Director's
findings as merely supplemental to those proposed by the
hearing officer would ordinarily necessitate an explicit
adoption of the hearing officer's findings by the Executive
Director. While it might be appropriate to consider the
hearing officer's findings if it were clear the Executive
Director had adopted the findings despite his failure to say
so explicitly, there are at least five factors which, taken
together, preclude us from making that leap in this case.
First. the DEQ order does not, as is customary when a
higher administrative reviewing authority wishes to adopt
an adjudicator's fmdings in whole or in part, specifically
adopt the findings of the hearing officer, or the findings
except to the extent inconsistent with DEQ's findings, or
particular findings incorporated by reference. Second,
before setting out his findings of fact, the Executive
Director refers to the Recommended Decision, but with no
particular reverence and only in the context of cataloguing
what the record consists of. He th.en enters "the following
Findings of Fact" making no reference to the hearing
officer's findings. [l] Third, the Executive Director, in the
order that follows the findings and conclusions, states
specifically that "[f]or the reasons stated above, the Orders
to Abate to LaSal and Rio Vista are affirmed, 1' again
making no reference to the hearing officer's findings.
Fourth, the Executive Director's approach to and
organization of the findings suggest a conscious desire on
his part to be as general in his "findings" as possible, while,
by contrast, the bearing officer bad obviously taken great
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pains to be very detailed and precise in fonnulating his
findings given the conflicting
Page 1049

and complex testimony of the experts. [2]
Fifth, in the "Comments" section of the decision, the
Executive Director states specific reasons as to why he did
not accept two particular recommendations of the hearing
officer. Contrary to the State's suggestion that, by
implication, the Executive Director adopted the balance of
the hearing officer's recommended order, including all of
his findings, it appears instead that the Executive Director
felt constrained to treat two particularly problematic aspects
of the hearing officer's decision, namely, (1) the
apportionment of liability as between LaSal and Rio Vista,
a party at the administrative level who did not seek judicial
review, which apportionment the Executive Director
concluded was beyond the scope of the proceeding, and (2)
the hearing officer's entry of findings concerning Auto Tire,
even though Auto Tire was not a party even at the
administrative level. Expressly treating these two
jurisdictional concerns does not, of itself, answer the
separate question of whether the Executive Director
accepted all of the hearing officer's factual findings.
In conclusion, the Executive Director's broad, conclusory
findings, standing alone, are not adequate to permit proper
review. The Executive Director's final order, which makes
no specific reference to the hearing officer's findings, but
rather suggests the Executive Director intended to formulate
his own set of findings to which the hearing officer's
findings would not be considered supplemental, prevents us
from looking to the hearing officer's Recommended
Decision to supply the detail necessary for meaningful
judicial review.

which, inter alia, called attention to the questionable
evidentiary foundation of some of the hearing officer's
findings. In rendering his decision, it is almost as though the
Executive Director saw as the path ofleast resistance the
substitution of generalized findings rather than having to
come to terms with the allegedly insufficient evidentiary
basis for the hearing officer's key findings.
[3] If our inferences are wrong and it was always the
Executive Director's intent to adopt as his own the findings
of the hearing officer, it will be easy for him to say so. If, as
we speculate in note 2, he had concerns about the basis for
some of the findings, the proper approach is not to
generalize the findings so the specific concerns are
submerged, but to face them head on. Different subsidiary
findings may well emerge, but the degree of detail offered
by the hearing officer is a good guide to how much detail
the Executive Director should offer if he intends to deviate
from the recommended fmdings.
Requiring the Executive Director to provide detailed
findings is more than an academic exercise. See Adams,
821 P.ld at 7-8 (explaining that detailed findings arc critical
to a tribunal's analytical process). Because he has not
explicitly adopted the hearing officer's findings, we look to
the Executive Director's findings to provide us with the
factual basis for his decision. Thus, as in Adams, "[b]ecause
of the matrix of factual possibilities in the present case, we
are unable to conduct a meaningful review" without
detailed factual findings that disclose the steps by which the
Executive Director reached his decision. Id. at 7.

For the reasons stated above, we reverse the Order of the
Executive Director upholding the Order to Abate, and
remand for the entry of adequate findings. [3)
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ., concur.

Notes:
[I] The order states, with our emphasis, that 11[h]aving
reviewed the transcript of the hearing, exhibits,
recommended decision, and comments of petitioners and
respondent on the Recommended Decision, the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order are
entered in these proceedings."
[2] We note that the Executive Director had the benefit of
post-Recommended Decision comments from the parties
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INDUSTRIAL

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY.

No. 7751.
~

the plaintiffs by agreements in writing give the exclusive
right (subject to an exception not important here) to solicit
orders for the sale and installation of Rusco Windows and
products in a certain territory at prices fixed by the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs furnish all order fonns and dealers
are required to submit all orders solicited by them to the
plaintiffs for acceptance within five days after procuring
them. When the plaintiffs accept an order it becomes a
contract between the customer and them. Dealers are
precluded by their agreement with the plaintiffs from
referring the orders which they solicit to any one but the
plaintiffs. If a sale made by a dealer requires financing, the
dealer must complete certain forms furnished by the
plaintiffs giving necessary infonnation. All credit
investigations are made by the plaintiffs. Dealers receive a
commission on the orders which the plaintiffs accept, the
commission being usually paid after the products have been
installed.

Supreme Court of Utah.
September 3, 1953
Page74S
(123 Utah 424) Herbert B. Maw, Salt Lake City, for
appellants.
E. R. Callister, Atty. Gen., and Fred F. Dremann, Salt Lake
City, for respondent.

WOLFE, Chief Justice.
Certiorari to review a decision of the Board of Review of
the Industrial Commission affirming the decision of the
Appeals Referee that the plaintiffs are liable for
contributions to the Unemployment Compensation Fund on
moneys paid by them to certain 'franchise dealers' who
solicited orders for the sale of the plaintiffs' windows and
other products; also to certain 'contract installers' who
installed the plaintiffs' windows in buildings. The case
presents for our determination whether the 'franchise
dealers' and 'contract installers' were in the employment of
the plaintiffs within the meaning of the Employment
Secwity Act, Section 35--4-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated,
1953.
The plaintiffs are partners engaged in the business of
distributing Rusco Windows and other products
manufactured
(123 Utah 425] by the F. C. Rusco Company of Cleveland,
Ohio. Sales of the products are made by individuals and
corporations denominated by the plaintiffs as 'franchise
dealers,' hereinafter referred to simply as dealers, to whom

By their agreements with the plaintiffs, dealers may not
handle, sell or distribute any other products, although there
was testimony adduced that some dealers did, in fact, solicit
sales of products not carried by the plaintiffs. The dealers
work when and as they desire, pay their own expenses, hire
help, if needed, at their own expense, and operate from their
own homes or offices. They do, however, use the plaintiffs'
office telephone as a reference in their selling activities and
the plaintiffs provide a table at its office for the use of the
dealers. While the dealers develop some of their own
prospects, they are aided by leads furnished by the plaintiffs
and placed by them in the dealers' individual mail boxes at
the plaintiffs' office. Because the plaintiffs have sales and
installation quotas to meet, the services of dealers who do

(123 Utah 426) not produce sufficiently are tenninated by
the plaintiffs. Only five days' notice of tennination need be
given to the dealers by the plaintiffs.
Before commencing work, dealers are given training by the
plaintiffs or by factory representatives to acquaint them
with the products which they will sell. During their training
period, the length of which depends upon their previous
sales experience,
Page 746

prospective dealers arc classed as employees by the
plaintiffs and unemployment contributions are paid on their
earnings.
Windows sold by the dealers are installed by persons who
usually have full or part time employment elsewhere. Like
the dealers, installers are given training by the plaintiffs to
familiarize them with how the windows should be installed.
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After this training, the plaintiffs enter into a written

agreement with each installer whereby the latter agrees to
furnish all necessary tools and to perform the service
necessary to install the products sold by the dealers in a
workmanlike manner. The agreements between the
plaintiffs and the installers provide that they may be
cancelled on five days' notice by either party. When going
on an installation job, the installer obtains at the plaintiffs'
premises the windows or other products which have been
fabricated by the plaintiffs or which have been received by
the plaintiffs in a fabricated state. He also signs a receipt for
them, and obtains a list of specifications for the installation
which involves 20 points on standard jobs. After
transporting the products in his own truck to the job and
after installing the products pursuant to the specifications,
the installer returns a completed form to the plaintiffs
verifying that the materials have been installed, whereupon
he is paid. The amount of payment received by the installers
for the installation of windows is fixed by the plaintiffs, but
on certain other jobs the installers often bid on the amount
for which they will do the work. While the work of the
installer is usually not inspected by the plaintiffs, they do
occasionally inspect and sometimes
(123 Utah 427) the franchise dealer who obtained the job
inspects the work to make certain that the customer is
satisfied.
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that neither the dealers
nor the installers were in their 'employment• but that the
relationship ofvendor-vendee existed between the dealers
and them and that the installers were 'independent
contractors' outside the scope of the Employment Security
Act. In determining the merits of the plaintiffs' contention,
the following definitions found in subsections of Section
35-4-22 of the Act should be borne in mind:
'{j)(l) 'Employment' means any service performed prior to
January 1, 1941, which was employment as defined in the
Utah Unemployment Compensation Law prior to the
effective date of this act, and subject to the other provisions
of this subsection, service performed after December 31,
1940, including service in interstate commerce, and service
as an officer of a corporation performed for wages or under
any contract of hire written or oral, express or implied.'
'(p) 'Wages' means all remuneration for personal services,
including commissions and bonuses and the cash value of
all remuneration in any medium other than cash. Gratuities
customarily received by an individual in the course of his
employment from persons other than his employing unit
shall be treated as wages received from his employing unit.
The reasonable cash value of remuneration in any medium
other than cash and the reasonable amount of gratuities
shall be estimated and detennined in accordance with the

rules prescnoed by the Commission;•••.•
If the dealers and the installers rendered services for the
plaintiffs for wages or under a contract of hire, then the
plaintiffs had persons in their employment and are liable for
contnoutions on their wages unless those persons are
excluded from the Act by the exclusion test contained in
Section 35-4-22(j)(S)(A), (B) and (C), which test we will
consider later in this opinion.
We find in the record competent evidence from which the
Board of Review could have rcaaonably concluded that
both the dealers and the installers were rendering services
(123 Utah 428) for the plaintiffs for 'wages' as that term is
defined in the Act. This court held in Creameries of
America, Inc., v. lndustrlal Comm.• 98 Utah 571, 102 P.2d
300, 304, that the word 'services' while not defined in the
Act, should be given a broad meaning. Said the court,
speaking through Mr. Justice McDonough, 'In ordinary
usage the tenn 'services' has a rather broad and general
meaning. It includes generally
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any act performed for the benefit of another under some
arrangement or agreement whereby such act was to have
been performed.' We further stated that all remuneration
payable for personal services is 'wages.'
The plaintiffs were in the business of fabricating, selling
and installing Rusco products. To make their business
successful, customers to purchase their products had to be
obtained. In this endeavor, services were rendered to the
plaintiffs by the dealers who solicited orders for the
purchase of Rusco Windows and products. When the
plaintiffs accepted an order obtained by a dealer, there arose
a contract between the plaintiffs and the customer for the
sale and installation of the plaintiffs' products. The plaintiffs
are the sole distributors in this state of Rusco Windows and
products and thus are the only persons who could accept the
orders and supply the windows. The dealers by their
agreement with the plaintiffs could not refer their orders to
any one other than the plaintiffs. The orders were written up
on forms supplied by the plaintiffs; prices for the windows
were fixed by the plaintiffs, and dealers had to submit
orders to them within five days after obtained. The dealers
did not have legal title to the products for which they
obtained orders. Title reposed in the plaintiffs. It was their
products which the dealers sold, unlike the case of Fuller
Brush Co. v. Jndustrial Comm.• 99 Utah 97, 104 P.2d 201,

129 A.L.R. 511, where this court held that certain dealers
selling brushes manufactured by the plaintiff owned the
brushes, and thus in selling those
(123 Utah 429) brushes they were rendering service for
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themselves and not for the plaintiff company.

the plaintiff in distnbuting those products to its customers.

Under the definition of wages given in the Act, which
definition is set out above, it is clear that the dealers'
remuneration constituted wages. That the dealers'
remuneration was a commission is manifest from paragraph
14 of the agreement between the plaintiffs and the dealers:

Having determined then that both the dealers and the
installers performed services for 'wages' for the plaintiffs,
we must next ascertain whether the dealers and the
installers are excluded from the operation of the Act by the
test posed in Section 3S-4-22(j)(S){A), (B), and (C),
providing that

This franchise dealer shall be entitled to a commission on
any contract secured by him from customer after said
contract has been approved by the distributor [plaintiffs]
and after the products ordered by the customer have been
installed and invoiced and the commission to be fixed by
and in accordance with a discount or commission schedule
maintained by the distributor at its office in Salt Lake City,
Utah. The distributor agrees on written request to provide in
writing to the franchise dealer the amount of commission
called for on any particular contract or order secured by this
franchise dealer.'
The dealers were, in effect, agents who solicited orders for
the sale of their principals' goods and were compensated
therefor by a commission on their sales.
There can be no question but what the installers were
performing services for the plaintiffs for 'wages.' After the
plaintiffs accepted an order, they were obligated by contract
to furnish and install the products. The installers performed
a fulfillment of the plaintiffs which was in fulfillment of the
plaintiffs' contract with the customer. When the plaintiffs
needed some one to install windows, they notified one of
the installers who called at the plaintiffs' place of business
and obtained the windows and any other necessary
materials, along with a list of specifications. After
completing the job, he returned a completed fonn to the
plaintiffs verifying that the windows had been installed and
received compensation governed by a schedule fonnulated
by the plaintiffs.
The service perfonned by the dealers and installers for the
plaintiffs is analogous to the service found to be

[123 Utah 430) rendered for the newspaper publishing
company by its newspaper carriers in the case of Salt Lake
Tribune Publishing Co. v. Industrial Comm., 99 Utah 259,
l 02 P .2d 307. There the company was interested in seeing
that its newspaper reached its subscribers and in order to
accomplish that result it entered into a contract whereby a
carrier was to perfonn the service of delivering its
newspapers. Similarly, in Creameries of America Inc. v.
Industrial Comm., supra, we held that one Foss, who was a
'franchise dealer' of the plaintiff's products was rendering
personal services for wages for
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'(j)(5) Services performed by an individual for wages or
under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or
implied, s.hall be deemed to be employment subject to this
act unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the
commission that'(A) such individual has been and will continue to be free
from control or direction over the performance of such
services, both under bis contract of hire and in fact; and
'(B) such service is either outside the usual course of the
business for which such service is performed or that such
service is performed outside of all the places of business of
the enterprise for which such service is performed; and
'(C) such individual is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession, or
business of the same nature as that involved in the contract
of service.'
It will be noted that the three requirements of the test are
stated conjunctively and hence all three requirements must
be met if the services rendered for the plaintiffs are to be
excluded from the Act.
(123 Utah 431) Assuming for the purposes of this decision
that the evidence compels a finding that the dealers and
installers met the requirements of both (A) and (B), there is
evidence in the record from which the Board of Review
could have reasonably concluded that requirement (C) was
not met, i. e. that neither the dealers nor the installers were
'customarily engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, profession or business of the same nature as
that involved in the contract of service.' In Fuller Brush Co.
v. Industrial Comm., supra, we pointed out that a shoe
shiner, an auto mechanic, a plumber and a barber meet this
requirement because the services which they perform
emanate as a part of a business in which they are engaged.
They perform services for others while in the pursuit of a
business independently established and in which they are
customarily engaged and for which service, like a common
carrier, they hold themselves out to perform. The plaintiffs
urge that each dealer was customarily engaged in the
independently established business of salesmanship. This
contention is untenable. Requirement (C) contemplates that
the service rendered is a part of, and is rendered in
pursuance of, a business of the person rendering the service,
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independently established, in which that person is
customarily engaged. In other words, the 'independently
established business' must exist independent of the services
under consideration in the sense that it is the whole-of
which the particular service is a part. In Fuller Brush Co. v.
Industrial Comm., supra [99 Utah 97. 104 P.2d 203], it was

stated:
'Plaintiff contends that the provision [requirement C] refers
wholly to the service involved, and argues that if in
rendering such service, claimant was acting for himself he
was engaged in a business of his own, and therefore during
such employment was customarily engaged in an
independently established business. The difficulty with this
position is that it ignores entirely the significance of the
words 'customarily' and 'independently.' The statute does
not say. as the

(123 Utah 432) Colorado court read it in Industrial Comm.
v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 103 Colo. 550, 88
P .2d 560, 'independently engaged in an established
business,' • • •. The adverb 'independently' clearly modifies
the word 'established,' and must therefore carry the meaning
that the 'business' or 'trade' was established independently
of the employer or the rendering of the personal service
forming the basis of the claim. And in the exclusion clauses
(j)(S), or perhaps more correctly the clauses making
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the exception from the general inclusion of all persons
rendering personal services for wages, the present tense 'is'
indicates the employee must be engaged in such
independent business at the time of rendering the service
involved. 'Customarily' means usually, habitually,
according to the customs, general practice or usual order of
things, regularly.'

By their agreements with the plaintiffs, dealers were not
allowed to sell products not carried by the plaintiffs,
although there was testimony that some dealers did not in
fact abide by this restriction. However, it is not enough that
the dealers may have other sources of income. In selling
such other products the dealers were not pursuing an
independently established business, but rather working
under contract of employment with other parties. The
dealers paid nothing for their franchises or dealerships.
They were prohibited by their agreements with the plaintiffs
from assigning their franchises to any one else. The risk of
profit and loss was all in the plaintiffs. Selling for the
plaintiffs was the only or at least the main business of the
dealers, if indeed it can be called a business. They bad
nothing aside from their relationship with the plaintiffs.
When the services of a dealer were tenninated by the
plaintiffs, he became unemployed and had to secure
employment elsewhere. He had no business of his own to

fall back on-a business established independently of his
relationship with the plaintiffs and from which bis services
for the plaintiffs emanate, a business in which be was
customarily engaged aside from his relationship with the
plaintiffs. The dealers' occupation was selling, but they had
no independently established business as do brokers or
commission merchants. None of the dealers

[123 Utah 433) held themselves
operating a sales agency.

out to the public as

In holding that the dealers do not satisfy requirement (C),
we are supported by two cases heretofore decided by this
court on this point. In Globe Grain & Milling Co. v.
Industrial Comm., 98 Utah 36, 91 P.2d 512, one Thomas
was engaged in soliciting orders for sheep pellets prepared
by the plaintiff. Like the dealers in the instant case, Thomas
was restricted to a certain territory and took orders on
company fonns. The only other remunerative work which
he did during the period of time that he was selling pellets
was to sell a car of com for a party in Nebraska and to refer
to one Maxfield, a dealer or broker in feed, customers to
whom he was unable to sell. There was also evidence that
Thomas attempted to sell insurance when the pellet selling
business was slow. This court upheld a determination by the
Commission that the evidence did not satisfy requirement
(C). Thomas's occupation was selling. He had sold
insurance before becoming employed by the plaintiff. But
he was not at the time of his employment with the plaintiff
customarily engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, profession or business.
In Creameries ofAmerica, Inc. v. Industrial Comm., 98
Utah 571, 102 P.2d 300,306, one Foss entered in a contract
called a 'franchise agreement' with the plaintiff in which
Foss was given the exclusive right to sell its products at
retail in a defined area. We sustained findings by the
Commission that there existed a service relationship
between Foss and the plaintiff and that Foss was not
customarily engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, profession or business. In regard to the latter
finding, this court stated that after the tennination of the
'franchise agreement' Foss had 'nothing, except what credits
he might have as a result of obtaining new customers for the
company, or what bills he might have outstanding.'
(Emphasis added.)
(123 Utah 434) What we have said in regard to the dealers
applies equally as well to the installers. Their situation
differs from the dealers only in that a small fraction of their
time was consumed in rendering services for the plaintiffs
whereas the dealers spent almost all, if not all, their working
time performing services for the plaintiffs. However, this
difference does not strengthen their case insofar as meeting
requirement (C). The evidence reveals that two of the
installers were regularly employed by the Kennecott
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Copper Company,

times, which seems to be entirely unrelated to, and has
nothing whatsoever to do with the contractual obligations or
the manner in which the service is rendered.

Page750
one by the United States Smelting & Refining Company,
one was a salesman, and another's occupation was
unknown. It is readily apparent that because the installers
were so employed, their services which they rendered for
the plaintiffs did not emanate from any independently
established business in which they were customarily
engaged. To the contrary, they were customarily engaged in
employment elsewhere for other employers. None of them
were licensed contractors or self-employed carpenters or
craftsmen.
Both the plaintiffs' agreements with the dealers and with
the installers specified that the dealers and installers were
independent contractors and not agents or employees of the
plaintiffs. A similar provision was contained in the
'franchise agreement' under consideration in Creameries of
America, Inc. v. Industrial Comm., supra. Such provisions,
however, are ineffective in keeping an individual without
the purview of the Employment Security Act when by his
activity he brings himself within--just as parties sharing
profits cannot avoid becoming partners with its attending
legal liability despite any agreement which they make to the

contrary.
The decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission is affirmed Each party to bear its own costs.

McDONOUGH and WADE, JJ., concur.

It appears to me that the foregoing gives rise to a question

as to whether the application of the statute results in unjust
discrimination as between employees which fall into
different classes solely because of(C) of (J)(S)
[123 Utah 436) referred to in the main opinion which
specified that a person hired who is 'customarily engaged in
an independently established trade * * • of the same na~
as that involved in the contract of service. * • *' is not
covered
lliustration: Suppose A and B work for Leach under the
identical contract; that A is also employed by X Company
in other type of work; that B bas an independently
established business as an 'installer,' builder, or contractor.
Under this statute A would be covered while B would not.
There are these separate facets of discrimination:

1. In case of layoff A gets paid unemployment
compensation benefits, while B does not.
2. A will suffer disadvantage in getting hired on the job
because the employer will more readily hire B for whom
such contributions need not be made.
There is also a limitation upon the employer's freedom to
choose between A and B upon their merits because of the
economic

(123 Utah 435) CROCKETT, Justice.
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I concur, but note a problem which arises under the statute
[ 1] in question.

0j

It bas long been established that whether one rendering
service for another is covered by the unemployment
compensation docs not depend upon any common law
concept of master and servant or independent contractor
relationship,-the law defines classes of individuals covered
and it is only to the definitions in the act that we look to
determine who is included. [2] The purpose of the Act was
to stabilize the economy and decrease the burdens of
unemployment (3) These matters are well settled and are
effectively covered in the main opinin.
The right to coverage by unemployment compensation
presumably is based upon the relationship existing between
the individual who hires and the one rendering service; their
mutual rights and duties being measured by the contract
between them. But under test 'C' upon which the main
opinion is based, coverage is made to depend upon a
circumstance entirely extraneous to the contract of service:
that is, it depends upon what the 'employee' does at other

advantage to be gained by hiring B instead of A.
It is appreciated that there may be a discrimination between
classes of individuals if there is some reasonable basis for
differentiation between them which is related to the
purposes sought to be accomplished by the act and it
applies uniformly to all persons within the class. [4] I am
not sure that I see that the differentiation brought about by
paragraph (C) above referred to can be said to fulfill that
requirement. Sparing the detail here, it seems that there are
as good reasons why B should be paid as there
(123 Utah 437) are that A should, and that A should be as
able to get hired as B, consistent with the. purpose of
relieving the hardship of unemployment and stabilizing the
economy.
So far as I have discovered, this problem has not been
considered by this court in any of the cases dealing with this
statute; it is not raised, nor passed upon in this case. I
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therefore concur in the opinion of Chief Justice WOLFE.

HENRIOD, J., dissents.

Notes:
[1] 35-4-1 et seq., U.C.A.1953.

~

[2] Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 104

Utah 175, 134 P.2d 479. Auth. there cited.
[3] Ibid.
[4] State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920, 117 A.L.R.
330; Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement System, Utah,
246 P.2d 591.

~
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from the Utah Court of Appeals. The court of appeals
reversed the Commission's order and remanded the matter
to the Commission to award Martinez benefits. We granted
certiorari to determine (1) whether the court of appeals
applied the correct standard of review, and (2) whether the
employee or the employer bears the burden of proof when
an employee seeks compensation under Utah Code section
34A-2-413(1)(c).
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164 P.Jd 384 (Utah 2007)

2007UT42
Enrique MARTINEZ, Respondent,

Original Proceeding in the Utah Court of Appeals

'i 2 Regarding the first issue, the court of appeals reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard the Commission's
determination that Martinez could perform the "essential
functions" of his prior employment, as well as its
determination that other work was "reasonably available" to
him. Because we conclude that the court of appeals should
have reviewed these determinations under a substantial
evidence standard, we remand them to the court of appeals
for consideration under the appropriate standard of review.
With regard to the second issue, we conclude that an
employee seeking an award of permanent total disability
bears the burden of proving each of the four elements
specified under section 34A-2-413(l)(c).
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BACKGROUND

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

1 3 On October 28, 1996, while performing temporary
work as a movie extra for Medi~ Martinez slipped and fell
on a wet floor, suffering injury to his cervical spine and

v.

MEDIA-PAYMASTER PLUS/CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATIER-DAY SAINTS, and Labor
Commission of Utah, Pedtloners.

Nos.20050745,20050750.
Supreme Court of Utah
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Richard R. Burlce, Salt Lake City, for respondent
Merrill F. Nelson, Christian S. Collins, Salt Lake City, for
Media-Paymaster Plus
Alan L. Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for Labor Commission
Floyd W. Holm, Murray,
CompensationFundofUtah

for

amicus

Workers'

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

PARRISH, Justice

INTRODUCTION

1

1 Enrique Martinez petitioned the Utah Labor
Commission (the nCommission") for an award of permanent
total disability compensation against his former employer,
Media-Paymaster Plus ("Media"). After an administrative
law judge (the 11 ALJ11 ) denied his claim and the Commission
confirmed the decision, Martinez sought a writ of review

right shoulder. Martinez had retired from state employment
in 1995 after working for 28 years as a maintenance
specialist. At the time of the accident, he was working
part-time at a McDonald's restaurant He continued to work
there until December 1996. In September 1997, Martinez
tried to return to work at Medi~ but no work was available.
At that time, Martinez also tried to return to light-duty work
at McDonald's but was told no such work was available.
Martinez has not worked since leaving McDonald's in
December 1996.

1 4 On July 31, 2000, Martinez filed an action with the
Commission to compel Media to pay him permanent total
disability compensation for his injuries. Section 34A-2-413
of the Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act11 ) governs
permanent total disability detenninations. The relevant
portions of the Act are as follows:
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability
compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to
show by a preponderance of evidence that:

(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment ... as a
result of the industrial accident or occupational disease that
gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement;
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(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and

(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the
direct cause of the employee's permanent total disability.
(c) To find an employee pennanently totally disabl~ the
commission shall conclude that:

(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
Page388
(ii) the employee has an impairment . . . that limit[s] the
employee's ability to do basic work activities;

(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment ...
prevent[s] the employee from performing the essential
functions of the work activities for which the employee has
been qualified until the time of the industrial accident or
occupational disease that is the basis for the employee's
permanent total disability claim; and
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably
available, taking into consideration the employee's:
(A) age;
(B) education;
(C) past work experience;
(D) medical capacity; and
{E) residual functional capacity.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b)-(c) (2005) (amended

2006).

prior job and other reasonably available work, and (2) the
Commission incorrectly allocated the burden of proof.
Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, Inc., 2005 UT App 308,

119, 13, 16, 117P.3d 1074.

'If 7 In reversing the Commission on the first issue, the court
of appeals reviewed for abuse of discretion the
Commission's application of its findings of fact to the law.
The court held that the Commission had abused its
discretion in concluding that Martinez could perform the
essential functions of a fast-food worlcer, id.,i110-13, and
in concluding that other work was reasonably available to
Martinez, id. 11 1,4.15.

1 8 In reversing the Commission on the second issue, the
court of appeals focused on the differences in language
between Utah Code section 34A-2-413(l)(c) ("subsection
(c)") and Utah Code section 34A-2-413(l)(b) ("subsection
{b)").[1] Subsection {b) delineates three elements for which
an "employee has the burden of proof' in order to establish
entitlement to benefits for pennanent total disability.
Subsection (c) sets out four additional items that the
"Commisaion shall conclude" before finding an employee
permanently totally disabled. After detennining that the
statute was ambiguous with respect to which party bears the
burden of proof under subsection (c), the court analyzed
punctuation rules, canons of statutory construction, and
public policy. It then determined that the employer bore the
burden of proof under subsection (c)./d.117-9.
1 9 We granted certiorari on two issues: (1) whether the
court of appeals applied the correct standard in reviewing
the Commission's order, and (2) whether the employee or
the employer bears the burden of proof under Utah Code
section 34A-2-413(l)(c).

1 5 The AU denied Martinez's claim, finding that Martinez

ANALYSIS

"failed to prove that he cannot perfonn the essential
functions of worlc he was qualified to perfonn, and . . .
failed to prove that there is no other worlc reasonably
available." Following the denial of his claim by the AU,
Martinez appealed to the Commission. The Commission
confirmed the AU's decision that Martinez had failed to
satisfy two of the elements required to establish pennanent
total disability under section 34A-2-413. First, using
Martinez's work at McDonald's as a benchmark, the
Commission concluded that Martinez bad failed to show
that his impairments prevented him from perfonning the
essential functions of his position at McDonald's. Second,
the Commission concluded that Martinez bad failed to
prove that he was unable to perform other reasonably
available worlc.

1 IO Regarding the first issue, we conclude that the court of
appeals should have reviewed

'ii 6 The court of appeals reversed the Commission's order,
holding that (I) the Commission abused its discretion in
concluding that Martinez was capable of performing his
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the Commission's findings that Martinez could perfonn the
essential functions of his prior employment and that other
work was reasonably available to him l!llder a substantial
evidence standard but, in fact, improperly reweighed the
Commission's factual determinations under the guise of
reviewing the application of facts to law. Because the court
of appeals should have considered these issues under a
substantial evidence standard, we reverse and remand for
consideration under the appropriate standard of review.
,i 11 We similarly reverse the court of appeals' holding on
the second issue. As a threshold matter, we find that the
court of appeals correctly reviewed the Commission's
statutory
interpretation
of Utah
Code
section
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34A-2-413(1 )(c) for correctness. We find, however, that the
employee bears the burden of proof under section
34A-2-413(l)(c) because, when subsections (b) and (c) are
read in contex~ it is clear that subsection (c) delineates the
elements an employee must prove to meet his subsection
(b)(ii) burden of establishing that he is permanently totally
disabled.

L STANDARD OF REVIEW

'ii 12 We first consider Martinez's argument that the
Commission's factual findings arc inadequate as a matter of
law. We then tum to Media's contention that the court of
appeals erred by reviewing the Commission's factual
findings despite Martinez's failure to marshal the evidence.
Having disposed of these two threshold matters, we then
consider the appropriate standard of review.

the respective abilities of each individual employee. On the
basis of this evidence, the Commission compared
Martinez's abilities with the essential functions of fast-food
work and concluded that "Mr. Martinez's work-related
impairments do not prevent him from performing such
functions." Thus, the Commission's failure to directly
address Martinez's sitting and standing limitations or to
allow for some task modification in reaching its conclusion
that other work was reasonably available does not warrant
reversal as a matter of law.

B. Clarification ofthe Marshaling Requirement

1 16 During oral argument, Media argued that the court of
appeals was required to dismiss Martinez's factual challenge
to the
Page390

A. The Commission's Factual Findings Are Not Inadequate

as a Matter ofLaw

Commission's order because Martinez failed to properly
marshal the evidence. Media further argued that this failure

1 13 Martinez argues that if the essential functions of his
prior work and the reasonable availability of other work are
factual issues, the Commission's factual findings on these
issues are so inadequate as to require their reversal as a
matter of law. In essence, Martinez argues that there is no
"logical and legal basis for the [Commission's] ultimate
conclusions," see Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986), and that
consequently, this court bas no principled basis on which to
sustain its factual findings, see Mountain States Legal
Found. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 636 P.2d 1047, 1051-52
(Utah 1981 ). In such an instance, marshaling is not required
because "the findings are so inadequate that they cannot be
meaningfully challenged as factual detenninations."
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Cl App.
1991).

alone constitutes reversible error.[2] Media's argument is
not well-taken and, in fact. evinces a fundamental
misunderstanding of the marshaling obligation. We
accordingly pause to clarify it.

1 14 Martinez contends that it was irrational for the
Commission to conclude that other work was reasonably
available in the face of testimony by a vocational expert
that Martinez could not perform any currently available
jobs without some task modification. Martinez further
points to the Commission's failure to mention Martinez's
sitting and standing limitations in concluding that Martinez
could perform the essential functions of his prior work. We
disagree.
1 15 The Commission's conclusion that available fast-food
positions could be modified to accommodate Martinez's
limitations is a logical finding based on the presented
evidence. Further, despite the Commission's failure to
mention the sitting and standing requirement, its order did
carefully consider Martinez's weight limitations on lifting
and pushing, evidence of symptom magnification, and the
fast-food industry's practice of assigning tasks according to

1 17 To successfully challenge an agency's factual findings,
the party "must marshall [sic] all of the evidence supporting
the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and
in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Grace
Drilling Co. v. Bd. ofReview ofIndus. Comm'n, 776 P.2d
63, 68 (Utah Ct App. 1989); accord Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9) (" A party challenging a fact finding must first
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
finding. ").[3] This requires counsel to construct the
evidence supporting the adversary's position, and then
"ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." West Valley City v.
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah CtApp.1991
). Compliance with this undertaking helps ensure that the
factual findings of the agency are overturned only when
lacking in substantial evidence.
1 I 8 In our zeal to emphasize the importance of the
marshaling requirement to parties, we have used language
implying that appellate courts are strictly bound to affinn
the accuracy of the agency's or trial court's factual findings
in the absence of tnaIShaling. See, e.g., United Park City
Minu Co., 2006 UT 35,132,140 P.3d 1200 ("Because [the
defendant] has failed to marshal the evidence supporting the
. . . award, . . . we cannot conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion."); Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp.,
2004 UT 28, , IO, 94 P.3d 193 ("The court of appeals does
not review the trial court's factual findings where the party
challenging those findings fails to marshal the evidence.
Instead, the court of appeals must assume that the record
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supports the findings of the trial court." (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)).

'J 19 Despite this language, the marshaling requirement is
not a limitation on the power of the appellate courts. Rather,
it is a tool pursuant to which the appellate courts impose on
the parties an obligation to assist them in conducting a
whole record review. It is not, itself, a rule of substantive
law. Consequently, parties that fail to marshal the evidence
do so at the risk that the reviewing court will decline, in its
discretion, to review the trial court's factual findings. See
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 1 82 n.16, 100 P.3d 1177
(explaining that the marshaling requirement is critical
because in its absence the appellate court 11must go behind
the trial court•s factual findings, 't which often requires a
"colossal commitment of time and resources").

1 20 The reviewing court, however, retains discretion to
consider independently the whole record and detennine if
the decision
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below bas adequate factual support. While parties have a
duty to marshal the evidence when challenging the factual
basis for a lower body's decision, we refrain, consistent with
the Rules of Appellate Procedure, from dictating the
remedy the court of appeals must impose when parties fail
to meet this requirement. Utah R. App. P. 24(b)(k) ("Briefs
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken,
on motion or sua sponte by the court .... " (emphasis added)).

1 21 In short, parties remain obligated by our rules to
marshal the evidence when challenging the factual findings
of a lower court. We refrain, however, from limiting the
appellate courts' discretion by mandating a particular
remedy when parties fail to meet this requirement. Having
determined that the court of appeals retained the discretion
to review Martinez's challenge to the Commission's factual
findings, we tum to the standard of review question on
which we granted certiorari.
C. Whether Martinez Could Pe,form the "Essential
Functions" ofFast-Food Work and Whether Other Work
Was ''Reasonably Available" to Him Are Factual Questions
We Review for Substantial Evidence

1 22 The court of appeals applied an abuse of discretion
standard in reviewing the Commission's conclusions that
Martinez .,could perfonn the 'essential functions• of a fast
food worker and that other work was 'reasonably available'
for him." Marlinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2005 UT App
308, ,i 10, 117 P.3d 1074 (quoting Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-413(l)(c)(iii), (iv) (2005) (amended 2006)). The
court of appeals appears to have based its selection of this
standard of review on its conclusion that ( l) the Act

impliedly grants discretion to the Commission to apply "the
facts to the Act"; and (2) it would consequently review only
the Commission's application of the "facts that it found to
the law. 11 Id. 'tf110-11.

,i 23 We conclude that the court of appeals erred in
applying an abuse of discretion standard of review because
the provisions of Utah Code section 34A-2-413 call for a
factual determination. As a result, the court of appeals
actually reweighed the Commission•s factual determinations
under the guise of applying the undisputed facts to the law.
Because determining the "essential functions" of prior
employment and ascertaining whether other work is
"reasonably available" are factual issues, we remand the
matter to the court of appeals for consideration under a
substantial evidence standard of review.

1 24 Although we reverse the court of appeals with respect
to the standard of review, we acknowledge the difficult
issue it presents. Judicial review of Commission decisions
is governed by both Utah Code section 34A-2-801 and
Utah•s Administrative Procedures Act (the 11 UAPA"). Utah
Code Ann.
§ 34A-2-801(7)-(8) (2005). Section
63-46b-l6(4)(d) of the UAPA allows relief when "the
agency bas erroneously interpreted or applied the law... Id.§
63-46b-16(4)(d) (2004). Subsection (4)(g) allows relief
when .. the agency action is based on a determination of fact
. . . that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Id. §
63-46b-l6(4)(g). Finally, subsection (4)(b)(i) allows relief
when an agency action is 11an abuse of the discretion
delegated to the agency by statute." Id.
§
63-46b-16(4)(h)(i); see alsoAmeritemps, Inc. v. Labor
Comm'n, 2005 UT App 491, 'tl 8, 128 P.3d 31 (finding that
an abuse of discretion standard should be used 11when an
agency has discretion to apply its factual findings to the
law" (citation omitted)).
, 25 The court of appeals is correct that agency actions are
reviewed for abuse of discretion when there is an express or
implied delegation within the statute. That truism, however,
does not dictate the appropriate standard of review because
codifying a factual issue does not transform an issue from
one of fact to a mixed question of law and fact for purposes
of detennining the appropriate standard of review. Our task,
therefore. is to determine, first, whether "essential
functions" and "reasonably available" are factual, legal, or
mixed issues and, second, the appropriate standard of
review.
Page392

'tl 26 We discussed the distinctions between legal, factual,
and mixed questions and their relationship to the
appropriate standard of review in State v. Pena. 869 P.2d
932, 935-37 (Utah 1994). There, we defined factual
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questions as "entailing the empirical, such as things, events,
actions, or conditions happening, existing, or taking place,
as well as the subjective, such as state of mind." Id. at 935.
In contrast, we defined legal determinations as "rules or
principles uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities
and status in similar circumstances." Id. We also recognized
a third category, "the application of law to fact," which asks
"whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a
given rule of law." Id. at 936.

1 27 Because the court of appeals analyzed whether the
undisputed facts adequately met the statutory requirements
of"essential functions" and "reasonably available,"[4] we
give this third category close consideration. See Martinez,
2005 UT App 308, ,I 11, 117 P.3d 1074. We begin with the
proposition that the existence of an articulable legal issue is
a necessary element of a mixed question. Pena. 869 P.2d at
931; see, e.g.• Pullman Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273,
290 n.19, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982)(defining a
mixed question of law and fact as occurring when
"historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law
is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the
statutory standard, or ... whether the rule of law as applied
to the established facts is or is not violated"). In other
words, a mixed question is one in which we must
determine when the articulated legal rule to be applied to a
set of facts-a rule that we establish without deference to the
trial courts-embodies a de facto grant of discretion which
permits the trial court to reach one of several possible
conclusions about the legal effect of a particular set of facts
without risking reversal.

Pena, 869 P.2d at 937.

1 28 Therefore, when determining whether an issue
presents a mixed question, we must first identify the legal
principle at issue. Our decision in Drake v. Industrial
Commission, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997), is iJlustrative.
There, we were asked whether the court of appeals
appropriately reviewed for legal correctness the issue of
whether the petitioner was injured in the scope of her
employment Id. at 180. The Labor Commissio~ along with
the employee's insurer, argued that scope of employment
detenninations were factual and consequently subject to a
substantial evidence standard ofreview. Id at 181 & n. 7.
We rejected this argument, holding that whether facts fall
under the "legal rule termed 'special errands,' . . . requires
some legal analysis." Id. Prior precedent and persuasive
authority had established a legal, albeit highly fact
dependent, rule for determining when a "special errand" fell
within an employee's scope of employment. Id. at 183.
Given the fact•dcpcndcnt nature of the inquiry, however,
we found that we could not "spell out in detail a legal rule
that will adequately anticipate the facts that should be
outcome determinative" for the policy behind the legal rule

to be served. Id. at 182 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Consequently, we determined that whether a "special
errand'' is within an employee's scope of employment is a
mixed question of law and fact requiring some deference.
Id. We further explained that when considering" 'whether a
given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of
law,' " id. at 181 (quoting Pena, 896 P.2d at 936), deference
to the lower court is created when a legal standard is
defined " 'so that it actually grants some operational
discretion to the trial courts applying it,' " id. (quoting State
v. Vincent. 883 P.2d 278, 282 (Utah 1994).

1 29 In summary, factual issues are generally empirical,
legal issues apply an abstract rule regardless of the specific
facts, and mixed questions generally arise when the
applicability of the legal rule turns on the combination of
present facts. Having undertaken
Page393
this attempt to flesh out the distinctions between questions
oflaw, questions offact, and mixed questions oflaw and
fact, we tum to the issues presen~ here.
1. Essential Functions

130 Whether certain tasks are "essential functions" varies
from job to job and industry to industry. A judge is
ill-equipped to determine, with his or her legal expertise,
the essential elements of a fast•food job. Rather, that
determination must be based on factual evidence and
testimony ftom those with experience in the industry.
Additionally, there is no legal rule that could create the
basis for a mixed question of fact and law. While the
adjective 1'essential" does introduce a level of abstraction
into the fact-finder's determination, it does not create a
mixed question any more than the modifier nreasonable"
changes the reasonable man standard into a legal
determination. Cf. Benson v. Ames, 604 P.2d 927,929 (Utah
1979) (finding that negligence under a reasonable man
standard is a factual determination disrupted on appeal only
if substantial evidence fails to support the trial court's
ruling). We consequently hold that the question of whether
an employee can perfonn the "essential functions" of prior
employment is a factual determination that should be
overturned on appeal only if substantial evidence fails to
support it
2. Reasonably Available
, 31 The second issue, whether other worlc was
"reasonably available" to Martinez, is a closer question. In
different contexts, reasonableness has been considered both
a legal and a factual question. See. e.g., Benson, 604 P.2d at
929 (finding that whether a defendant acted as a "reasonable
man" in a negligence case is an issue for the trier of fact that
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should not be disturbed on appeal if it is supported by
substantial evidence). But see, e.g., Evans v. State. 963 P.2d
177, 179 (Utah 1998) (finding that "reasonable cause" was
primarily a legal question in the antitrust arena, but that
appellate courts should grant the fact-finder a "measure of
discretion"); Salmon v. Davia Coun(V, 916 P.2d 890, 892
(Utah 1996) ("[T]he reasonableness of an award of attorney
fees ordinarily presents a question of law with some
measure of discretion given to the trial court.").
Additionally, the Labor Commission has defined
"reasonably available11 as "regular, steady, and readily
available" work, Utah Admin. Coder. 612-1-l0(O)(l)(b), a
definition that reads like a legal rule to be applied to a
factual situation.

1 32 Despite these countervailing examples, we conclude
that the question of whether other work is 11reasonably
availablelt is a factual determination. The statute asks the
Commission to determine if other work is reasonably
available, "talcing into consideration the employee's□
age; . . . education; ... past work experience; ... medical
capacity; and . . . residual functional capacity." Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv). These factual considerations
inform what is reasonable; its parameters are not further
defined by an overarching legal principle, as in the case of
reasonable suspicion, for example. See Pena. 869 P .2d at
939.

...

,i 33 Our conclusion that "essential functions" and
"reasonably available" are factual determinations is
consistent with both our prior precedent and the applicable
statutory language. First, we have traditionally viewed
permanent total disability determinations as factual. Hodges
v. W. Piling & Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718, 721 (Utah
1986); Kerans v. Indus. Comm'n, 713 P.2d 49, S4 (Utah
1986); Brundage v. IML Freight, Inc., 622 P.2d 790, 792
(Utah 1980); Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Jndus. Comm'n, 109
Utah 553,168 P.2d 319, 322 (Utah 1946). Second, as
discussed herein, the language of subsection (b) requires the
employee to prove permanent total disability by a
11
preponderance of the evidence. " using the elements of
subsection (c) to meet that evidentiary burden (emphasis
added).

,i 34 In sum, we conclude that the court of appeals
erroneously applied an abuse of discretion standard when
reviewing the Commission's factual findings that Martinez
was capable of performing the "essential functions" of his
prior job and that be was capable of performing other work
"reasonably available" to him.

Page394
D. The Correct Standard ofReview Is Substantial Evidence

1 35 Having determined that the correct standard of review

is substantial evidence, we pause to ·consider its
requirements. Substantial evidence exists when the factual
findings support "more than a mere scintilla of evidence ...
though something less than the weight of the evidence."
Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 776
P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct App. 1989) (internal quotation marlcs
and citation omitted, alteration in original). An
administrative law decision meets the substantial evidence
test when "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate11 the
evidence supporting the decision. Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).

1 36 In order to detennine whether a decision is supported
by substantial evidence, the reviewing court must consider
the whole record before the lower court. Whitear v. Labor
Comm'n, 973 P .2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1997)). Whole record
review considers the evidence in support of the
administrative finding, as well as evidence that detracts
from the finding. Id. To aid the appellate court in
conducting a whole record review, the party challenging the
factual findings must marshal all of the evidence and
demonstrate that, despite the facts supporting the decision,
the "findings are not supported by substantial evidence."
Grace Drilling Co., 776 P.2d at 68.
1 37 When we consider the actual substance of the court of
appeals' ruling that Martinez could not perform the
"essential functions" of his past employment, the effect of a
different standard of review becomes clear. For instance, it
does appear, as the court of appeals stated, that the
"Commission simply ignored the impact of the sitting and
standing limitation." Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus,
Inc., 2005 UT App 308, ~ 13, 117 P.3d 1074. However,
with the statement "The Commission ignored a significant
portion of an evaluation that it explicitly accepted," id.
(emphasis added), the court of appeals implicitly
acknowledged that some of the Commission's factual
findings were supportive of its ultimate conclusion. This
acknowledgment bas different implications under a
substantial evidence standard; if more than a scintilla of the
evidence supports the conclusion, then the Commission's
ruling should remain intact.
'f 38 As a natural consequence of selecting the wrong
standard of review, the court of appeals reweighed the facts
that fonned the basis of the Commission's conclusion that
other work was "reasonably available" under the guise of
applying the facts to the law. For example, the court of
appeals stated that the Labor Commission ignored Dr.
Bertsch's cross-examination testimony that no jobs in the
current market could accommodate Mr. Martinez's
limitations. Id. ,i 15. The Commission's order, however,
merely gave more weight to the portion of her testimony
that was more favorable to its factual findings. In fact, Dr.
Bertsch testified that she had contacted many local
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fast-food restaurants with open positions and their managers
expressed a willingness to hire someone with Martinez's
limitations. Although recognizing that some task
modification would be required, the Commission found that
fast-food work requires the completion of a "variety of tasks
... performed by a aew of several employees." It further
found that Martinez's educati~ work experience, and
language ability would increase his employability. This
evidence supports the Commission's conclusion that "Media
[had] presented persuasive evidence that many employers in
the fast-food business have work immediately available for
someone with Mr. Martinez' background and abilities."

'ii 42 We disagree and hold that the language of subsection
(c) grants the Commission authority to determine only
whether the facts presented meet the statute's requirements
for a finding of permanent total disability. It docs not
bestow on the Commission the authority to allocate the
burden of proof.

1 39 In sum, we find that the court of appeals should have
applied a substantial evidence standard of review to the
questions of whether Martinez could perform the "essential
functions" of his prior employment and whether other jobs
were "reasonably available" to him. Because it applied the
incorrect standard of review, the court of appeals
inappropriately reweighed the Commission's factual
findings under the guise of reviewing mixed questions of
law and fact. Consequently. we remand for a determination
under the correct standard of review.

1 43 Our conclusion in this regard is consistent with the
legislature's more general delegation of authority to the
Commission found in Utah Code section 34A-1-301, which
bestows on the Commission "the duty and the full power,
jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply
the law in this chapter or any other title or chapter it
administers." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-l-301 (2005). We
previously have held that section 34A-l-301 does not grant
the Commission discretion for statutory interpretation.
Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n. 2000 UT 66, 1 18, 7 P.3d 777.
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'ii 44 It is also consistent with our case law on implied
agency delegation. In Salt Lake City Corp. v. Department of
Employment Security, 651 P.2d 1312, 1315-17 (Utah 1982),
we acknowledged the Commission's latitude in affirming its
award of unemployment benefits to a state employee who
had voluntarily left her job. The statute at issue in that case
provided that wiemployment benefits were generally
wiavailable when employees volwitarily quit, but allowed
the Commission to award benefits when required by "equity
and good conscience." Id. at 1317. We conclude that this
language implicidy "bespeak[s] a legislative intent to
delegate . . . interpretation to the responsible agency.11
Morton, 814 P.2d at 588 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). In contrast, however, subsection (c) only
gives the Commission discretion to "find" the facts required
to establish the elements of permanent total disability.

II. THE EMPLOYEE BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROOF
UNDER UTAH CODE SECTION 34A-2--413(l)(c)

'tf 40 The parties and the amicus disagree on the standard of
review applicable to the Commission's ruling on the burden
of proof issue, so we consider this threshold matter first.
A. We Afford No Deference to the Commission on Matters

ofStatutory Construction

1 41 Burden of proof questions typically present issues of
law that an appellate court reviews for correctness. Beaver
County v. State Tax Comm'n, 916 P.2d 344, 357 (Utah
1996). Amicus Workers' Compensation Fund ("WCF"),
however, contends that we should defer to the
Commission's conclusion regarding the burden of proof
because the legislature impliedly granted the Commission
discretion to decide the issue wider Utah Code section
34A-2--413(l)(c). WCF reasons that "where the legislature
either expressly or implicitly grants [an] agency discretion
to interpret or apply a statutory term," appellate courts
should defer to the agency's interpretation unless it
constitutes an abuse of discretion. luckua v. Bd. of Review
ofIndus. Comm'n, 840 P.2d 811,813 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);
accord Morton Int'/, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of State Tax
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588-89 (Utah 1991) (superseded by
Utah Code section 59-1-610( 1)(b) for the specific instance
of administrative decisions by the Utah State Tax
Commission as stated in 49th St. Galleria v. Tax Comm'n,
Auditing Div.. 860 P.2d 996 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). WCF

contends that subsection (c) impliedly grants such
discretion to the Commission because the listed
requirements for a permanent total disability determination
are prefaced with the clause "the commission shall
conclude."

1 45 Our conclusion is also consistent with the principle
that grants of discretion to administrative agencies should
be limited to those issues on which the agencies have
"special experience or expertise placing [them} in a better
position than the courts to construe the law." King v. Indus.
Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Utah Ct App. 1993). Here,
however, there is nothing to suggest that the Commission is
in a better position than this court to construe the statutory
allocation of the burden of proof. We consequently hold
that the court of appeals appropriately applied a correctness
standard when assessing which party bore the burden of
proof under subsection (c).
Page 396
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B. The Employee Bears the Burden ofProving the Elements
ofPermanent Total Disability

functional capacity.
Id.§ 34A-2-413(l)(c) (amended2006).

,r

46 We review the court of appeals' statutory
interpretation of section 34A-2-413(l)(c) for correctness.
See State v. Ireland. 2006 UT 82, 1 6, 150 P.3d 532. When
interpreting statutes, we look first to the statute's plain
language with the primary objective of giving effect to the
legislature's intent Savage v. Utah Youth Vill, 2004 UT
102, ,r 18, 104 P.3d 1242. "We presume that the legislature
used each word advisedly" and read "each tezm according
to its ordinary and accepted meaning." State v. Barrett,
2005 UT 88, ,r 29, 127 P.3d 682 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Statutes should be read as a whole
and their provisions interpreted in harmony with related
provisions and statutes. Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ,r 17,
66P.3d592.

1 47 When the language of the stablte is plain, other
interpretive tools are not needed. Adams v. Swensen, 2005
UT 8, ,t 8, 108 P.3d 725. However, if the language is
ambiguous, the court may look beyond the statute to
legislative history and public policy to ascertain the statute's
intent Utah Pub. Employees Ass'n v. State, 2006 UT 9, ,i
59, 131 P.3d 208 (Parrish, J., concurring). When viewed
holistically, a statute is ambiguous if duplicative, yet
plausible meanings are not eliminated from possibility. Id. 1
60.
1 48 Having acknowledged these rules, we consider the
plain language of section 34A-2-413(1) of the Act, which
outlines the threshold requirements an employee must meet
to receive compensation for pennanent total disability.
Subsection (b) states that the employee has the burden of

proving three subparts: (i) that the employee was
significantly impaired as a result of an industrial accident or
occupational disease; (ii) that "the employee is permanently
totally disabled11 ; and (iii) that 11the industrial accident or
occupational disease was the direct cause of the employee's
permanent total disability." Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-4 l 3( 1)(b)(i)-(iii) (2005).
,i 49 We next twn to subsection (c), which states that "[t]o
find an employee permanently totally disabled, the
commission shall" reach four necessary conclusions:

(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; (ii) the
employee has an impairment or combination of
impairments that limit the employee's ability to do basic
work activities; (iii) the . . . impairments prevent the
employee from performing the essential functions of the
work activities for which the employee has been qualified
until the time of the industrial accident . . . and (iv) the
employee cannot perform other work reasonably available,
taking into consideration the employee's age; education;
past work experience; medical capacity; and residual

1 50 Although subsection (c) does not explicitly allocate
the burden of proot: a reading of the statute as a whole
makes clear that it falls to the employee. Both subsections
(b) and (c) include the same critical phrase: "permanently
totally disabled." Subsection (b)(ii) cursorily states that "the
employee has the burden of proof to show by a
preponderance of evidence that" he or she "is permanently
totally disabled." It is unclear, however, from the wording
of subsection (b){ii) what is required for the employee to
prove permanent total disability. Subsection (c) simply
enumerates those requirements. In short, subsection (c)
imbues subsection (b)(ii) with meaning.
,i 51 The court of appeals' interpretation, allocating
subsection (c)'s burden of proof to the employer, renders
meaningless the employee's responsibility to prove
permanent total disability under (b)(ii). We avoid
construing "a particular provision of a statute so as to
neutralize ... other provisions if any other construction of
the particular provision is at all tenable." Chris & Dick's
Lumber &Hardware v. TaxComm'n, 791 P.2d 511, 516
(Utah 1990) (Howe, J., dissenting).

1 52 The plain language of subsection (c) further bolsters
our interpretation that the employee bears the bmden of
proof. In each of subsection (c)'s four subparts, "the
employee" must be in a particular posture in order to be
found pennanently totally disabled. These elements of
prooftumon
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intimate facts about the employee's circumstances--his
unemployment or how his medical capacity or age affects
his ability to do reasonably available work, for example.
The fact that the employee is in the best position to proffer
evidence relevant to these factual detenninations further
supports our interpretation that the employee bears the
burden of proof under subsection (c).
'j 53 The court of appeals' interpretation, on the other band,
mandates that the employer disprove the elements of
subsection (c), which would require judicially created
additions to and subtractions from the statute's plain
language. For example, subsection (c)(i) requires proof that
"the employee is not gainfully employed." Under the court
of appeals' reading, the employer would have to prove that
the employee is gainfully employed. See Martinez v.
Media-Paymaster Plus, Inc., 2005 UT App 308, ,i 9, 117
P.3d 1074. Although we concede that section
34A-2-413(1)(c) was not artfully drafted, we refrain from
creating clarity by reading additional terms into the stablte.
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,i 54 In conclusio~ we reverse the court of appeals because
we can find only one plausible reading of the statute based
on its plain language-namely, that the employee has the
burden of proving the elements of subsection (c).[5]

CONCLUSION

1 55 The court of appeals should have applied a substantial
evidence standard of review to the Commission's
conclusions that other work was "reasonably available" to
Martinez and that he could have perfonned the "essential
functions 11 of a fast-food employee. Consequently, we
reverse the court of appeals and remand for a determination
under the appropriate standard of review. We also reverse
the court of appeals' allocation of the burden of proof. We
hold that under the plain language of Utah Code section
34A-2-413(1), the employee bears the burden of proving
the four elements of subsection (c).
1 56 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice
Wilkins, Justice Dunant, and Justice Nehring concur in
Justice Parrish's opinion.

Notes:

[1] In 2006, the legislature amended subsection (c) to
clarify that the burden of proof under subsection (c) was
intended to fall on the employee. Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-413(l)(c)(Supp. 2006). Because we find that the
language of the 1995 version of the statute was
unambiguous, we refrain from considering the statutory
amendment. See Olsen v. Samuel McIntyre Inv. Co., 956
P.2d 257,259,261 (Utah 1998) (holding that the court does
not look beyond an unambiguous statute and that
retroactive legislative enactments are not applied in pending
cases except in a few narrow circumstances not applicable
here).

Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, ,I
21, 54 P.3d 1177 (holding that to correctly dispute the
lower court's factual findings as clearly erroneous, "an
appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of
the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a
light most favorable to the court below"); United Park City
Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006
UT 35, 1137-38, 140 P.3d 1200 ("[P]arties who ask this
court to consider fact-sensitive questions-including those
questions reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard-have a duty to marshal all the evidence that
formed the basis for the trial court's ruling.") Consequendyt
this discussion applies to the marshaling requirement
generally, not just in the context of a challenge to an
agency's factual findings.
[4] Mixed questions are generally defined as the
application of law to fact, Pena, 869 P.2d at 936, but the
court of appeals transposed the standard and asked whether
the Commission abused its discretion in "applying the facts
that it found to the law." Martinez, 2005 UT App 308, 'I 11,
117 P.3d 1074 . Because it appears that the court of appeals
intended to treat "essential functions" and 11reasonably
available" as mixed questions of law and fact, we proceed
from that premise.

[SJ Having reached this legal conclusion. we remain
mystified about its effect on the outcome of this case.
Usually, burden of proof questions are outcome
determinative only in the case of an evidentiary draw. And
in their briefs to us, neither party asserts that was the case
here. Thus, even had we upheld the court of appeals'
decision on the burden of proof issue, it is unclear whether
that conclusion would have required the Commission to
reverse its initial denial of permanent total disability. We
encourage parties to consider and brief the effect of their
legal challenges on a case's outcome so that we can better
advise lower courts about the ramifications of our rulings.

[2) Although we address the implications of this argument,
we do not concede the accuracy of its premise. Martinez did
challenge the Commission's factual findings before the
court of appeals, but did so undei the theory that the factual
findings were inadequate as a matter of law. See Martinez,
200S UT App 308, ,i 3, 117 P.3d 1074. Under such a theory,
marshaling is not required. Woodward, 823 P.2d at 477.
Further, the court of appeals did not purport to consider the
sufficiency of the facts. Martinez, 2005 UT App 308, ti] 3,
117 P.3d 1074. However, because we ultimately agree with
Media's contention that "essential functions" and
"reasonably available" are factual issues, we consider the
implications of the argument.

[3] The marshaling requirement applies when a party
challenges a court's or an agency's factual findings,
regardless of the standard of review at issue. See, e.g.,
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who are often identified because they have established an
online presence through such media as Facebook, biogs,
and online products reviews, that demonstrated their
familiarity and experience with particular products and
services. Needle does not require that the advocates work in
an industry related to the products; rather, it selects
advocates primarily due to their product expertise,
regardless of how that expertise may have been acquired.
Needle also supervises the advocate application process,
though the online retailer makes the final decision whether
to hire any potential advocate.
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OPINION

Original Proceeding in this Court

[13] Once the advocates complete Needle's application
process and are approved by the onlinc retailer, they arc "
signed up as contractors" to Needle itself. Needle owns and
maintains the software through which the browser-based
chat platform operates, and it licenses the software to each
retailer for use. The advocates are expected to provide their
own computers and internet access. Needle does not set
working hours or quotas, nor does it provide office space.
Instead, the advocates work at their own pace and during
hours of their own choosing from wherever they find
convenient. Most advocates work " very part-time" and are
not expected to work exclusively for Needle or for Needle's
online retailer clients. However, if an advocate has a period
of inactivity longer than ninety days, he or she is required to
re-certify with the particular online retailer in order to
continue to work. The online retailers pay Needle for the
advocates' work on a per-chat basis, and Needle in turn pays
the advocates per chat. At the end of each year, Needle
provides each advocate with a 1099 fonn.[3] Advocates
also earn points that can

STEPHEN L. ROTH, Judge:
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[11] Needle, Inc., seeks review of the Utah Workforce
Appeals Board's (the Board) decision upholding an

administrative law judge's (the ALJ) determination that
individuals working as online product advocates for
Needle's retail clients are employees, not independent
contractors. We decline to disturb the Board's decision.
BACKGROUND
['12] Needle is a software company that has developed a "
customer engagement software" platform that it licenses to
online retailers of products and services. This platform
enables customers visiting a retailer's website to interact in
real-time " chats" [2] with persons knowledgeable about the
retailer's products and services. Needle assists the online
retailers in advertising for, locating, and recruiting "
advocatesn to perform these interactive chats. These
advocates are generally enthusiasts of the retailer's products

be redeemed for products or services directly from the
online retailer.
[,4] In addition, Needle's platform monitors the advocates'
performance according to criteria specified by the retailer.
While neither the retailer nor Needle has "control over the
content of the chats" -the chats are "unscriptedn and "
undirected" -the platform is programmed to preferentially
route chats to advocates who are rated as having performed
well according to the pre-selected metrics. Thus, the
number of chats in which an advocate is able to participate
depends both on the volume of customers requesting live
chats at a particular time and· the advocate's own
performance rating.
['115] Needle claimed that its advocates were independent
contractors for purposes of the unemployment
compensation regulatory scheme. The Department of
Workforce Services field auditor determin~ however, that
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Needle's advocates should instead be classified as
employees and included in the audit the advocates' earnings
as part of the total wages subject to unemployment
compensation contributions. A hearing officer affinned the
auditor's decision, concluding that the advocates were not "
independently established in a business activity that exist[s]
separate and apart from Needle." Needle appealed this
decision, and after a hearing in March 2014, the AU
affirmed the hearing officer's decision that the advocates
were employees. Needle then appealed the AIJ's decision
to the Board. The Board, with minor changes, adopted the
All's factual findings, reasoning, and conclusions and
determined that the advocates were not established in an "
independent business separate from Needle" and were
therefore not independent contractors for unemployment
compensation purposes. Needle seeks review of the Board's
decision.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

~

[16] Needle argues that the Board erred when it determined
that the advocates were employees rather than independent
contractors. In particular, Needle contends that the Board's
decision is based on facts " not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court." See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g)
(LexisNexis 2014). It also argues that the Board's decision
and its underlying determinations are " otherwise arbitrary
or capricious." See id. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iv). We will
uphold the Board's decision if its factual findings and
determinations are supported by II substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record" Id. §
630-4-403(4)(g). " Substantial evidence is that quantum
and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to
convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion11 and "
is more than a mere scintilla" but " something less than the
weight of the evidence." Rosen v. Saratoga Springs City,
2012 UT App 291, ,I 9, 288 P.3d 606 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). We also defer to the Board's
credibility determinations and its resolution of conflicts in
the evidence, seeA/len v. Department of Workforce Servs.,
2005 UT App 186, 'ii 20, 112 P.3d 1238, and we will not
ovettl.h-n the Board's determinations simply because we
think " another conclusion from the evidence is
pennissible," Allied Constr. & Dev., Inc. v. Labor Comm'n
Appeals Bd., 2013 UT App 224, 'ii 2, 310 P.3d 1230
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
['!17] Needle also argues that the Board " erroneously
interpreted or applied the law" pertaining to the
determination of independent contractor status under Utah
Code section 35A-4-204 and rule R994-204-303 of the
Utah Administrative Code. See Utah Code Ann. §
63G-4-403(4)(d). We generally review the Board's
interpretation and application of statutes and regulations for
correctness. BMS Ltd. 1999 Inc. v. Department of

Workforce Servs., 2014 UT App 111, 'i ,i 8, 10, 327 P.3d
578. However, due to the " fact-intensive inquiry" involved
in applying the
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law to the facts in cases where an employment relationship

is at issue, seeCarbon County v. Workforce Appeals Bd.,
2013 UT 41, 1 7, 308 P.3d 477 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted), we afford the Board deference in
its intermediate determinations and will afftrm its ultimate
decision " so long u it is within the bounds of
reasonableness and rationality," Prosper Team Inc., v.
Department of Workforce Servs., 2011 UT App 142, 1 6,
256 P.3d 246 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); Tasters Ltd v. Department of Emp't Sec., 863
P.2d 12, 19 (Utah ClApp. 1993) (" [T)his court will reverse
the Board's ultimate determination, and upset its
intermediate conclusions, only if we conclude they are
in'ational or unreasonable." ). And " [w]e do not reweigh
the evidence or substitute our decision for that of [the
Board] but instead will uphold its determinations if they are
supported by the record evidence." Evolocity Inc. v.
Department of Workforce Servs., 2015 UT App 61, 16, 347
P.3d406.

ANALYSIS
I. Applicable Rules and Law

[18] In Utah, there is a presumption that persons who
perform" [s]ervices ... for wages or under any contract of
hire" are employees. Utah Code Ann. § 3SA-4-204(3)
(LcxisNexis 2011); see alsoBMS Ltd 1999, 2014 UT App
111, 16,327 P.3d 578. Needle's advocates perform services
under contract and are therefore presumed to be employees
for purposes of unemployment compensation. In order to
overcome that presumption, Needle must demonstrate that
the individuals performing services are, instead,
independent contractors. SeeBMS Ltd. 1999, 2014 UT App
11 I, ,i 6,327 P.3d 578. An independent contractor is one
who is II regularly" and " customarily engaged in an
independently established trade," and an independently
established trade is one that is " created and exists apart
from a relationship with a particular employer and does not
depend on a relationship with any one employer for its
Admin.
Code
continued
existence."
Utah
R994-204-303(1 )(a).
[19] To establish that an individual is an independent
contractor, Needle bears the burden to show both of the

following:
(a) the individual is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession, or
business of the same nature as that involved in the contract
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of hire for services; and

sophisticated than simply tallying the factors for and
against." ).

(b) the individual has been and will continue to be free

from control or direction over the means of perfonnance of
those services, both under the individual's contract of hire
and in fact
Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-204(3)(a), (b) (emphasis added).
Because the factors are conjunctive, both parts of the
test-the independently established trade prong and the
control or direction prong--must be met for an individual to
qualify as an independent contractor. SeePetro-Hunt LLC v.
Department of Workforce Servs., 2008 UT App 391, 1122,
31, 197 P.3d 107. As aresult, ifthe employer does not"
prove□ to the satisfaction of the Department that the worker
is customarily engaged in an independently established
trade . • . of the same nature as the service in question,"
Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(1)(c), then the court need
not analyze the second prong of the independent contractor
test-direction or control, seePetro-Hunt, 2008 UT App
391,131, 197 P.3d 107.

[110) The Department of Workforce Services bas
promulgated a list of factors to be used " as aidsn in the
analysis of each prong of the independent contractor
determination. Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303. Because
we agree with the Board that the independently established
trade prong is determinative in this case, we address only
the factors pertinent to that analysis. The factors are
whether the worker (1) maintains a separate place of
business, (2) provides his or her own tools and equipment,
(3) has clients other than the employing entity, (4) has the
potential for either profit or loss, (S) advertises, (6) has or
requires professional or other licenses to engage in the
particular business, and (7) maintains business records and
tax forms. Id. R994-204-303(l)(b)(i)-(vii).
The rules
instruct the Department to apply" [s]pecial scrutiny [to] the
facts" in order to " assure
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that the form of a service relationship does not obscure its
substance." Id. R994-204-303. And because the factors are
"intended only as aids," " [t]he degree of importance of
each factor11 will vary " depending on the service and the
factual context in which it is perfonned." Id. In other words,
in reviewing the Department's decision on this topic, courts
must consider the working relationship in its totality, and
the factors in the context of that relationship. The factors
should not be rigidly or blindly applied; neither should they
be mathematically tabulated at the end of the analysis to
arrive at the ultimate determination-whether
the "
substance11 of the working relationship is characteristic of
an independent contractor relationship. Id. ; see alsoBMS
Ltd. 1999, 2014 UT App 111, 112, 327 P.3d 578 (" [T]he
application of the [independent contractor] test is more

[11 I] Needle challenges the Board's determination
regarding every factor except licensing. We address each
challenged factor separately to determine whether there is
substantial evidence to support the Board's finding on that
factor and, for those factors where Needle bas argued it, we
also address whether the Board correctly interpreted and
applied the law. We then considerwhether the Board's
ultimate detennination that the advocates arc not
independent contractors, but employees, was sufficiently
supported.

Il. Factors
A. Separate Place of Business

[112] This factor requires the Board to detennine whether"
[t]he worker has a place of business separate from that of
the employer." Utah Admin. Code R994•204-303(l)(b)(i).
The Board found that 11 [t]here was no evidence presented
during the hearing that the advocates had a separate place of
business. 11 It also recognized that the ALl bad noted that 11
this factor is not critical," because the advocates " do not
need a place of business but rather work from their homes
or anywhere else there is an [i]ntemet connection." Needle
contends that the Board misinterpreted and misapplied this
factor and that the Board's determination is not based on 1'
substantial evidence."

[1'13] Needle first argues that the Board's determination
resulted from its misinterpretation of the rule. In particular,
Needle contends that the Board inappropriately focused on
" whether the advocate has a fixed location from which be
or she does business" rather than "whether the advocate
perfonns setVices.from Needle's place ofbusiness."
[,Jl4] The plain language of the rule suggests that this factor
focuses on two related considerations. The first looks at
whether the work is performed at a location separate from
the employer's place of business. And the second seems to
consider who is responsible to provide the workplace.
Cf.Petro-Hunt LLC v. Department of Workforce Servs.,
2008 UT App 391, 1 24, 197 P.3d 107 (upholding the
Board's determination that an employee did not perform her
services at a location separate from the employer where she
performed " all of her Petro-Hunt responsibilities in the
company's office during normal business hours, she worked
forty to sixty hours a week, and she did not maintain a
separate place of business" ). To the extent that the Board
has interpreted this factor to require the advocates to have
their own dedicated physical office or business space, we
agree with Needle that such an interpretation seems to
require more than is contemplated by the rule; in certain
working relationships, it is enough that the workers perform
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their work at a separate location of their choice, regardless
of whether that location is an office space in a separate
building, the worker's home, or any other suitable location.
However, it seems clear from the Board's findings that it
understood that the advocates performed their work at a
l~ation separate from Needle and that Needle was not
responsible for providing them with a working location.
In~ the Board found that Needle did not provide a
working location for the advocates, that the advocates were
responsible for providing the location from which to worlc,
and that n the individuals do not need a place of business
but rather work from their homes or anywhere else where
there is an [i]nternet connection." Because these findings go
directly to the
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core considerations of this factor, there is no basis to
conclude that the Board misinterpreted what was required.

[115] Needle next asserts that the Board misunderstood the
evidence. In particular, it talces issue with the Board's
finding that Needle" does not have a place of business" and
its determination that "[t]here was no evidence presented
during the hearing that the advocates had a separate place of
business." But the Board's finding regarding Needle's place
ofbusiness, while admittedly contrary to the evidence
presented, does not affect its overall determination that the
advocates perform their services from a location separate
from Needle. Whether or not Needle has a fixed place of
business, it is clear from the Board's fmdings that it
recognized that the advocates perform their work at a
location separate from any Needle facility, as the factor
requires. Furthermore, the Board's statement that " no
evidence" was presented that the advocates " had a separate
place of business" is accurate; Needle offered testimony
that the advocates may perform their services from any
location with internet access, but it presented no evidence
that any advocate had an established business location.

C,16] Finally, Needle contends that the Board's
detennination that " this factor was not critical n in the
overall independent contractor calculus is clearly erroneous
as well as being contradictory to the AU's determination
that this factor weighs in favor of independence. We
disagree. Rather, a fair reading of the Board's determination
seems to be that, while the evidence regarding this factor
suggests independence, it is not " critical" to the overall
determination of independent contractor status, because the
advocates' specific" type of work" means that they" do not
need [an established} place of business" to perform their
services. Assessing the relative weight of the statutory
factors is well within the Board's purview. SeeBMS Ltd.
1999 Inc. v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2014 UT App
111, 1 12,327 P.3d 578 (noting that "the relevance of a
given factor will differ depending on the nature of the work

perfonned11 ) . Accordingly, we see no reason to disturb the
Board's determination regarding this factor.
B. Tools and Equipment

[117) This factor requires the Board to determine whether "
[t)he worker has a substantial investment in the tools,
equipment, or facilities customarily required to perform the
services. 11 Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(1)(b)(ii). The
Board found that although the advocates n are required to
have a computer and access to the internet," 11 it is assumed
the advocates already had those tools'' because most
advocates were first identified by Needle due to their online
presence " through Facebook or a blog." The Board also
found that the " only other tool" required to do the work
was supplied by Needle in the form of its own software
platfo~ which the Board characterized as " a necessary
tool" because " the advocates could not interact with
customers., without it The Board concluded that while this
factor weighs in favor of employee status, it " is certainly
not a deciding factor in and of itself." Needle argues that the
Board misinterpreted the regulation and that the Board's
findings and determinations regarding ~s factor were not
supported by substantial evidence.

[118] Needle first contends that the Board misinterpreted
and misapplied the rule. In particular, it contends that the
Board appears to have interpreted the rule to mean that the
advocates must supply " every single tool and piece of
equipment" when the rule requires only that " advocates
make a substantial investment in tools required to perform
services," which it asserts the advocates undisputedly do by
providing a computer and an internet connection. In
essence, Needle contends that this factor should not weigh
in favor of employment simply because the Board found
that Needle provided a II necessary tool." While we agree
with Needle that the plain language of the rule does not
appear to require the worker to provide every tool and piece
of equipment-the qualifier in the rule is " substantial
investment" -we do not understand that the Board
discounted the advocates' investments simply because it
found that Needle provided a " necessary tool. 1' Rather, a
fair reading of the Board's
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determination is that it simply weighed the evidence
regarding the Needle platfonn--a tool that is the sine qua
non of the advocates' ability to participate in chats for
Needle's retailers-more heavily in its calculus than the
advocates' ownership of a computer and internet access. It
is not a misinterpretation of the rule to weigh the evidence
as supporting one determination over the other.
SeeEvolocity Inc. v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2015
UT App 61, 1 ,r 12-13, 347 P.3d 406 (concluding that the
Board's decision that the alleged employee had not made a "
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substantial investment" was not clearly erroneous where,
although the alleged employee used her own computer,
telephone, and internet service, the company furnished
other equipment, most notably the software 11 necessary for
[the alleged employee] to perform her work").
[119] Along these lines, Needle also asserts that it was error
for the Board to discount " the advocates' investment in
their computers and internet" merely because the advocates
likely " had computers and internet connections before
contracting with Needle. 11 It contends that we rejected a
similar analysis in Tasters Ltd. v. Department of
Employment Security, 863 P.2d 12 (Utah CtApp. 1993),
and that, due to advances in technology, doing business
often " requires no more than a computer and internet
connection'' and, therefore, such an investment should be
considered substantial in relation to what the job requires.
Needle is correct that in Tasters, in considering whether
food demonstrators were independent contractors, we
rejected the argument that " household" tools do not cany
the same weight as more specialized tools, such as a power
drill, for example. Id. at 26. We also determined that even
though the actual . investment was small per food
demonstrator (between $50 and $200) and the tools could
be " used in the home as well as on the job," the
demonstrators' investments in their tools were " essential,"
given that most demonstrators made II less than six hundred
dollars per year performing demonstrations" and that " if a
demonstrator did not invest in the equipment, he or she
would be unable to perform any demonstrations." Id. at 2S.
But in Tasters, there was no argument that this factor
should have weighed in favor of an independent contractor
relationship even though the demonstrators had all of the
equipment in their homes before contracting with Tasters.
Rather, the arguments regarding tools and equipment in
Tasters related to whether the" cost of the equipment" that
the demonstrators were required to purchase represented a "
real, essential, and adequate investment" [4] and whether,
because they were classified as household rather than
industrial tools, they should have been given " equal"
instead of" minimal" weight in the overall analysis.
[120] Here, we do not understand the Board to have decided
that even though the advocates likely had the computers and
internet access before contracting with Needle, they had no
investment in the " tools . . . customarily required11 to
perform advocate services. Rather, the Board's reasoning
seems to be that the investment into a computer and internet
service is not a " substantial investment11 where the
evidence supported reasonable inferences that the advocates
did not invest in those tools to be able to provide product
advocacy services. Evidence was presented that Needle
identified potential advocates through those potential
advocates' posts and contributions to social media
platforms, which supports a reasonable inference that the
advocates' investment in both a computer and internet

access had occurred prior to and independent of their work
for Needle. Further, computers and internet access are now
common appurtenances of most citizens' daily lives, used
for shopping, schoolwork, social connection, and
entertainment, including online interaction. As a
consequence, it was not error for the Board to conclude that
the acquisition of a computer and internet access was not a "
substantial investment'' in

€iiJ
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the tools of a trade. This is particularly so where Needle
offered testimony that the advocates' work was itself" very
part-time" and where Needle presented no evidence that the
advocates had acquired either computers or internet access
for reasons other than the advocates' personal use.
[121] Needle also contends that the Board's determination is
not supported by " substantial evidence." It contends that
the Board II ignore[d] the nature of the relationship between
Needle, its client and the advocates" when it determined
that Needle provided a " necessary tool" ; that the platform
is not " necessary . . . because the advocates could have
performed their services using any number of similar
software platforms" ; and that the Board II ignore[d] the
evidence showing that some advocates invest substantially
more" in required tools by way of investing " thousands of
dollars in the products for which they are advocates. 11

[122] First, regardless of the "nature" ofNeedle's role in
relation to the advocates and its retail clients, Needle owns
the software that enables the advocates to perform the
services that Needle licenses to its clients as part of the
advocacy package. Needle offered testimony that it was this
platform that advocates were required to " log into" and that
the platform then provided the advocates II access to the
[retail] customers who are requesting chats" by" rout[ing]"
"those chat requests ... through [the Needle] technology
platform to the advocate." Thus, regardless of how Needle's
relationship to the advocates and its retailers is labeled, the
Board's determination that " the advocates could not interact
with customers through a client1s website without the use of
the software platform provided by [Needle]" is supported
by the evidence Needle presented to the Board. Moreover,
nothing in the plain language of this factor requires the
Board to consider the " nature" of the putative employer's
role in relation to its alleged employees and clients in the
way Needle claims.
[123] Needle's argument that its platform is not "
necessary," because the advocates could provide the same
services through other software platforms, is similarly
unpersuasive. The advocates were contracted to work for
and were paid by Needle. Regardless of whether the
advocates O could have" performed the same services for
another employer through a different platform, the fact
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remains that the advocates provided advocacy services to
Needle by using the proprietary platform Needle licensed to
the online retailers. The fact that other software platforms
might hypothetically be available to do a similar job does
not undercut the fact that the Needle platform was the core
mechanism by which the advocates, the online retailers, and
their customers were connected. Thus, in the working
relationship at issue, Needle's platform was a " necessary"
tool.
[1124] Finally, although Needle claims that the Board
ignored evidence that the advocates also invested
substantially in the products of the retailers for whom they
advocated, Needle presented no more than anecdotal or
hypothetical evidence regarding product purchases the
advocates might have made in the course of their
employment with Needle. More to the point, Needle did not
show that the product purchases an advocate might have
made that contributed to bis or her qualifications for
advocate work for a particular retailer were ever made with
that goal in mind. Rather, absent evidence to the contrary,
the reasonable inference is that the advocates had acquired
specific products for personal use and that such purchases
resulted in familiarity with the product and enough
enthusiasm to motivate them to voluntarily post reviews or
engage with others online. Indeed, it was often the
advocates' pre-employment reviews of retailers' products as
consumers that attracted Needle's attention and offers of
work in the first place. Thus, we cannot conclude that
product acquisition is a category of invesbnent in tools and
equipment that the Board improperly 11 ignored. 11

[125] Accordingly, we conclude that the Board's
interpretation of the tools and equipment factor was not
unreasonable, and its determination that this factor weighs
in favor of employment is supported by substantial
evidence.
C. Other Clients
['126] This factor requires the Board to determine whether "
[t]he worker regularly performs

Page704
services of the same natme for other customers or clients
and is not required to work exclusively for one employer."
Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(l)(b)(iii). The Board
found that " there is no evidence any advocates have other
clients for whom they provide similar services." The Board
assumed tha~ owing to the 11 very few hours" the advocates
worked for Needle, the advocates had other employment,
but observed that II there is no evidence [the other
employment] is related in any way to the services the
advocates provide to ... [Needle]." Needle argues that the
Board misinterpreted the evidence before it regarding the "

business0 that its advocates were in and that the Board also
misapplied this factor by ignoring evidence that the
advocates were not " required to work exclusively for
Needle. 11
[127] As indicated, the Board acknowledged that the
advocates worked part time and presumed they had other
work apart from their work for Needle. But this factor to
requires more than just the ability to work for someone
other than the employer; the rules require that a worker's "
independently established trade . . . is created and exists
apart from a relationship with a particular employer and
does not depend on a relationship with any one employer
for its continued existence." Utah Admin. Code
R994-204-303(1)(a); seealsoLeach v. Board ofReview of
Indus. Comm'n, 123 Utah 423, 260 P.2d 744, 748 (Utah
1953) (stating that an "independently established business
must exist independent of the services under consideration
in the sense that it is the whole-of which the particular
service is a part" ). In this regard, it is not sufficient that a
worker is merely " free to perform work for other clients11 ;
rather, the worker must actually " 'regularly perform(]' work
for other clients," and the other work must be of the " 'same
naturem as that provided in the employment relationship at
issue. Evolocity Inc. v. Department of Workforce Servs.,
2015 UT App 61, 1114-15, 347 P.3d 406 (quoting Utah
Admin. Code R994-204-303(l)(b)(iii)). For example, in
Evolocity, we concluded it was not error for the Department
ofWorkforce Services to determine that the claimant II did
not perform work for clients other than Evolocity" where
there was no evidence that her short-term, part-time work
for the United States Census Bureau was " of the same
nature as the work she performed for Evolocity" and where,
even though the claimant was " free to work for other
clients, 11 there was no evidence that she was II regularly
perform[ing]" work for others. Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted) ; see alsoPetro-Hunt UC v.
Department o/Worlcforce Servs., 2008 UT App 391, ,i 1
26-27, 197 P.3d 107 (concluding that this factor weighed in
favor of employment where the employee " did not have
any other clients besides Petro-Hunt" and where her
employment contract also contained a non-compete clause "
which [the employee} believed prevented her from
performing similar services to any other client for a period
of 12 months" ). Thus, Needle must show that the advocates
provided services of a similar nature to other clients in order
to establish that this factor weighs in favor of independence.
[~28] Needle contends that the Board's determination rested
upon a misunderstanding of the evidence. In particular,
Needle contends that the Board improperly focused on 11
[w]bether [the advocates] provide[d] other chat services"
when, instead, according to Needle, the advocates are in the
business of " selling their expertise," essentially as online
entrepreneurs. in which chat advocacy plays only a part.
Needle contends that this distinction is important because it
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means that whether the advocates provide 11 other chat
services" is too narrow a question and therefore " irrelevant
to whether [an advocate] is in an independent business." In
an effort to demonstrate this distinction, Needle compares
the advocates' business to that of a college professor who is
hired to provide expert witness services in litigation. where
" [t]he fact that [the college professor] did no other work as
an expert witness" would not transform him into an
employee of the entity that hired him. Needle contends that,
like the college professor, it is the advocates'
onlinc--centered expertise that is sought. In this regar~
Needle points to evidence it presented to the Board
regarding one of its product advocates who is also a "
professional level online gamer" and 11 derives income from
that [video gaming] expertise11 by providing
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consulting services to a gaming company in addition to
being an advocate for Needle. Needle essentially argues that
this person's chat advocacy is simply one component of a
larger business of selling his broader online gaming
expertise.
[-al9] But Needle fails to acknowledge the central
difference between the college professor example and its
Utah advocates as a group: the reason the college professor
would not have been an employee of the entity that hired
him to be an expert witness is the fact that the college
professor was already established in the independent
business of being a professor with relevant expertise. Here,
other than the isolated example of the gaming professional,
Needle has not shown that its Utah advocates are actually
established in any relevant internet business apart from their
work for Needle.[5] Moreover, when the goal is to provide
the Board " substantial evidence" from which to make its
findings and determinations, and where the employment
relationship at issue in this case is between one employer
and a class of employees, one isolated example from that
class hardly seems to fit the bill. Certainly, Needle did not
provide other evidence to the Board to suggest that the
majority of advocates or that the advocates as a class of
employees in fact " regularly perform□ services of the same
nature for other customers or clients." [6] See Utah Ad.min.
Code R994-203-303(1 )(b)(iii).
[130) As a consequence, because Needle did not provide
substantial evidence to the Board to demonstrate that its
advocates are actually and " regularly perfonn[ing]" related
services for other clients--whether chat services, product
expertise, or a broader sort of internet expertise related
service-it was not error for the Board to afford little weight
to the evidence that the advocates were not required to work
exclusively for Needle. See id. Accordingly, we decline to
disturb the Board's determination that this factor weighs in

favor of employment.
D. Profit or Loss

[~'31] This factor requires the Board to determine if" [t]he
worker can realize a profit or risks a loss from expenses and
debts incurred through an independently established
activity. 11
Utah
Admin.
Code
business
R994-204-303(l)(b)(iv). The Board found that there was "
no evidence the advocates could experience a loss as there
were no costs associated with the services they provided11
and that" [t]hc amount of profit they made was dctmnincd
by the number of encounters they had with customers."
Needle argues that the Board misinterpreted and misapplied
the rule. In particular, it contends that the disjunctive It or"
in the plain language of the rule means this factor should
support a finding of independence if it is shown that the
worker can either realize a profit or risk a loss. Needle
asserts that because its advocates can realize a profit, this
factor should support a finding of independence, regardless
of whether the advocates risk a loss. It also contends that its
advocates do risk a loss and that the Board improperly
discounted the related evidence.

~

(132] The Board seemed to interpret this factor to require
that the profit or loss must be tied to expenses or debts
incurred through the business activity. In other words, it
reasoned that it is not enough for a worker to be able to
realize a profit or suffer a loss in earnings simply through
performing more or less piecework[?] of this kind. Rather,
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the profit or loss must occur as a consequence of expenses
or debts related to the independent business activity. Our
case law supports this interpretation. For example, in
Evolocity, we declined to disturb the Board's determination
that the employee could not realize a profit or loss where
she incurred no debts or expenses related to her work and
where she could not " increase the amount she was paid"
because she was paid " a set salary every two weeks."
Evolocity Inc. v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2015 UT
App 61, ,i 118-19, 347 P.3d 406. Similarly, in Petro-Hunt,
we concluded that because " all the money" the alleged
employee received u was pure profit with no accompanying
risk ofloss," Petro-Hunt had failed to show that the Board
erred when it determined that this factor " weighed in favor
of employment II Petro-Hunt UC v. Department of
Workforce Servs., 2008 UT App 391, 128, 197 P.3d 107.
Thus, unless an employer is able to show that there is a risk
of loss that accompanies the potential for profit, this factor
cannot support a determination of independence.
['J33] Here, Needle has not demonstrated that its advocates
risk a loss. Needle only cursorily contends that the Board's
conclusion " that the advocates could not risk a loss is not
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supported by substantial evidence." In particular, Needle
asserts that the Board's finding that the advocates could not
risk loss is supported only by " the speculation that the
advocates already had a computer and internet before
becoming advocates" and that this finding is " contradicted
by the record," which shows the advocates had " to provide
a computer and internet connection, and in many cases had
to make substantial investment in developing their expertise
prior to becoming advocates." But it is Needle's burden to
provide substantial evidence on the record to support a
contrary positio~ and it has not done so. Needle did not
provide more than presumptive, anecdotal, or hypothetical
evidence that its advocates made substantial investments in
computers, internet service, or retailer products to be able to
provide product advocacy services to clients like Needle or
its customer-retailers. Nor did Needle provide evidence of
any other expenses or debts that the advocates might have
incurred to facilitate an independent product advocacy
business. Rather, as we have already discussed, the Board's
inference that the advocates had invested in computers,
internet service, and retailer products independent of their
work for Needle was a reasonable one.

,c\i111
\llil/iil

['j34] Furthermore, Needle's contention that its advocates
can realize a " profit" is unpersuasive. The advocates are
paid at regular intervals on a per-chat basis, and are thus
essentially online pieceworkers. Nonetheless, Needle
contends that its advocates are able to realize a profit
through their own efforts-namely, by providing better
quality chats or by logging in during hours when fewer
advocates traditionally wolk. But the potential to add
income through acts of worker initiative does not
necessarily move an employee toward independent
contractor status where the increases in income are purely
dependent, as here, on the quantity and quality of their
relationship with the particular employer. Rather, the
increase or decrease in income from the sort of decision
involved in whether to do more or fewer chats, or to choose
more optimal times, seems essentially automatic and does
not involve the true uncertainty of result that characterizes
the sort of " risk" inherent in the concepts of profit or loss.
As a consequence, the profit realized by the advocates,
dependent on a simple choice to work harder or smarter
seems to be " pure profit with no accompanying risk
loss." SeePetro-Hunt, 2008 UT App 391, 1 28, 197 P.3d
107; see also Profit, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)
(defining " profit" as " (t]he excess of revenues over
expenditures in a business transaction").

:r

[135] Thus, the Board's rejection of Needle's argument does
not seem irrational or unsubstantiated. And because Needle
did not provide the Board with substantial evidence to show
that its advocates risked a loss, it appears that the advocates
are able to realize only " pure profit with no accompanying
risk of loss." SeePetro-Hunt, 2008 UT App 391, , 28, 197
P.3d 107. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the Board's

determination that this factor weighed in favor of
employment.
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E. Advertising
(136] To meet this factor, Needle must show that " [t]he
worker advertises services in telephone directories,
newspapers, magazines, the Internet, or by other methods
clearly demonstrating an effort to generate business." Utah
Admin. Code R994-204-303(1)(b)(v). The Board found that
there was " no evidence the advocates advertise their
services" and rejected Needle's argument that having a 11
F acebook presence or a blog presence . . . should be
considered advertisement," because there was no evidence
that" the Facebook page or blog contained solicitations to
work as an advocate." Needle argues that the Board
misinterpreted the rule when it determined that the
advocates do not advertise and that the Board simply
misunderstood the nature of the advocates' services.
[137] First, Needle contends that the Board misinterpreted
the rule because the rule should not be interpreted so
narrowly as to " require that every public presentation
contain an explicit solicitation for work in order to
constitute 'advertising.'" While this may be generally
true,[8] the language of this factor as a whole narrows the
meaning of the word by requiring that advertisements must
be done in a way that " clearly demonstrat[es] an effort to
generate business." We have also interpreted this factor to
require that the advertising specifically demonstrate " an
effort to generate business." For example, in Evolocity, we
concluded that the employee was not advertising her
services where she only spoke " to friends and neighbors
about her work" and 11 invit[ed] several of them to work for
Evolocity" rather than " advertis[ing] . . . in an effort to
generate business for herself." Evolocity Inc. v. Department
o/Workforce Servs., 2015 UT App 61, 'J 16,347 P.3d 406.
Similarly, in New Sleep Inc. v. Department of Employment
Security, 703 P .2d 289 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme
Court found it significant that the water bed installers at
issue were not " known to be in the business of installing
water beds" and did not " [hold] themselves out to the
public generally as being tradesmen." Id. at 291.

[138] Consequently, the evidence cannot support a
determination of independence if, for example--as Needle
argues here-the advertising consists of blog entries that
merely " cause people to notice" that the blogger has
developed a particular interest or expertise. Nor would it be
enough simply to write a customer review of a product or
participate in a forum discussion regarding a particular
brand, even one that the reviewer considers him or herself
knowledgeable about and loyal to. Rather, there must be
evidence that the generation of public awareness regarding
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certain product-related postings was II clearly" done with
intent to " generate business" for an independently
established enterprise. Accordingly, we conclude that the
Board did not misinterpret the rule when it required the
purported advertisements to include II solicitations to work
as an advocate."

C,39] Nonetheless, Needle argues that because the
advocates are " providing online product consulting
services," the advocates' posts and biogs that demonstrate
product expertise and enthusiasm should be considered
advertisements. In this regar~ Needle asserts that the
advocates were identified precisely because of their
Facebook posts and biogs. Needle also compares the online
activities of the advocates with the efforts of photographers
or lawyers who " often discuss and post examples of their
work on biogs, Twitter accounts, and Facebook,"
contending that " [t]he fact that they do not explicitly solicit
a sale does not make [their online postings] any less ofan
advertisement," because the postings " allow potential
customers to see ... the expertise in action."
c,(40] Even assuming that such activities by photographens
and lawyers would amount to advertising under the
language of this factor, Needle bas not persuaded us that the
advocates' online activities demonstrated anything more
than mere product enthusiasm and expertise.
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Unlike photographers or lawyers who maintain biogs in
relation to an established photography business or a legal
practice, Needle has failed to show that the advocates' posts
were made with the purpose of showcasing their particular
product expertise with the intent to attract interested online
retailers or businesses like Needle that might be looking to
hire product advocates. Rather, all that the evidence
demonstrates here is that the advocates had established
online presences indicating enthusiasm for and knowledge
regarding particular products and that their knowledge and
enthusiasm incidentally attracted Needle's attention, without
being designed or calculated to do so. Thus, Needle bas not
presented evidence that the advocates have publicly
advertised in any way it clearly demonstrating an effort to
generate business" as product advocates; rather, their
employment by Needle seems to be merely a coincidental
result of each advocate's online activities for other purposes.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Board's determination
that this factor weighed in favor of employment was not
unreasonable.

F. Business Records
['J41] This factor requires the employer to show that" [t]he
worker maintains records or docwnents that validate
expenses, business asset valuation or income earned so he

or she may file self-employment and other business tax
fotmS with the [IRS] and other agencies." Utah Admin.
Code R994-204-303(l)(b)(vii). The Board found that the
advocates " are paid via a 1099 form" [9] but stated, "
[T)hat does not necessarily show that the individuals made
a considered decision to establish themselves as an
independent business." Needle argues that the Boardts
determination is " inherently contradictory" ; it asserts that
the AU determined that this factor supported a
determination of independence and that even though the
Board adopted the AU's findings, its reasoning appears to
contradict the Ar.rs detennination. Needle contends that to
the extent the Board " finds that this factor does not weigh
in favor of a finding of independence, the Board's decision
misinterprets the Rule and is not supported by substantial
evidence."

[142] Rather than determining that this factor weighs
against independence, however, the Board's reasoning
seemed to be that while 1099 forms do support
independence, they are not determinative, particularly
where the decision to provide a 1099 form (rather than a
W-2, for instance) bas not been shown to have been made
by the advocates themselves and where there is no other
evidence of documentation, record maintenance, or filings
consistent with the operation of an independent business.
The plain language of the rule asks whether the worker "
maintains records" in order to " file self-employment and
other business tax forms with the [IRS] and other agencies."
Id. (emphases added). Needle offered testimony that its
advocates were provided l 099 forms and that it did not
know whether its advocates actually maintained records to
track business expenses for the pmpose of filing 11
self-employment and other business tax fotmS." Thus, other
than the passive receipt of the employer-generated 1099
forms, there was no substantial evidence that the advocates
" file[ d) or maintain[ed] records as a business or pa[id]
taxes as a business."
('!I43] Consequently, Needle's contentions-that the Board
misinteq,reted this factor and that its determination that the
factor weighed against independence was not supported by
substantial evidence-are without merit. We therefore
decline to disturb the Board's detennination on this factor.
Ill. The Board's Ultimate Determination
['t!44) Because we conclude that the Board's determinations
regarding the individual factors were not unreasonable, we
also conclude that the Board's overall determination that
Needle's Utah advocates are employees rather than
independent contractors for purposes of Utah's
unemployment regulatory scheme is reasonable. A worker's
status in this regard is ultimately determined by the
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scheme.

" substance" rather than the " form" of the relationship
between the employer and the alleged employee. See Utah
Admin. Code R994-204-303; see alsoNorth Am. Builders
Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Div., 22 Utah 2d 338, 453
P.2d 142, 145 (Utah 1969) (" The significant aspect is the
relationship between the alleged employer and employee."
). Here, the evidence before the Board supports its
conclusion that the " substance" of the advocates'
relationship with Needle was that of employee rather than
independent contractor in the context of our carefully
defined and closely regulated state program. While the
Board found, as did the AU, that some of the evidence
presented suggested independence-for example, that the
advocates do not perform their work at Needle's facility and
that the advocates are provided I 099 fonns for tax
purposes-it did not find those factors to be critical to the
overall analysis of the employment relationship, particularly
given the nature of the services the advocates provided.
Rather, the Board, like the AU, concluded that the
evidence, considered as a whole and factor by factor, most
reasonably supported a conclusion that the advocates were
not " independently established" in a business that existed "
apart from [their] relationship with" Needle. See Utah
Admin. Code R994-204-303(1 )(a). The Board reasonably
concluded, based on an appropriate interpretation of the
applicable factors, that Needle's evidence did not establish
certain important indicia of an independently established
business--namely, that the advocates substantially invested
in tools of their trade, that they bad other clients for whom
they performed similar services, that they could realize a
profit or risk a loss based on costs incurred that were related
to an independently established business, and that they
advertised their services in a way designed to generate
business. Weighing the factors together, the Board
concluded that Needle failed to demonstrate that the
advocates were " customarily engaged in an independently
established trade" at the time they performed their services
for Needle. See id. We decline to disturb the Board's
conclusion that the advocates were properly categorized as
employees for purposes of unemployment compensation.
CONCLUSION

['1145] Based on the evidence before it, the Board did not
arbitrarily or unreasonably determine that Needle's
advocates were not " independently established" in
businesses " of the same nature" as the services they
performed for Needle. See Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-204(3)
(LexisNexis 2011). Thus, the Board correctly declined to
consider whether the advocates were free from the "
direction or control" of Needle. Id. Accordingly we decline
to disturb the Board's decision that Needle's Utah advocates
are employees rather than independent contractors in the
context of Utah's unemployment compensation regulatory

Notes:

[ 1]Senior Judge Russell W. Bench sat by special
assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah R.
Jud. Admin. 11-201(6).
[2]A "chat" is an internet-based "real-time conversation,
typically as a series of short text exchanges." See Chat.
DictiODBI)'.COm,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/cbat?s===t
[https://perma.cc/N99Y-EUTH ].
[3]Needle did not identify the specific 1099 form it
provided to the advocates. However, given the context, we
presume that it provided 1099-MISC forms. A I 099-MISC
form is a tax form that reports earnings paid to an
independent contractor or a person who is self-employed
but has perfonned work for another. The person or entity
that pays for the services fills out and provides the
1099-MISC form to the worker for earnings paid during the
tax year. See Form 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income,
https://www.irs.gov/uac/About-Form-I 099MISC
[https://perma.cc/U5KG-YH65 ]; Form 1099•MISC &
Independent Contractors, https://www.irs.gov/Help-&
-Resources/Tools-&
-FAQs/FAQs-for-Individuals/Frequently-Asked-Tax-Questi
ons-&
-Answers/Small-Business,-Self-Employed,-Other-Business/

Form-1099-MISC-&
-Independent-Contractors/Form-I 099-MISC-&
-Independent-Conttactors [https://perma.cc/AV9C-F74V ].

[4] Tasters Ltd. v. Department of Employment Security,
863 P.2d 12 (Utah Ct.App. 1993), was decided under a
prior statutory scheme. Under this prior scheme, the "
investment" factor was separate from the II tools" factor. See
Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22(j)(5) (Michie Supp. 1989). In
the prior scheme, " investment" required the Board to
decide " whether the individual has a real, essential, and
adequate investment in the business or has a lack of
investment and depends on the employer for such
facilities." Id. § 35-4-ll(j)(S)(O).
[5]Because it is not necessary to our decision, we do not
decide whether the on1ine gaming professional is engaged
in the sort of broader business contemplated by this or other
factors.
(6]The Board itself stated that it would have considered
evidence that the advocates were engaged more broadly in
selling either skills related to online chat systems or
internet-related skills in general, had it been provided the
evidence to do so. The Board particularly noted that if
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Needle had presented evidence that, for example, a "
hypothetical Coach bag enthusiast sold Coach bags or was
otherwise involved in some type of enterprise providing
advocate or chat representative services for any other
product," " there could be an argument" that the enthusiast
was " customarily engaged1' in providing services of the
same nature to other clients.

Gi.J

[7]" Piecework" is " work in which you are paid for each
thing you make or do and not for the amount of time you
work."
Piecewor~
Merriam-Webster.com,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/piecework
[bttps://perma.cc/4SCE-42UG ].
[8]
See
Advertise,
Merriam-Webster.com,
http://www.merriam-webstcr.com/dictionary/advertise
[bttps://perma.cc/BL98-SH6A] (defining II advertise" as: "
[l] to make the public aware of something (such as a
product) that is being sold; [2] to make a public
announcement (in a newspaper, on the Internet, etc.) about
something that is wanted or available; [3] to cause people to
notice (something)" ).
[9]We note that this is something of a mischaracterization.
The advocates are paid via direct deposit The 1099 forms
annually provided to the advocates simply memorialized the
total income paid to facilitate income reporting and tax

collection.
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site, or '' contract landmen," performing most of their duties
out in the field and at local courthouses. This case calls into
question whether Elliot was a company landman or a
contract landman.
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197 P.3d 107 {Utah App. 2008)

October 30, 2008

1 3 Prior to working for Petro-Hunt, Elliot performed
landman services for two other companies, Hingeline Land
and Title (Hingeline) and Bowman and Associates
(Bowman). Bowman had contracted to provide landman
services for Petro-Hunt; however, in September 200S,
Petro-Hunt canceled the Bowman contract At
approximately the same time, Petro-Hunt hired several of
Bowman1s employees, including Elliot Elliot was
specifically hired by Petro-Hunt to work on the Paradise
Leases, an endeavor that was projected to last one year.[1]
Under the terms of her contract with Petro-Hunt, Elliot
received $200 per day in compensation. $15 per day as a
per diem, and 44.5¢ per mile for all miles driven with her
personal car. The contract categorized Elliot as a broker and
independent contractor, and contained confidentiality
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and non-compete clauses. Petro-Hunt did not withhold any
taxes for Elliot and provided her with 1099 independent
contractor tax forms.

2008 UT App 391
PETRO-HUNT, LLC, Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES,
DMSION OF ADJUDICATION, Workforce Appeals
Board, and Bambi Elliot, Respondents.

No. 20080002-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
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Rick D. Roskelley and Littler Mendelson, Las Vegas,
Nevada, for Petitioner.
Geoffi-ey T. Landward, Salt Lake City, for Respondents.
Before Judges GREENWOOD, BENC~ and BILLINGS.

OPINION
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:

1 1 Petitioner Petro-Hunt, LLC (Petro-Hunt) appeals the
Workforce Appeals Board's (Appeals Board) conclusion
that Bambi Elliot was a Petro-Hunt employee, not an
independent contractor, and her wages are therefore subject
to unemployment insurance taxes. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
'I[ 2 Elliot worked for Petro-Hunt, an oil and gas exploration
company, from approximately September 2005 to January
2006. While working for Petro-Hunt, Elliot " generally
perfonned work that fit within the duties of landmen." In
the oil and gas industry, landmen typically assist companies
with acquiring land and mineral leases, performing due
diligence on those leases. and performing other
lease-related assignments. Landmen can be company
employees, conducting most of their work at the company

,i 4 As part of her responsibilities for Petro-Hunt, Elliot
was expected to perform due diligence on the Paradise
Leases. She reviewed lease title documents and records,
completed data entry, compiled reports and spreadsheets,
filed documents, made copies, and answered phones and
emails. She worked in the company's office in Ephraim,
Utah. during regular business hours, working approximately
forty to sixty hours a week. To complete her assignments,
Elliot worked primarily from her own laptop computer, on
which she 1' assimilated, consolidated, and organized the
data and reports submitted by the field landmen." While she
was with Petro-Hunt, Elliot did not advertise her services
and she II did not indicate she wished to obtain any other
clients because she was working full-time for Petro-Hunt
11

1 5 At the close of the Paradise Leases project, in January
2007, Elliot was released from her employment with
Petro-Hunt She worked for Baseline, another oil and gas
company, for approximately three months, then filed for
unemployment compensation in April 2007. Robert
Goodwin, a field auditor for the Utah Department of
Workforce Services, investigated the status of Elliot's
employment, and in the spring of 2007, concluded that
Elliot II performed a personal service for Petro-Hunt," the
service she provided constituted " covered employment,"
and, thus, Petro-Hunt was required to pay unemployment
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insurance taxes for the wages it bad paid to Elliot.
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6 Petro-Hunt appealed Goodwin's decision, and on
September 6, 2007, an administrative law judge (AU)
presided over a hearing on the matter. Two days prior to the
hearing, Petro-Hunt filed a motion seeking a continuance
and pennission to conduct discovery " in the form of
interrogatories, requests for the production of documents
and a deposition of [Elliot]." The AU denied Petro-Hunt's
motion and proceeded with the bearing.

1 7 After the September hearing, the AU issued findings of
fact and conclusions of law, in which she determined that
Elliot provided covered employment services for
Petro-Hunt and, accordingly, the wages Petro-Hunt paid to
Elliot were subject to unemployment insurance taxes.
PetnrHunt appealed the AlJ's decision to the Appeals
Board. After additional briefing, the Appeals Board
unanimously affirmed the AU's decision. Petro-Hunt
appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

4i 8 Petro-Hunt argues that by denying its motion for formal
discovery and a continuance, the Appeals Board violated its
right to due process " and [its] ability to prepare and
conduct a defense." While Petro-Hunt categorizes this
discovery issue as a constitutional question, the proper
standard of review for the Appeals Board's discovery ruling
is abuse of discretion. See Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-403
(Supp.2008) (stating that appellate court shall grant relief it:
among other reasons, " the agency action is ... an abuse of
the discretion delegated to the agency by statute" ); cf.Salt
Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
846 P.2d 1245, 1255 (Utah 1992) (holding that
administrative agency " acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
denying petitioners' request for discovery").

1 9 Petro-Hunt also asserts that the Appeals Board erred by
refusing to adopt Texas law that classifies landmen as
independent contractors and by failing to properly apply "
principles of Utah law" regarding independent contractor
professions. And finally, Petro-Hunt challenges the Appeals
Board's ultimate conclusion that Elliot was a Petro-Hunt
employee as opposed to an independent contractor. " This
court will reverse the Board's ultimate detennination [on
whether Elliot was an employee or an independent
contractor], and upset its intermediate conclusions, only if
we conclude they are irrational or unreasonable." Tasters
Ltd., v. Department ofEmployment Sec., 863 P.2d 12, 19
(Utah Ct.App.1993).
ANALYSIS

because the Appeals Board refused

<ii
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to allow it the opportunity to conduct formal discovery. Its
argument is based on the following two principles: First,
that entities subject to an administrative hearing have " a
due process right to receive a fair trial in front of a fair
tribunal/ and second, that " the modem rules of civil
procedure were developed and subsequently adopted by
each level of the judiciary from federal and state courts to
administrative agencies. " (Emphasis added.) A.a discussed

below, neither of these two principles support Petro-Hunt's
assertion of error.
,i 11 While it is true that " every person who brings a claim
..• at a hearing held before an administrative agency has a
due process right to receive a fair trial in front of a fair
tribunal," Bunnell v. Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331,
1333 (Utah 1987), we cannot say that this fairness
requirement necessarily includes a constitutional right to
formal discovery in administrative proceedings. q.Salt
Lake Citizens Congress, 846 P.2d at 12SS (holding that
administrative agency " acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
denying petitioners' request for discovery" ). But seeSims v.
National Transp. Safety Bd., 662 F.2d 668, 671-72 (10th
Cir.1981) (noting that some " [c]ircuits have expressed the
view that judicially reversible unfairness may result from a
denial of discovery" ). " At a minimum," the procedural
fairness mandate requires " '[t]imely and adequate notice
and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way.' " Jn re
Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996) (alteration in
original) (quoting Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211
(Utah 1983)). And while due process requirements are " '
flexible and call [ ] for the procedural protections that the
given situation demands,' 11 id. (quoting Labrum v. Utah
Stale Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 911 (Utah 1993)), we
see no constitutional right, either implied or explicit, to
formal discovery in administrative proceedings.
AccordBeaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 916 P.2d
344, 3S2 (Utah 1996) (" [D]iscovery in administrative
proceedings is available only if governing statutes or
agency rules so provide." ); Sims, 662 F.2d at 671 (" ' There
is no basic constitutional right to pretrial discovery in
administrative proceedings.'
(quoting Silverman v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 549 F.2d 28, 33 (7th
Cir.1977))); State ex rel. Hoover v. Smith, 198 W.Va. 507,
482 S.E.2d 124, 134 (1997) (" Generally, there is no
constitutional right to pre-hearing discovery in
administrative proceedings." ); 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative
Law § 327 (1994) (" There is no constitutional right to
pretrial discovery in administrative proceedings.").
11

112 Perhaps the flaw in Petro-Hunt's argument stems from

I. Due Process

1 10 Petro-Hunt argues that

it was denied due process

its misconception that Utah's administrative agencies have
formally adopted the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.[2] This
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is, however, not the case. Instead, the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act (UAPA) provides that in fonnal
adjudicative proceedings, administrative agencies " may, by
rule, prescribe means of discovery adequate to permit the
parties to obtain all relevant information necessary to
support their claims or defenses." Utah Code Ann. §
6304-20S(l) (Supp.2008). And only if an agency chooses
not to craft its own discovery rules do the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure apply. See id. (" If the agency does not
enact rules under this section, the parties may conduct
discovery according to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."
).

1 13 In this instance, it is clear that the Department of
Workforce Services has specifically adopted administrative
rules that govern discovery procedures for unemployment
insurance proceedings. See Utah A<hnin. Code
R994-508-108. Rule R994-508-108 of the Utah
Administrative Code states that formal discovery is only
appropriate in limited circumstances:
(2) The use of fonnal discovery procedures in
unemployment insurance appeals proceedings [is] rarely
necessary and tend[s] to increase costs while delaying
decisions. Formal discovery may be allowed for
unemployment insurance hearings only if so directed by the

AL.land
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when each of the following elemenJs is present:
(a) informal discovery is inadequate to obtain the
information required;
(b) there is no other available alternative that would be less

costly or less intimidating;
(c) it is not unduly burdensome;
(d) it is necessary for the parties to properly prepare for the
hearing;and

(e) it does not cause unreasonable delays.
Id. R. R994-508-108(2) (emphasis added). Thus, in lieu of
crafting an explicit right to formal discovery in
unemployment insurance proceedings, the Department of
Workforce Services has determined that the party
requesting formal discovery bas the burden to establish that
certain factors have been met before its request will be
granted, and the Appeals Board has the discretion to
determine if the requesting party has met its burden. Based
on this statutory scheme, we conclude that there is no
constitutional right to fonnal discovery in unemployment
insurance proceedings.

'ii 14 Further, as Petro-Hunt conceded at oral argument, it
docs not challenge this overall statutory scheme; rather, it
only challenges the Appeals Board's ultimate conclusion on
a constitutional basis. Although Petro-Hunt could have
challenged the Appeals Board's denial of formal discovery
as an abuse of discretion, it has not done so. See generally
Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i) (stating relief may be
obtained if the agency has abused its discretion).
Nevertheless, in order to address the issue of fairness raised
by Petro-Hunt, we note the following. In its request for
fonnal discovery, Petro-Hunt cited the aforementioned rule
and then provided a bald assertion that formal discovery
was appropriate. More precisely, Petro-Hunt reiterated the
factors that must be met for formal discovery to be allowed
and then stated that "[e]ach of these factors is met here."
Petro-Hunt, however, failed to provide any details ofhow
each requirement was actually met. In spite of Petro-Hunt's
terse argument, the Appeals Board made findings on each
of the rule's requirements before concluding that fonnal
discovery was inappropriate. The Appeals Board
specifically concluded that: (1) "[t]here is no evidence in
the record establishing informal discovery was inadequate
to obtain the information Petro-Hunt was seeking, or that
[Elliot] was uncooperative with Petro-Hunt's informal
requests, if there were any" ; (2) " Petro-Hunt bas not
shown ... that there were no other available alternatives
beyond interrogatories, requests for production, and [Elliot]
traveling to Las Vegas to have her deposition taken" ; (3)
Petro-Hunt's requests were costly and intimidating, would
have significantly delayed the hearing, and been unduly
burdensome for Elliot, " especially ... considering that
[Elliot] received Petro-Hunt's discovery requests" only a
few days before the scheduled hearing; (4) Elliot had
testified regarding all of the factors used to determine if she
was an employee or an independent contractor and there
was no evidence presented to indicate that she had lied; (5)
although Petro-Hunt was requesting Elliot's tax returns, the
AU had already requested the same. and Elliot testified that
she could not find them, thus, formal requests for the
returns were not likely to have produced a different result;
and (6) Petro Hunt was provided " a full opportunity to see
the evidence presented against it, to call and examine its
own witnesses, and to cross-examine witnesses who
testified against it."
~ 15 In challenging the Appeals Board's denial of its
request for formal discovery, Petro-Hunt identifies no
evidence indicating that informal discovery procedures
were inadequate, that there were no less costly or
intimidating means available to gain access to the desired
information, or that the requests would not have caused
unreasonable delay. Instead, Petro-Hunt merely argues that
it was prevented from presenting evidence that independent
landmen " have been traditionally engaged by the oil and
gas industry on an independent contract basis" and that
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Elliot II conducted and continues to conduct an
independently established trade and occupation as a broker
of oil, gas and mineral leases." Petro-Hunt also asserts that
it was denied the opportunity to request Elliot's tax returns
to establish that Elliot II was engaged as an independent
contractor for other companies."
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However, even assuming that Petro-Hunt's assertions are
true, Petro-Hunt is not alleviated from the obligation to
establish that informal discovery procedures were
inadequate to obtain the desired information. Because
Petro-Hunt does not present any evidence indicating that it
attempted to obtain this information through infonnal
procedures, or that it met the additional requirements for
formal discovery, we determine that there was no abuse of
discretion in the Appeals Board's decision to deny
Petro-Hunt's request for formal discovery. Moreover, we
believe that Petro-Hunt was provided a fair hearing under
the circumstances.
Il. Texas and Utah Law Regarding Landmen

,I 16 Petro-Hunt next argues that the Appeals Board erred
as a matter of law by refusing to adopt a Texas statute
which generally defines landmen as independent
contractors, and by refusing to recognize Utah precedent
that automatically recognizes members of certain
professions as independent contractors. As a basis for its
Texas law argument, Petro-Hunt asserts that where Utah
law is silent on a matter, i.e., contains no regulations
regarding independent landmen, we should look to the law
of sister states, such as Texas, as persuasive authority. This
argument, however, is unpersuasive because even though
Utah law does not address landmen specifically, it clearly
requires tribunals to examine the facts of each case and
analyze specific factors when determining whether an
individual is an independent contractor or an employee for
purposes of unemployment compensation.

1 17 More specifically, Utah Code section 35A-4-204
states that an individual perfonning services for wages
under a contract of hire is considered an employee

Utah Code Ann. § 3SA-4-204(3) (Supp.2008). Further,
administrative rule R994-204-303 lists several factors that
should be analyzed to determine if these two statutorily
required circwnstances exist. See generally Utah Admin.
Code R994-204-303.

~

,r 18 The administrative code goes on to explain that when
making an employee/independent contractor determination,
the facts of each case should be given " [s]pecial scrutiny"
and" [t]he factors listed in ... [the administrative code] are
intended only as aids in the analysis of the facts of each
case. The degree of imponance of each factor varies
depending on the service and the factual context in which it
is performed." Id. Based on this statutory authority, we
reject Petro-Hunt's notion that Utah statutory law mandates
categorizing landmen as independent contractors in favor of
recognizing that Utah law requires a specific inquiry into
the facts present in each case when making an independent
contractor determination. Thus, we further conclude that the
Appeals Board acted rationally and reasonably in refusing
to adopt a Texas statute which generally categorizes
landmen as independent contractors. [3]
Page 114

11 19 For similar reasons, we also reject Petro-Hunt's
argument that the Appeals Board erred by not adopting 11
long established Utah precedent" recognizing that
individuals engaged in certain " independently established
trades were not • employees' of the companies they
contracted with." First, the case to which Petro-Hunt refers
fails to support the proposition that persons engaged in
certain professions automatically qualify as independent
contractors. In fact, in North American Builders, Inc. v.
Unemployment Compensation Division, 22 Utah 2d 338,
453 P.2d 142 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court examined the
specific facts of the case, including the administrative code
factors discussed above, to determine whether the
individual was an employee or an independent contractor.
Seeid. at 143-45. The court made no generalizations about
certain professions and we decline to adopt that practice
here.
III. The
Conclusion

Appeals

Board's Independent Contractor

unJess it is shown to the satisfaction of the division that:
(a) the individual is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession or
business of the same nature as that involved in the contract
of hire for services; and
(b) the individual has been and will continue to be free
from control or direction over the means of pcrfonnance of
those services, both under the individual's contract of hire
and in fact.

1 20 Finally, Petro-Hunt challenges the Appeals Board's
conclusion that Elliot was an employee because, as
Petro-Hunt asserts, Elliot was customarily engaged in an
independently established trade and Petro-Hunt II did not
have the right of or exercise direction or control over
Elliot's services." As previously stated, we will uphold the
Appeals Board's decision that Elliot was an employee and
not an independent contractor as long as we determine that
the decision was reasonable and rational. SeeTasters Ltd. v.
Department of Employment Sec.• 863 P.2d 12, 19 (Utah
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Ct.App.1993). To detennine if the Appeals Board's decision
is reasonable and rational, we apply the substantial evidence
test, which requires us to examine " all of the evidence
supporting the Board's findings and [determine whether,]
despite the supporting facts and all reasonable infcrcnces
that can be drawn therefrom, the findings are not supported
by substantial evidence given the record as a whole." Id.
Granting what the supreme court bas referred to as "
maximum deference," we will uphold the basic facts the
Appeals Board relied on in reaching its ultimate conclusion
" if there is evidence of any substance that can reasonably
be regarded as supporting the determination made." Allen &
Assocs. v. Board ofReview. 132 P.2d 508, 508-09 (Utah
1987) (per curiam).

1 21

In examining the Appeals Board's conclusion, we

begin with the proposition that Utah law presumes that

Gw

~

individuals perfonning services for wages are employees "
unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the division that: (a)
the individual is customarily engaged in an indepcndendy
established trade ... ; and (b) the individual bas been and will
continue to be free from control or direction." Utah Code
Ann. § 35A-4-204(3)(a)-(b) (emphasis added). To assist a
tribunal with making a determination on both of these
requirements, the administrative code lists several factors
that tribunals should consider. See Utah Admin. Code
R994-204-303(l)(b). The rules make clear, however, that "
[t)he factors ... are intended only as aids in the analysis of
the facts of each case." See id. R. R994-204-303.

1 22 In this case, the Appeals Board analyzed first whether
Elliot was " customarily engaged in an independently
established trade." Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-204(3)
(Supp.2008). After concluding that inquiry in the negative,
the Appeals Board declined to examine whether Elliot was
free from control or direction. The Appeals Board reasoned
that because the statute's requirements for a finding of
independent contractor status are conjunctive, a
determination that the first requirement was not met negates
the obligation to analyze the second requirement. On
appeal, Petro-Hunt challenges the Appeals Board's ultimate
conclusion that Elliot was an employee, not an independent
contractor, as well as the Appeals Board's decision not to
examine the second independent contractor requirement,
i.e., whether Elliot was free from control or direction.

1 23 While Petro-Hunt takes issue with the Board's
conclusion under each factor, it does not identify any
disregarded evidence, but rather, " relies only upon its view
of the evidence before the administrative llibunals." Allen &
Assocs., 732 P.2d at 508. Thus, we explore each factor the
Appeals Board addressed to detennine if the conclusion that
Page 11S

Elliot was a Petro-HW1t employee is, in fact, supported by

the evidence to the extent that the Appeals Board's ultimate
conclusion is reasonable and rational.

A. The Factors

124 Under the first factor, "Separate Place of Business,"
Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(l)(b)(i), the Appeals
Board examined whether Elliot " has a place of business
separate from that of the employer." Id. Based on the
evidence presented, the Appeals Board ruled that the
evidence weighed in favor of employment. In reaching this
finding, the Appeals Board relied on Elliot's testimony in
which she indicated that she performed all of her
Petro-Hunt responsibilities in the company's office during
normal business hours, she worked forty to sixty hours a
week, and she did not maintain a separate place of business.
Petro-Hunt argues that the Appeals Board should have
concluded differently under this factor because the only
evidence before it was Elliot's self-serving testimony and
Petro-Hunt did not have an opportunity to discover if Elliot
was lying. This argument, however, is unavailing because
Petro-Hunt cross-examined Elliot and had an opportunity to
present its own evidence on this issue. Without any
evidence to indicate otherwise, we uphold the Appeals
Board's conclusion that Elliot did not maintain a separate
place of business.

1 25 Under the second factor, " Tools and Equipment," id.
R. R994-204-303(I)(b)(ii), the Appeals Board declined to
rule in favor of one party or the other. It concluded that the
evidence was " neutral" because both parties had provided a
similar amount of equipment, i.e., Elliot provided a laptop
and software while Petro-Hunt provided items such as a
copier, fax, and printer. Petro-Hunt disputes the Appeals
Board's conclusion under this factor, asserting that
computers and software are expensive and thus, the
evidence under this factor " weighed heavily in favor of
independent contractor status." We decline, however, to
disturb the Appeals Board's determination, especially
considering the fact that it is undisputed that both parties
provided some office equipmenl

1 26 The third factor, " Other Clients," id. R.
R994-204-303(1)(b)(iii), addresses whether " (t]he worker
regularly performs setvices of the same nature for other
customers or clients and is not required to work exclusively
for one employer." Id. Under this factor, the Appeals Board
admittedly stated that "the facts on this issue are unclear,"
but ultimately determined that the evidence weighed in
favor of employment. The Appeals Board relied on Elliot's
testimony that she " did not have any other clients besides
Petro-Hunt" as well as the fact that Elliot's contract
contained a " non-compete clause, which she believed
prevented her from performing similar services to any other
client for a period of 12 months." The Appeals Board was
also persuaded by Elliot's testimony indicating that her two
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previous employers issued her W-2 tax forms instead of
1099 forms.

1 27 Petro-Hunt

attacks the Appeals Board's conclusion
under this factor on the basis that " Elliot admitted to
performing landman services for three other brokerage
companies, including [Hingeline, Bowman, and Baseline],"
and while working for Petro-Hunt, " Elliot was not required
to work full time and was permitted to work as much or as
little as she wished." However, neither of these two
arguments arc compelling because Elliot testified that she
worked for Hingeline and Bowman prior to working for
Petro-Hunt and afterwards, she worked for Baseline. The
Appeals Board found Elliot's testimony was credible, and
Petro-Hunt provides no contradictory evidence to cast doubt
on her assertions. Moreover, regarding Elliot's hourly work
requirements, the Appeals Board is required to base its
determination on the circumstances as they existed at the
time of employment, not on those that could have existed
given the tenns of the contract. SeeMcGuire v. Department
of Employment Sec., 768 P.2d 985, 989 (Utah
Ct.App.1989). The only evidence presented on this issue
indicates that, regardless of the terms of her contract, Elliot
worked. between forty and sixty hours a week, during
normal business hours, inside the company's Ephraim, Utah
office. Again, Petro-Hunt fails to present any evidence to
contradict Elliot's testimony. Because we conclude that the
Appeals
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Board's finding under this factor is supported by the
evidence, we will not disturb its determination that this
factor weighed in favor of employment.

,r 28 The fourth factor calls into question whether "[t]he
work.er can realize a profit or risks a loss from expenses and
debts incurred through an independently established
activity."
Utah
Admin.
Code
business
R994-204-303(l)(b)(iv). Here, the Appeals Board
detennined that " [Elliot] had very little overhead" ; she
worked in an office that Petro-Hunt had leased; she was
reimbursed for travel; other than a computer, she was
provided with all necessary office equipment; and all the
money she received was pure profit with no accompanying
risk of loss. Based on this evidence, the Appeals Board
determined that the facts under this factor weighed in favor
of employment. On appeal, Petro-Hunt tersely asserts that
the Appeals Board " ignored evidence of how Ms. Elliot
was paid and the underlying legal agreement between [the
two parties]," which allowed Elliot to "have hired helpers,
control[ ] her costs and take[ ] on additional work."
However, even if Petro-Hunt's allegations were true, it fails
to establish bow these facts undermine the Appeals Board's
conclusion that at the time Elliot was employed by
Petro-Hunt, she had no risk of loss nor could she realize a

profit.

1 29 Under the fifth factor, " Advertising," id. R
R994-204-303(1)(b)(v), Petro-Hunt asserts only that the
Appeals Board " erroneously focused its attention on what
Ms. Elliot chose not to do rather than on the legal rights she
had in her business relationship with Petro-Hunt 11
Notwithstanding Elliot's potential right to advertise her
services, " the appropriate inquiry" examines the facts as
they existed at the time of employment, not what could
have been. SeeMcGuire, 168 P.2d at 988. Thus, we
conclude that Petro-Hunt's argument under this factor is
unavailing.
,I 30 Because Petro-Hunt concedes that the sixth factor is
inapplicable in this case, the only factor left to address is
the seventh, which examines business records and tax
forms. See Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(l)(b)(vii).
Here, the Appeals Board took note of the fact that
Petro-Hunt paid Elliot as an independent contractor, issuing
her a l 099 tax fonn. It further noted that this factor "
generally weighs in favor of independent contractor status,
though it is not dctcnninativc by itself." Petro-Hunt argues
that the Appeals Board's finding under this factor was
wrong, and it should have been able to conduct discovery of
Elliot's tax forms. However, given that Elliot admitted to
filing a 1099 in relation to her employment with
Petro-Hunt, and her testimony that she was unable to locate
the fonns in question, there is no indication that such
discovery would have provided any benefit to Petro-Hunt,
especially given the Appeals Board's determination that this
factor weighed in favor of independent contractor status.

1 31 After examining each factor individually, the Appeals
Board determined that 11 [a]t the time the services were
rendered, [Elliot] was not engaged in an independently
established trade or profession." Based on this conclusion,
the Appeals Board declined to analyze the additional
independent contractor requirement, that " the individual
has been and will continue to be free from control or
direction over the means of performance of those services,
both under the individual's contract of hire and in fact."
Utah Code Ann. § 3SA-4-204(3)(b) (Supp.2008).
Petro-Hunt argues that this was reversible error. We,
however, disagree. To establish that an individual is an
independent contractor, Petro-Hunt must show both that
Elliot was engaged in an independently established trade
and that she was free from control or direction over her
services. Seeid. § 35A-4-204(3)(a)-(b). Because the Appeals
Board concluded that Petro-Hunt failed to establish that
Elliot was engaged in an independently established trade,
and we see no error in that conclusion, we agree with the
Appeals Board that it was not required to analyze whether
Elliot was free from control or direction.
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We conclude that the Appeals Board's discovery

ruling does not present a constitutional question, but rather,
a procedural
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indicating that Elliot was engaged in the practice of
negotiating for mineral rights or negotiating for the
exploration or development of minerals. To the contrary,
the evidence presented indicates that Elliot was involved in
recording information related to mineral rights into her
computer, compiling reports, answering phones, and
sending and receiving emails.

question, reviewed for abuse of discretion. Further, we see
no error in the Appeals Board's conclusion that Petro-Hunt
failed to establish that formal discovery procedures were
necessary. We also conclude that the Appeals Board did not
err in failing to adopt a Texas statute addressing
independent landmen or Utah precedent categorizing certain
types of workers as independent contractors. And finally,
we affinn the Appeals Board's ultimate conclusion that
Elliot was a Petro-Hunt employee, not an independent
contractor, on the basis that the Appeals Board's decision is
reasonable and rational.

'i 33 I CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Judge.

1 34 I CONCUR EXCEPT AS TO SECTION I, IN
WHICH I CONCUR ONLY IN THE RESULT: RUSSELL
W. BENCH, Judge.

Notes:
[1] Petro-Hunt refers to Elliot as a landman, while Elliot
refers to herself as a land administrator. Because the
Appeals Board focused on the substance of her work and
not her title, this distinction is likely irrelevanl
Nonetheless, Elliot testified that there is a distinction
between the two because landmen go out into the field
while land administrators work in an office.
(2] We do not mean to imply that there is a constitutional
right to discovery where administrative agencies have
fonnally adopted the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We are
merely acknowledging Petro-Hunt's misconception to
clarify the origin of the right to discovery in administrative
proceedings.
(3) We also note that even if the Appeals Board were to
adopt the Texas law to which Petro-Hunt refers, that law is
not particularly helpful to Petro-Hunt's case. For example,
the Texas statute states that individuals are to be classified
as independent landmen, exempt from unemployment
insurance taxes, where three conditions are met, one of
which requires the individual to be " engaged primarily in
negotiating for the acquisition or divestiture of mineral
rights or negotiating business agreements that provide for
the exploration for or development of minerals." Tex.
Lab.Code Ann. § 201.077 (Vernon 1995). Under the facts
presented in this case, there is no evidence in the record

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

percentage of ownership after the settlement of divorces.

Page664
811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991)

SAVAGE INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner,
v.

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, Respondent.

No. 900248.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 3, 1991
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Prior to April 1, 1982, the stock of KNT Leasing
Corporation ("KNT") was owned by the brothers, with each
owning 33 1/3 percent of the stock. On April I, 1982,
Savage Western acquired 86. 7 percent (2,600 shares) of the
stock of KNT in exchange for its own stock. The remaining
13.3 percent (400 shares) was retained by Neal Savage
pending divorce settlements. Prior to its acquisition by
Savage Western, .KNT filed separate Utah corporate
franchise tax returns. In order to conform its tax year to that
of Savage Westem, KNT filed a separate corporate
franchise tax return for the partial tax year June 1, 1981, to
March 31, 1982. The return reported a current year's loss of
$74,641 and reported $61,252 of prior years' losses as being
available for carryover. On November 15, 1984, the name
of K.NT was changed to Savage Transportation
Corporation. On January 15, 1985, the remaining 400
shares of Savage Transportation were acquired by

R. Brent Jenkins, Dale R. Kent, Salt Lake City, for
petitioner.

Page 666

R. Paul Van Dam and Mark E. Wainwright, Salt Lake City,
for respondent.

Savage Industries. On March 30, 1987, Savage
Transportation was merged with Savage Industries.

HALL, Chief Justice:

Prior to April 1, 1983, the shares of W estem Rock Products
Corporation ("Western Rock") were owned by Kenneth
Savage, T. Luke Savage, Charles Blackbum, and Eldon
Reese. On April 1, 1983, Savage Western acquired the
shares of Kenneth Savage and T. Luke Savage, for a total of
81 percent ownership of W estcm Rock. During the next
two years, the shares owned by Blackburn and Reese were
redeemed, giving Savage Western I 00 percent ownership in
Western Rock. For periods of time prior to the April 1.
1983 acquisition by Savage Western, Western Rock filed
separate corporate franchise tax returns. In order to conform
its tax year to that of Savage Western, Western Rock filed a
separate corporate franchise tax return for the partial tax
year January I, 1983, to March 31, 1983. The return
reported a current year's loss ofS648,29I. Western Rock's
separate return loss was first carried back to prior Western
Rock separate returns, where $359,685 (as determined by
Commission adjustment) was applied to offset income, thus
leaving $288,606 of the loss available to be carried forward.

Savage Industries, Inc., seeks a writ of review of a final
order of the Utah State Tax Commission ("the
Commission") entered on April 20, 1990, which denied
Savage Industries' petition for redetennination and upheld
the finding of the auditing division that subsidiary
corporations of Savage Industries were not entitled to cany
over their own preacquisition losses in determining their
annual income for preparation of the consolidated returns of
Savage Industries.
The facts in the case have been stipulated to by the parties
and are supplemented by findings of the Commission in its
redetermination hearing. Prior to April 1, 1982, Kenneth
Savage, T. Luke Savage, and Neal Savage owned the
majority of the stock of fourteen different operating
corporations. On April 1, 1982, a stock holding and
management corporation, Savage Western Industries
Corporation ("Savage Western"), was fanned to consolidate
the corporations into a manageable structure. On April 1,
1982, the stock of Savage Western was entirely owned by
the three brothers and members of their families. On
November 28, 1984, Savage Western underwent a statutory
merger with Savage Industries, Inc., and Savage Western
changed its name to Savage Industries, Inc. On December
31, 1986, shares of Savage Industries stock were transferred
between the brothers to give each brother an equal

Starting with the fiscal year ending March 31, 1983,
Savage Western, and later Savage Industries, joined with its
subsidiaries in filing a Utah consolidated corporate
franchise tax return. [ 1] In August of 1987. Savage
Industries filed amended consolidated franchise tax returns
for lhe yeani ended March 31, 1983, I 984, 1985, and 1986
to correct errors made on previously filed returns. In its
amended consolidated return for the fiscal year ending
March 31, 1983, Savage Western carried over$26,770 of
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KNT's separate return loss and applied it to offset KNT's
income on the consolidated return. In its amended
consolidated return for the fiscal year ending March 31,
1985, Savage Industries carried over $290,332 of Western
Rock's separate return loss and applied it to offset W estem
Rock's income on the consolidated return. KNT's net
operating loss was used to offset income generated by
KNT. Western RocJcls net operating loss was used to offset
income generated by Western Rock. Neither net operating
loss was used to oftset the income of any other member of
Savage Industries' consolidated group.

In November of 1987, the auditing division began
examining these amended retmns and, in an audit report
dated February~ 1988, disallowed carryovers of the losses
on the consolidated returns. Savage Industries petitioned the
auditing division for a reconsideration of its decision. On
March 21, 1988, the auditing division responded to Savage
Industries' petition and reiterated its position.

~

On April 5, 1988, Savage Industries filed a request for
hearing before the Commission in order to orally present
argmncnts prior to the Commission's rendering a final
decision on its petition for redetermination. Oral argument
was made before the Utah State Tax Commission on
August 17, 1989. The Commission found in favor of the
auditing division and against Savage Industries.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our first task in this case is to determine the appropriate
standard of review of the Commission's decision. The
Commission's decision to deny Savage's petition for
redetermination was based on its interpretation of Utah
Code Ann. § 59-7-108. In its conclusions of law, the
Commission stated that Savage's interpretation of this
section was incorrect and that the plain language of the
statute prohibited the deductions sought by Savage. The
Commission's decision was therefore based purely on its
construction and interpretation of the legislative enactment
and is purely a question of law.
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In determining the standard of review of agency decisions,
the Utah courts lJave consistently followed three basic
standards of review, which were set forth in the case of
Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public
Service Commission. (2) In that case, Justice Oaks, writing
for a unanimous court, held that review of administrative
decisions fell into three distinct categories which required
differing standards of judicial deference to be given to the
agency's decision. First, agency detenninations of basic fact
were to be given great weight and would only be overturned
if they were not supported by any evidence of substance
whatsoever. [3] Second, agency determinations of general

~

law, including interpretation of the state and federal
constitutions and of acts of Congress and of the Utah
Legislature, were to be reviewed giving no deference to the
agency's decision, but reviewing it for correctness. [4)
Third, in between these two standards, agency decisions
involving mixed questions of law and fact or the application
of specific factual situations to the legislative enactments
under which the agency operates were to be given deference
by the courts and were to be upheld so long as they fell
within the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. [S]
Subsequent to Department of Administrative Services, a
large body of case law has evolved applying and refining
the scope of the three standards. [6] Review of agency
determinations of fact has remained consistent, with courts
upholding agency findings of fact if they were based upon
any evidence of substance. [7] Review of agency
detenninations of law, however, has been less clear under
Department of Administrative Services. [8] This is
especially so in
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cases distinguishing between agency decisions which were
granted deference by the courts and those reviewed for
correctness. Recent decisions of this court have addressed
this distinction and have clarified which agency decisions
are granted deferential review and which fit within the
"general law" category, to be reviewed using a correction of
error standard.
In Hurley v. Board ofReview of Industrial Commission,
[9] this court attempted to clarify the distinction between
cases requiring deference to agency decisions and cases
which would be reviewed using a correction of error
standard. In distinguishing the two standard.,, we noted that
agency decisions which are granted a more deferential
review are often mixed questions of law and fact, which
require application of specific technical fact situations to
the statutes which an agency is empowered to administer.
These are the types of decisions and applications in which
the agency's special expertise puts it in a better position
than an appellate court to evaluate the circumstances of the
case in light of the agency mission. In contrast, decisions
involving statutory interpretation, issues of basic legislative
intent, or construction of ordinary tenns in the organic
statute of an agency involve areas in which an appellate
court is as well suited to decide the legal questions as is the
agency. In cases where the basic question is what docs the
law require? the standard is a correction of error standard.
[10)
In Chris & Dicks v. Tax Commission, (11] we reiterated
that correction of error is the basic standard of review of
agency decisions of law. We stated:
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In the usual case, questions of statutory construction are
matters of law for the courts, and we rely on a "correction
of error" standard of review, according no deference to the
agency's interpretation. There are a limited number of
circumstances where the agency's interpretation of a statute
or role may be entitled to some deference, as where
construction of the statute should take into account the
agency's expertise developed from its practical, firsthand
experience with the subject matter. [ 12]
This language clarifies that the intermediate standard of
review is only to be applied in areas of agency technical
expertise or in areas where the legislature bas specifically
granted the agency discretion in its decision-making
process. For most questions of basic statutory interpretation
or construction of the law, the court is as suited to decide
the issues involved as is the agency and therefore will
review the agency decision for correctness. [13]
The instant case would clearly fit within the correction of
error standard under Chris & Dicks, Hurley, and their
predecessors. The Commission's decision was based upon
its interpretation of ordinary statutory terms. Its
interpretation was not based upon any technical expertise of
the Commission nor upon application of a complex,
technical fact situation to the statute. The Commission's
decision was merely its interpretation of what the statute
prohibits. The decision is therefore one which this court is
as competent as the Commission to decide, and a correction
of error standard would be appropriate under our prior case
law.
Because Savage's petition for redetermination was ftled
afterJanuary 1, 1988, the Utah Administrative Procedure
Act ("UAPA") [ 14] governs our review of the
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Commission's decision denying that petition. We therefore
must inquire into what effect that act has upon the standard
of review of the Commission's interpretation of law. In its
1987 legislative session, the Utah Legislature enacted the
UAPA for the direction, governance, and review of all
agency action within the state. Specifically, section
63-46b-16(4) governs appellate review of agency decisions
made after a formal adjudicative hearing. Section
63-46b-16(4) states:
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the
agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as
applied;

(b) the agency bas acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred
by any statute;
(c) the agency bas not decided all of the issues requiring
resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the
law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or
decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed
procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to
disqualification;

~

(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact,

made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;

~
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by
statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the
agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and
reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency; or

(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
The Commission argues that the language of section
63-46b-l 6(4) requires us to give deference to agency
decisions. This argument is based on the language in
subsection (4) requiring that "substantial prejudice" be
shown before a court may grant relief from agency action.
The Commission's position is that this phrase implies that
we should give deference to agency decisions and that we
should uphold those decisions unless they are
"substantially" incorrect.
The phrase "substantiid prejudice" within subsection (4)
refers to the "person seeking review." It does not modify the
actual standards of review found within subsection (4). This
means that the person seeking review of an agency action
must suffer substantial prejudice as a result of that action
before a court may grant relief from the action. This portion
of subsection (4) relates to the damage or harm suffered by
the person seeking review and was written to ensure that a
court will not issue advisory opinions reviewing agency
action when no true controversy has resulted from that
action. The phrase simply docs not relate to the degree of
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deference a court must give an agency decision.

In this case, Savage has been substantially prejudiced by
the Commission's decision denying its petition for
redetermination. Savage's subsidiaries have been denied the
use of over $300,000 in tax deductions in the form of loss
carryovers. Therefore, the substantial prejudice requirement
of subsection (4) is clearly met
Under section 63-46b-16(4)(d), a court may grantrelief
based upon an agency's erroneous interpretation of law.
This incorporates the correction of error standard previously
applied by the Utah courts in cases involving agency
inteipretations of law. This incorporation ofthe correction
of error standard is confirmed by looking at the legislative
history of the UAPA. The Utah Administrative Procedure
Act was patterned after the Model State Administrative
Procedure Act [ 15] Section 63-
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46b-16(4) is in nearly all respects identical to the Model
Act's section 5-116(c). Therefore, helpful information about
the intended scope and application of Utah's Act can be
obtained by resort to the comments and cases concerning
the Model Act and its application in other states. In
reviewing subsection 5-116(c)(4) of the Model Act (the
equivalent of subsection 63-46b-16(4)(d) of Utah's Act), the
commentators stated=
Paragraph
(c)(4)
includes
two
distinct
matters-interpretation and application of the law. With
regard to the agency's interpretation to [sic] the law. courts
generally give little deference to the agency, with the result
that a court may decide that the agency bas erroneously
interpreted the law if the court merely disagrees with the
agency's interpretation. [ 16]
This comment confrrms that under the Model Act and
therefore under the UAPA, an agency's interpretation of the
law is to be reviewed using a correction of error standard. It
is clear that the Commission's decision in this case is to be
reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the
Commission's interpretation of the law. This approach is
mandated whether arrived at under the terms of the UAPA
or under the holdings of our prior case law. We will
therefore review the Commission's decision concerning
Savage's petition
for
redetermination using a
correction-of-error standard.

Il. SECTION 59-7-I08(14)(f).
Turning now to the merits of the case, the basic issue
presented is the correct interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §
59-7-108(14)(t), which prohibits an acquiring corporation
from using preacquisition losses of an acquired corporation.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-108(14)(f) (1987) reads:

"Corporations acqwnng the assets or stock of another
corporation may not deduct any net loss of the acquired
corporation incurred prior to the date of acquisition."
The terms of a statute should be interpreted in accord with
usually accepted meanings. [ 17] In consttuing legislative
enactments, the reviewer assumes that each term in the
statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read
literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or
inoperable. [18]
The plain language of section 59-7-108( 14)(f) is specific in
its operation and intent. The section specifically prohibits
the deduction of certain types of net loss carryovers, those
incurred by an acquired corporation prior to the date of its
acquisition. Section 59-7-108(14)(t) is also specific as to
who is prohtoited from deducting preacquisition loss
carryovers. The section prohibits all "corporations acquiring
the assets or stock of another corporation" from taldng these
deductions. All other corporations or entities are left outside
the prohibitions of the statute. Therefore, by the plain terms
of the statute, the acquired corporation is not prohibited
from deducting its preacquisition losses merely because its
stock has been purchased by another entity. [19] The
acquired corporation does not fit within the statute's specific
prohibitions and should be free to deduct the preacquisition
losses from its own income.
The Commission argues that the filing of consolidated
returns by petitioner somehow transforms the deductions by
the acquired corporations into those of Savage Industries,
the acquiring corporation. While the filing of a consolidated
return does create a single taxing unit which includes both
the acquiring and the acquired
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corporation, the fonn of the consolidated return does not
change the deduction from one of the acquired corporation.
The consolidated return is not merely the return of the
acquiring or parent corporation. All deductions taken on the
return should not therefore be considered to be the
deductions of the parent corporation. The Commission's
own regulations regarding preparation and filing of a
consolidated return make it clear that the corporations filing
such returns maintain their separate identities although a
single tax is calculated for the group. Tax Commission
regulation R865-6-4F(G) states that the parent corporation
acts as the agent for the consolidated group. This provision
does not state that the return is considered that of the parent;
indeed, it mandates that the group must notify the
Commission of its new agent if the parent is contemplatin8
dissolution and is not qualified to file as part of the
consolidated return. Regulation R865-6-4F(H) allows the
Commission to pursue individually the subsidiaries that
make up the group if the tax is filed improperly as separate
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returns. Therefore, it is clear that the return is filed for each

member of the affiliated group and is not just that of the
parent corporation.
The fonn of the return itself also makes distinctions
between the parent corporation and its individual
subsidiaries. Under R865--6-4F(J)(3), separate schedules for
each corporate entity listing income and deductions must be
filed with the consolidated return. It is on these separate
schedules that the deductions at issue were taken by the
acquired corporations. The deductions were only taken in
years when the specific acquired corporations had sufficient
income to offset the previous losses. (20] The deductions
taken by KNT and Savage Western were the separate
deductions of these acquired corporations. The fact that
they were taken in years when the acquired corporations
filed consolidated returns does not make them the
deductions of Savage Industries, the acquiring corporation,
and does not make the deductions violations of section

S9•7-108.
The Commission argues that the allowance of deductions
for prcacquisition losses by an acquired corporation will
violate the legislative intent of section 59-7-108. This
court's primary responsibility in construing legislative
enactments is to give effect to the legislature's underlying
intent. [21] "In determining the legislative intent of a
statu~ 'the statute should be considered in the light of the
purpose it was designed to serve and so applied as to carry
out that purpose if it can be done consistent with its
language.' " (22] The Commission cites no legislative
record or other history to ascertain the intent of the
legislature in drafting section 59-7-108. Therefore, in
attempting to determine legislative intent, we should look
first to the plain meaning of the language at issue in the
statute. (23] The words of the statute indicate an intent to
prevent buying of loss corporations by high profit
corporations solely for the use of the loss corporation's
previous loss carryover deductions. A further intent may be
to limit the use of loss carryover deductions to those
corporations which have previously suffered the losses and
therefore are entitled to average their low income years with
their high income

corporations is not the type of loss "manipulation" the
legislature intended to prohibit by the statute. The
secondary intent of the statute is also furthered by allowing
acquired corporations to deduct loss carryovers. The
subsidiary or entity which incuned the loss is the one that
later is able to benefit from the canyover in averaging its
income between high and low income years. No deduction
may be taken by the acquired corporation or any affiliated
group of which it is a member until that acquired
corporation generates enough income to offset the loss
canyover.
The Commission also urges that the deduction sought by
Savage Industries should not be allowed because it will
encourage corporations to manipulate assets between parent
and subsidiaries to wrongfully take advantage of the net
loss carryovers by the transfer of profitable operations to
the companies with prior net losses. The simple response to
this argument is that the statute must be enforced as it is
written, and as written, it does not prevent that type of
manipulation. Further, there is no evidence of misuse of
assets or of the feared manipulation in this case. Savage
Industries was formed to consolidate and manage existing
corporations owned by the Savage brothers. The
organization and corporate ownership of these corporations
remained the same both before and after the formation of
Savage Industries and the stock purchases by which KNT
and Savage Western became Savage Industries subsidiaries.
The entire thrust of these transactions appears to have been
for organization and management purposes and not for tax
manipulation.

years. (24]

Even the Commission's interpretation of the statute would
not prevent manipulation of corporate assets for the purpose
of accruing tax deductions based on prcacquisition losses. A
mere reversal of parent and subsidiary positions by
corporations would allow the "parent" loss corporation to
take advantage of its losses incurred prior to the purchase of
the profitable "subsidiary." This type of manipulation, as
well as that feared by the Commission under our
interpretation of the statute, is not addressed in section
59-7-108 and is better dealt with through other means, such
as careful Commission auditing of intercompany transfers.
The interpretation of the statute to allow acquired
corporations to deduct the prior net losses does not prevent
alternate means for discovering improper manipulation of
assets.

Evaluation of the current case shows that the allowance of
preacquisition losses by the acquired corporation does not
violate this intent. Allowance of the deduction does not
encourage high profit corporations to buy loss companies
merely for the purpose of deducting loss carryovers, as the
high profit company is required to tum around the loss
corporation until it generates profit before any carryovers
may be deducted. This type of turnaround of loss

We therefore hold that the statute as written does not
prohibit an acquired corporation from taking advantage of
its loss carryovers incurred prior to the date of acquisition
in order to offset its own as opposed to the acquiring
corporation's income. The deduction may be taken by the
acquired corporation, whether filing separately or filing a
consolidated return as part of an affiliated group. The
decision of the Commission denying Savage's petition is
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reversed, and the case is hereby remanded to the
Commission for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HOWE, Associate CJ., and STEWART, DURHAM and

ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

~

Notes:

[l] Utah Code Ann.§ 59-7-124 prescribes the requirements
for filing a consolidated corporate franchise tax return. The
ability to file a consolidated return is descn"bed in the
statute as a "privilege" of corporations with common stock
ownership. There is no dispute that Savage Industries and
its subsidiary corporations qualified to file consolidated
returns under this section.
[2] 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983).
[3] Id. at 609.
[4] Id. at 608.

[5] Id. at 610.
The degree of deference extended to [agency decisions] on
these intermediate types of issues has been given various
expressions, but all are variations of the idea that the
[agency] decisions must fall within the limits of
reasonableness or rationality. As used in this context, the
words "arbitrary and capricious" mean no more than this.

~

Taylor v. Utah State Training School, 775 P.2d 432, 433-34
(Utah CtApp.1989); Boyd v. Department of Employment
Sec., 773 P.2d 398, 400 (Utah Ct.App.1989); Smith &
Edwards v. Industrial Comm'n, 770 P.2d 1016, 1017 (Utah
CtApp.1989); Sisco Hilte v. Industrial Comm'n, 766 P.2d
1089, 1091 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
[7] There bas been a trend in recent case law to require
factual findings of an agency to be based on substantial
evidence. See, e.g., Bennett v. Industrial Comm'n, 726 P.2d
427,429 (Utah 1986); Big K Corp., 689 P.2d at 1353. This
standard for reviewing agency fmdings of fact is
incorporated into the Utah Administrative Procedure Act,
effective January 1, 1988, and found at Utah Code Ann. §

63-46b-l 6(4)(g).
(8] Compare Bennett, 726 P.2d at 429 (defining
"employee" under Utah's worlcers' compensation statute)
with Johnson v. Department of Employment Sec., 782 P.2d
965,968 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (defining ''just cause" under
Utah's unemployment statute). The distinction between
these two cases can be clarified by looking at the organic
statutes of the agencies involved. The statute giving the
agency power to detennine whether an employee has left
employment for just cause for purposes of unemployment
compensation gives the agency wide discretion based on
"equity and good conscience." Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-5.
The statute determining the scope of employment for
workers' compensation benefits does not give the Industrial
Commission such agency discretion. Utah Code Ann. §
35-l-43{l)(b).

Id.

[9] 767 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988).

[6] See, e.g., Telecommunications v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
747 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Utah 1987); Taylor v. Industrial
Comm'n of Utah, 743 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Utah 1987);
True-Flo Mechanical Sys. v. Board of Review, 743 P.2d
1161, 1163 (Utah 1987); Spreader Specialists, Inc. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 738 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 1987); Smith v.
Board ofReview oflndus. Comm'n, 714 P.2d 1154, 1155
(Utah 1986); Big K Cotp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 689 P.2d
1349, 1353 (Utah 1984); Barney v. Department of
Employment Sec., 681 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Utah 1984);
Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d
1135, 1139 (Utah 1983); Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer,
674 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 1983); Young & Sons v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 672 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1983). The court of
appeals has also decided several cases applying the three
standards of review of agency determinations. See, e.g.,
USX Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 781 P.2d 883, 886 (Utah
Ct.App.1989); Olympus Oil Inc. v. Harrison, 778 P.2d
I 008, l O10 (Utah Ct.App. l 989); Capital Gen. Corp. v.
Department of Bus. Regulation, 777 P.2d 494, 496 (Utah
Ct.App.1989), cert. denied, 781 P.2d 878 (1989); Kline v.
Utah Dep't of Health, 776 P.2d 57, 60 (Utah CtApp.1989);

[ 1O] See id. at 528.
(11] 791 P.2d 511 (Utah 1990).
(12] Id. at 513-14 (citations omitted).
[ 13] This standard has evolved through several Utah cases,
beginning prior to Department of Administrative Services.
See, e.g., Salt Lake City Corp. v. Department of
Employment Sec., 657 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Utah 1982); Big K
Corp., 689 P.2d at 1353 (applying a correction of error
standard "unless the Commission by virtue of expertise and
experience with the regulatory scheme is in a superior
position to give effect to the regulatory objectives to be
achieved or the terms of the statute make clear that the
Commission was intended to have broad discretion in
construing those terms"); Bennett, 726 P.2d at 429.
[14] Utah Code Ann.§§ 63-46b-1 through-22 (1989).
[ 15) Comments of the Utah Administrative Law Advisory
Committee, Utah A.P.A., at 15 (Code Co Law Publishers,
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April 25, 1988).
[ 16] Model State Admin. Procedure Act § 5-116 comment,
15 U.L.A. 127-30 (1981).

[17] Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah
1985).
[18] Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Tax Comm•~ 796 P.2d
1256, 1258 (Utah 1990); Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 244,
247 (Utah CLApp.1987).
[19] This situation differ.; from instances where the

acquired corporation is merged into the acquiring

corporation. There, the surviving corporation is the
"acquiring" corporation, and it appears that the deduction
would be prohibited. See generally Golf Digest/fennis Inc.
v. Dubno, 203 Coon. 455, 525 A.2d 106, 110-11 (1987);
Fieldcrest Mills, Inc. v. Coble, 290 N.C. 586, 227 S.E.2d
562, 574 (1976).
(20] The prior net losses of W cstcm Rock were not
deducted until 1985, although they were incurred in 1983.
This was because Western Rock itself did not generate
sufficient income to offset these net losses until 1985.
During the intervening years, however, Savage Industries
had net income sufficient to offset these losses. The fact
that Savage Industries did not seek to use these losses
illustrates the proper application of this statute to the
acquiring corporation.
[21] See Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936
(Utah 1980); Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d
738, 741 (Utah 1977); Utah Fann Bureau Ins. Co. v. Utah
Ins. Ouar. Ass'n, 564 P.2d 751, 7S4 (Utah 1977).
[22] Utah Power & Light v. Municipal Power Sys., 784
P.2d 137, 141 (Utah 1989) (quoting Johnson v. State Tax
Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 337, 411 P .2d 831, 832 ( 1966)).
[23] Chris & Dick's Lumberv. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511,
514 (Utah 1990); Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134,
763 P.2d 806,809 (Utah 1988).
(24] See Fieldcrest, 227 S.E.2d at 565 (discussion of the
purpose behind allowance of loss canyovers as deductions
from corporate franchise tax).
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OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Petitioner, Tasters Limited, Inc., seeks review of the
decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission detennining Tasters' workers to be employees
and not independent contractors for purposes of Utah's
Employment Security Act (UESA), Utah Code Ann. §§
35-4-1 to -26 ( 1988). The Board rendered its decision in
response to an earlier remand by this court. Tasters Ltd v.
Department of Employment Sec., 819 P.2d 361 (Utah
App.1991) (Tasters I). We reverse.

Tasters is in the business of providing workers, primarily at
the request of food brokers and product manufacturers and
their representatives (hereafter collectively referred to as
"brokers"), for demonstrations of various products in
grocery and department stores. Tasters maintains a list of
approximately 2,000 individuals willing to perfonn
demonstrations. [ 1]
These individuals contact Tasters, or vice versa,
concerning the availability of demonstrations. [2] If a
demonstration is available, Tasters will infonn the
individual of the time, place, and type of demonstration that
is requested by the particular broker. The demonstrator is
then free to accept or reject the demonstration for any
reason, personal or otherwise. No reprimand or disciplinary
action is taken against an individual who declines a
demonstration. [3]
Upon acceptance of a particular demonstration, the
demonstrator is solely responsible for its completion.
Demonstrators are not, however, required to personally
perfonn the demonstration. A demonstrator may choose to
assign the demonstration to another individual. Tasters has
no veto power over the choice of the replacement or even
the practice of engaging a substitute. Indeed, Tasters
frequently does not even have knowledge of the particular
substitution. If the assigned demonstration is completed, by
whomever and however, Tasters is obligated to pay the
individual who originally accepted the demonstration.
When an individual accepts a demonstration, be or she
ordinarily works according to the schedule. fixed by the
broker, as communicated by Tasters. Demonstrators are,
however, free to negotiate with the broker or store owner to
change the time of the demonstration. Upon arrival at the
store, the demonstrators are left unsupervised to perfonn the
demonstration. There is no direct control over how a
demonstration is conducted--the method and manner are left
entirely to the discretion of the demonstrator. Tasters has,
however, prepared and occasionally disseminated a one
page list of fourteen "VERY IMPORTANT THINGS TO
REMEMBER!!!" Nonetheless, Tasters provides no
fonnalized training to the demonstratoB. (41
Any equipment needed for a demonstration, such as a card
table, electric frying ~ crock pot, tablecloth, apron, and
related utensils, is provided and paid for by the individual
demonstrator. To the minimal extent necessary,
demonstrators must use
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their own phones and office space as Tasters does not
provide them with any such facilities. Moreover,
demonstrators are responsible for any theft, breakage of
their equipment, or any damage they cause to the premises
or customers of a store.
Demonstrators must complete a one-page report at the
conclusion of the demonstration indicating which product
was demonstrated, the amount of product sold during the
demonstration, and any expenses the demonstrator incurred
for disposable items such as toothpicks, napkins, and paper
cups. Both the store manager and the demonstrator are
required to sign this report and both may include any
feedback they deem relevant. The report is then submitted
to Tasters for resubmission to the broker whose product was
demonstrated. (Tasters does not use the report to evaluate
the demonstrator's performance.) The report contains a list
of charges, supported by receipts, of all the demonstrator's
reimbursable
expenses
for
disposable
items.
Reimbursement is made by the broker, not Tasters.
Once the demonstrator returns the report to Tasters, Tasters
pays the individual the amount previously agreed upon for
the demonstration. A demonstration which requires cooking
or fiying often pays more than a demonstration that only
involves passing out ready-to-cat samples.

In 1989, Tasters sought a ruling from the Utah Department
of Employment Security as to the status of its demonstrators
under UESA, and Tasters' corresponding responsibility, if
any, to make contributions to the unemployment
compensation funds, as a result of then-recent changes in
the statutory test for determining whether a worker is an
employee or an independent contractor. See Utah Code
Ano.§ 3S-4-22(j)(S) (Supp.1989). [S] On August 31, 1989,
the Department issued a formal determination that Tasters'
demonstrators
were
employees,
not
independent
contractors. (6) Tasters appealed to an Administrative Law
Judge, who affirmed the Department's determination.
Consequently, Tasters filed an appeal of the AU's decision
with the Board of Review. On July IO, 1990, the Board
entered its first decision affirming the determination 'that
demonstrators were employees of Tasters. Tasters then filed
a petition for writ of review with this court, which
culminated in Tasters I. The Board relied on the twenty
factors, (A)-(T), set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 3S-4-22(j)(S)
(Supp.1989), [7] to determine the status of Tasters'
demonstrators. However, because "[n]o fmdings were made
[by the Board] as to why some of the factors were
insignificant, while others were considered significant," this
court reversed the Board's determination and remanded the
action for additional findings of fact. Tasters I, 819 P.2d at
367.

its further consideration as ordered by this court. [8]
Nonetheless, on September 9, 1992, the Board finalized its
second decision, again concluding that "Tasters
demonstrators are not independent contractors within the
meaning of§ 35-4-22[ (j)(S) ] of the Utah Employment
Security Acl"
Tasters has now petitioned this court for review of the
Board's second decision. Tasters presents three key claims
on appeal:

Page 18

(1) that the Board's fmdings of fact are not supported by
substantial evidence; (2) that the Board exceeded the scope
of its legislative authority by improperly interpreting and
expanding key factors in the statute; and (3) that the Board
incorrectly determined that demonstrators are employees
and not independent contractors. [9]
STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Our review of the Board's decision is governed by the
applicable provisions of the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)
(1989). The cited section governs judicial review of formal
adjudicative proceedings. Under this section, varying
standards of review are applicable to agency decisions
depending on the nature of the challenge to such decisions.
UAPA requires this comt to grant relief to a petitioner if,
inter alia,
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred
by any statute;

(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the
law;

(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact.
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court; [or)
(h) the agency action is:

(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by

statute[.]
Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-16(4) (1989).
A. Factual Findings

(i)
Upon remand, the Board changed its classification of
eleven of the twenty factors, apparently as a consequence of

Tasters first challenges the correctness of the Board's
findings of fact. Tasters claims that the Board's findings of
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fact are not supported by substantial evidence as required
under section 63-46b-16(4)(g). Under UAPA, an agency's
factual findings will be affinned "only if they are 'supported
by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court.' " Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah App.1989) (quoting Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1988)). See Department of
the Air Force v. Swider, 824 P.2d 448, 451 (Utah
App.1991).

In First National Bank of Boston v. County Board of
Equalization, 199 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990), the Utah
Supreme Court stated that "'[s]ubstantial evidence' is that
quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to
convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Id at
1165. The Court also stated that appellate courts, when
applying the substantial evidence test under UAPA. are
required to consider not only the evidence supporting the
Board's findings but also the evidence negating them. Id
See Swider, 824 P .2d at 45 l; Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at
68. Additionally, it is important to note that the substantial
evidence test mandates that the party challenging the
Board's factual findings must marshall all of the evidence
supporting the Board's findings and show that despite the
supporting facts and all reasonable inferences that can be
drawn therefrom, the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence given the record as a whole. Grace
Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68. See Swider, 824 P.2d at 451;
Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464
(Utah App.1991); Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002
(Utah App.), cert. denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989).
B. Legal Conclusions
Tasters' second claim is that the Board erred in it.s
interpretation and application of section 35-4-220)(5) in
two closely related respects. First, Tasters asserts that the
Board exceeded its legislatively delegated authority by
improperly interpreting and applying key factors set forth in
the statute. Second, Tasters argues that the Board erred in
concluding that Tasters'

degree of deference such that it should be affirmed if its
decision is reasonable and rational." Wagstaff v.
Department of Employment Sec., 826 P.2d 1069, 1071-72
(Utah App.1992) (citing Morton, 814 P.2d at 589). Neither
party asks us to revisit this court's determination in Tasters
I, 819 P .2d at 364, that the Legislature granted discretion to
the Board to interpret section 3S-4-22G)(S). Accordingly,
this court will reverse the Board's ultimate determination,
and upset its intermediate conclusions, only ifwe conclude
they are irrational or unreasonable. See Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) (1989). See also King, 850 P.2d at 1286;
SEMECO Indus. Inc. v. Auditing Div., 849 P.2d l I 67, 1172
(Utah 1993) (Dur~ J., dissenting). However, no agency
enjoys the discretion to exceed the authority vested in it by
the Legislature. Insofar as the Board has run afoul of this
precept, as argued by Tasters, we will review its action for
legal error, without deference. See Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-16(4)(d) (1989). See also Adams v. Board of
Review, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App.1991 ); LaSal Oil Co. v.
Department ofEnvtl. Quality, 843 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah
App.1992).
INTRODUCTION TO ANALYSIS

It is elementary that each case should be decided on its
own particular set of facts, and the present appeal turns on
whether the facts and circumstances support findings which
reasonably and rationally lead to a conclusion of employee
status under UESA. In general terms,
[a]n employee is one who is hired and paid a salary, a
wage, or at a fixed rate, to perform the employer's work as
directed by the employer and who is subject to a
comparatively high degree of control in performing those
duties. In contrast, an independent contractor is one who is
engaged to do some particular project or piece of work,
usually for a set total sum, who may do the job in his own
way, subject to only minimal restrictions or controls and is
responsible only for its satisfactory completion.
Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316, 318
(Utah 1975).
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demonstrators were employees and not independent
contractors. Because both claims present challenges to the
Board's legal conclusions, the standard of review utilized
depends on the existence of a statutory grant of discretion to
the agency. Morton Int'/, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 814
P.2d 581, 583-89 (Utah 1991); King v. Industrial Comm'n,
850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App.1993).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that where " 'there is a
grant of discretion to the agency concerning the language in
question, either expressly made in the statute or implied
from the statutory language,' the agency is entitled to a

In its decision, the Board concluded that the weight of the
evidence did not support independent contractor status. In
so deciding, the Board noted that section 3S-4-22(j)(5)
contains a presumption of employee status. We are advised
in the Board's brief that the underlying objective of UESA
is "to provide financial stability to the economy itself and to
workers who lose their jobs through no fault of their own."
The Board contends that if it was to err in either direction,
the Legislature intended it to err in favor of finding
employee status. Although we may agree with the Board's
general observations, the Board is not privileged to commit
error in the name of safeguarding the general scheme of
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Upon review of the instant record, we detect a host of
errors made by the Board in its analysis and fact finding.

FACTORS DETERMINED NOT TO BE USEFUL
Although section 35-4-220)(5) allows the Board to
consider only those factors which are applicable to a
particular case, Tasters disputes the Board's determination
that five of the twenty factors were inapplicable to this case.

A. Factor (I): Equipment and Control
First, Tasters asserts that factor (I) was unreasonably
determined to be inapplicable. Tasters argues that factor (I)
is clear

Page20
on its face and that the Board's interpretation
application of this factor were unreasonable.

and

Factor (I) requires the Board to determine ''whether the
individual uses his or her own office, desk, telephone, or
other equipment or is physically within the employer's
direction and supervision." [10] The Board concluded this
factor was not useful because "neither the individual
demonstrators nor Tasters owns, operates or manages the
sites where work is performed." Tasters contends that the
Board unreasonably interpreted this factor to require an
examination of whether the individual works at his or her
own place of business or at the place ofbusiness of the
employer, while the statute merely contemplates the
ownership of equipment and the existence of employer
supervision and direction.
The plain meaning of the statute docs not support the
Board's interpretation, nor does the Board point us to any
legislative history suggesting that the focus of factor (I) is
to be on the ownership of the workplace. As noted, the
statute expressly states that the focus is to be on who owns
the equipment used to perform the job and on whether the
demonstrators are under the direction and supervision of
Tasters. In setting forth a detailed twenty factor analysis for
determining whether an individual is an employee or an
independent contractor. the Legislature indicated with
precision which considerations it deemed relevant to the
determination. Had the Legislature intended ownership of
the workplace to be a consideration. it could easily have
expressly stated its intent Inasmuch as the Legislature
chose not to expressly include ownership of the workplace
as a consideration, it was error for the Board to do so.
Turning to the evidence pertinent to factor (D, the record
reveals that demonstrators use their own telephones incident
to lining up demonstrations and their own equipment in

performing the demonstrations. They pay their own phone
bills, transportation costs, and equipment expenses.
Furthermore, Tasters provides no office space or telephone
facilities for its demonstrators. Given this evidence, we
conclude that the first part of factor (I), concerning
equipment, indisputably points to independent contractor
status.
The latter half of factor (I) focuses on whether the
demonstrators are physically under Tasters' direction and
supervision. Uncontroverted evidence shows that the
method and manner of the demonstration is left completely
up to the discretion of the demonstrator. While there is
evidence that occasionally an employee from Tasters will
visit a store where a demonstration is taking place-to offer
assistance or tips-it is inconceivable that the five office
personnel employed by Tasters, only three of whom are
full-time, could actually supervise the multitude of
demonstrators flung throughout six states. In all but the
exceptional case, no one from Tasters is even physically
present during a demonstration. Tasters does not perform
any periodic evaluation of a demonstrator's performance.
Tasters normally will not even know how a demonstrator
performed unless a problem is specifically brought to its
attention by a store manager or broker. Nor does Tasters
direct the demonstrators as to which jobs they must
perform. Tasters has no control over the demonstrator's
selection or rejection of a particular demonstration.
Given these facts, we conclude that the Board
unreasonably determined factor (I) to be inapplicable. The
evidence pertinent to this factor overwhelmingly suggests
independent contractor status.
B. Factor (E): Subcontracting Demonstrations
Tasters next challenges the Board's determination that
factor (E) is inapplicable. Factor (E) requires the Board to
decide "whether the individual has the right to

Pagell
hire, supervise, and pay other assistants pursuant to a
contract under which the individual is responsible only for
the attainment of a result or the individual hires, supervises,
and pays workers at the direction of the employer." Tasters
argues that the evidence indicates that demonstrators are
permitted to delegate assignments to others without Tasters'
approval or knowledge. However, the Board, while
recognizing that this is factually correct, stated in its
decision that
[t]he record does not show that when a demonstrator does
get a replacement there is any kind of a contract governing
the replacement's work. Clearly that kind of a transfer of a
demonstrator's job is not at all what is anticipated by factor

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(E) anyway because of the short term and untechnical
nature of the work done by Tasters demonstrators.
The Board argues that factor (E) "anticipates an employer
giving an assignment to a worker which is then broken up
for completion by numerous individuals." The Board
suggests that because there was no evidence that
demonstrators "hired, supervised or paid assistants pursuant
to a contract with Tasters for an assignment which Tasters
expected to be broken down for completion by numerous
individuals," this factor was inapplicable.
Analyzing the Board's rationale as set forth in its decision
and embellished in its brie~ we conclude that it committed
two errors in its interpretation. Initially, the Board appears
to interpret "pursuant to a contract" to require a written
contract between Tasters and its demonstrators allowing
work to be subcontracted. As previously stated. making this
kind of extra-legislative embellishment to the statute is
inappropriate. Analyzing the statute's plain meaning, the
uncontested facts establish that subcontracting is an
accepted practice and that there is an understanding
between Tasters and the demonstrators, albeit not reduced
to writing, that a demonstrator can assign a demonstration
to a replacement Therefore, absent any showing that the
Legislature intended for only written contracts to satisfy
this prong, we conclude that the Board's restrictive
interpretation is erroneous.
Additionally, the Board seeks in its argument to
differentiate between dividing a job into numerous mini
tasks and delegating an entire project to one individual.
Again, the Board points to no legislative history or other
basis for its interpretation that only particular variations of
engaging assistants qualify under the statute. We cannot
detect any legislative intent to distinguish between the two
types of delegations of responsibility.
The uncontroverted evidence shows that 11assistants11 are
engaged and supervised by demonstrators who need a
replacement to perform a particular demonstration. The
evidence clearly indicates that Tasters exercises no control
over the practice of subcontracting; the demonstrators are
free to hire whom they choose, pay them what they choose,
and supervise the replacement as they see fit.
We conclude that the demonstrator's unfettered prerogative
to control who perfonns the demonstration fulfills the "right
to hire" requirement of factor (E) and that the accepted
practice of delegating demonstrations is fully consistent
with the contract between Tasters and the demonstrators.
Accordingly, we hold that factor (E) inarguably points to
independent contractor status and the Board's determination
designating this factor as inapplicable is therefore
unreasonable.

C. Factors (S) and (T): Job Completion and Termination
Tasters additionally challenges the Board's determinations
with regard to factors (S) and (T). In the Board's first
decision, both these factors were found to support
independent contractor status, but this cl~illcation was
changed upon remand to "inapplicable." Factor (S) focuses
on "whether the individual may not be fired or discharged
as long as he or she produces a result which meets contract
specifications or may be discharged at any time." Similarly,
factor (T) asks ''whether the individual agrees to complete a
specific service, and is responsible for its satisfaction
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or is legally obligated to perform the service, or may
tenninate his or her relationship with the employer at any
. e. "
tim
The pertinent evidence indicates that demonstrators are
engaged to perform a specific demonstration, and so long as
that demonstration is completed, the demonstrator is paid in
full. Moreover, the demonstrator is solely responsible for
the completion of the demonstration, and, as previously
noted, demonstrators must personally find a replacement to
complete the demonstration if they cannot do so
themselves. The evidence also indicates that Tasters does
not "fire" anyone for inadequate perfonnance; Tasters
merely removes inactive or inadequate demonstrators from
its computer list of available demonstrators. The president
of Tasters testified without contradiction that a
demonstrator who did not show up to perform the
demonstration or who behaved poorly would simply not be
called to conduct another demonstration for Tasters. [11)
Moreover, if a store manager complains about a certain
demonstrator, Tasters merely places a mark next to the
demonstrator's name indicating that he or she should not be
placed for future demonstrations at that particular store.
Given the evidence presented, the facts pertinent to both
factor (S) and factor (T) clearly point to independent
contractor status, as the Board initially determined.

D. Factor (J): Pacing and Sequence
Finally, Tasters argues that factor (J), concerning "whether
the individual is free to perform services at his or her own
pace or perfonns services in the order or sequence set by
the employer," was unreasonably determined to be
inapplicable. The Board in reaching its decision determined
that a d]emonstrator[1s work consists of handing out
samples to those who pass by for a set period of time. There
is no 'pacing' involved in this kind of work and no ordered
sequence of duties because of the nature of the work." Thus,
the Board found this factor inapplicable. Tasters, however,
places great emphasis on the ability of demonstrators to
11

[
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conduct the demonstration in a manner and method of their
own choosing. While demonstrators choose the manner and
method in which they will perform the demonstration, the
pace at which they work is completely beyond their control.
The pace is undoubtedly set by the number of shoppers in
the store, the level of shopper interest in the particular
product, and the number of samples available for
distn'bution. Accordingly, we hold that the Board's
determination with respect to this factor was not irrational
or unreasonable and is therefore sustained.
FACTORS DETERMINED TO SHOW EMPLOYEE

STATUS
Tasters urges this court to hold that the Board unreasonably
concluded that seven factors, A, B, C, G, M, 0, and P, each
support employee status.
A. Factor (A): Schedules and Instructions
Factor (A) requires the Board to determine "whether the
individual works his or her own schedule or is required to
comply with another person's instructions about when,
where, and how work is to be performed." Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-4-22(j)(S)(A) (Supp.1989) (emphasis added). The
Board found that each demonstrator receives written
instructions on how and when the demonstration is to be
performed. The Board based this finding on a writing
"VERY
IMPORTANT
llflNGS
TO
entitled
REMEMBER!!!," which lists fourteen guidelines
concerning, inter alia, attire, length of breaks, punctuality,
and demonstration tactics. The Board found that this list set
forth binding requirements and consequently indicated
employee status.
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Tasters contends that the Board's finding is not supported
by substantial evidence. Tasters contends that the evidence
indicates that this list was merely prepared to avoid having
to constantly answer recurring questions that demonstrators
asked Tasters over and over again. Tasters claims that the
list is not a set of requirements but merely a set of helpful
hints.

We recognize that this list, read in isolation, is subject to
mixed interpretations. Some of the items appear to be
compulsory. For example, the list specifies that the
demonstrator is to "Ct]ake 1/2 hour lunch and two 15 minute
breaks." On the other hand, innocuous items on the list such
as "SMILE!!!," "[d]rcss appropriately," and "[p)lease wear
an APRON!,'' are such common-sense tips as to undercut
any inference of mandatory directive. Most of the items are
intrinsically neither mandatory nor advisory, suggesting the
need to resort to extrinsic evidence regarding follow-up and
enforcement before their actual nature can be judged. Due

to the conflicting and ambiguous character of the list, and
factor (A)'s specific mandate that the demonstrator be
required to comply with this list in order to find indicia of
employee status, consideration of such extrinsic evidence
becomes particularly important.
There was no evidence that this list was given to every
demonstrator. [12] The evidence indicates that, depending'
on the type of demonstration being done, as many as half
the suggestions may not even be applicable. For example, a
portion of the list is entitled "PACKING YOUR BASKET."
It lists items that the demonstrator may want to bring to the
demonstration such as a spatula, moist cloth, electric frying
pan, and twenty-five foot extension cord. If, however, the
demonstration does not require any cooking, there would be
no need for the demonstrator to bring a ftying ~ a
spatula, or an extension cord. Thus, it makes no sense to
find that such portions of the list set forth invariably
applicable requirements. Furthermore, no demonstrator bas
ever been fired or, apparently, otherwise disciplined for not
adhering to something on the list No procedures were in
place by which Tasters endeavored to ensure or even check
on compliance with the so-called requirements. Given the
evidence presented, we conclude that the record, as a
whole, does not substantially support a finding that this list
set forth mandatory requirements of the sort typical of a
routine employment relationship.

~

~
Next, this court must determine whether, absent the list as a
factual basis for the Board's determination that factor (A)
indicated employee status, the remaining pertinent evidence
can support the Board's determination. It is uncontested that
demonstrators are free to accept or decline jobs for any or
no reason; Tasters docs not require that a demonstrator
work at all. It is completely up to the demonstrator to pick
and choose which demonstrations, if any, they want to
perform, thereby exercising total control over their own
work schedule. Tasters does not require any demonstrator to
work a specific job or even a certain number of jobs or
hours.
We hold that the Board's determination that factor (A)
supports employee status is unreasonable. Given the
evidence of record, it is clear the demonstrators work their
own schedule and therefore that factor (A) can only point to
independent contractor status.
B. Factor (B): Training

Tasters contends that factor (B) clearly indicates
independent contractor status, and the Board's finding to the
contrary is unreasonable. In analyzing factor (B) the Board
must determine "whether the individual uses his or her own
methods and requires no specific training from the
purchaser, or is trained by an experienced employee
working with him or her, is required to take correspondence
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or other courses, attend meetings, and by other

evidence that someone other than the individual
demonstrator regulates that schedule points to the broker.
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methods indicates that the employer wants the services
performed." The Board also relied on the list of"VERY
IMPORTANT THINGS TO REMEMBER!!!" as the basis
for its finding that this factor supports employee status. As
previously discussed, this list was not shown to constitute a
set of mandatory requirements.
Tasters argues that the remaining evidence relevant to
factor (B) indicates independent contractor status. The
evidence reveals that demonstrators receive no training at
the hands of an experienced fellow demonstrator, and that
the occasional nonmandatory training session-arranged at a
broker's request--is typically conducted by the broker. Nor
are there any correspondence courses that a demonstrator is
required by Tasters to talce. As the Board acknowledges
elsewhere in its findings, the job of a demonstrator is
"untechnical," and thus there is no need for formal training.
Further evidence also indicates that demonstrators are left
unsupervised to perform the demonstration in a manner and
method which they choose.
The evidence simply does not support the Board's
determination that the list sets forth job requirements or that
the evidence pertinent to factor (8) otherwise indicates
employee status. Accordingly, we reverse the Board's
determination as unreasonable and instead conclude, given
the evidence of record, that factor (B) points to independent
contractor status.

~

C. Factor (G): Time Schedule
Tasters disputes the Board's finding that factor (G)
indicates employee status. Factor (G), which on the surface
seems to be only a slightly more focused version of factor
(A), asks the Board to ascertain "whether the individual
establishes his or her own time schedule or does the
employer set the time schedule. 11 While the Board concedes
that Tasters does not set the time of the
demonstration-instead this function rests with the brokers
and store managers--it nonetheless determined that the
demonstrators do not set their own hours. In analyzing this
factor, the Board apparently did not find it compelling that
the vast majority of demonstrations are staffed by
demonstrators who contacted Tasters to secure a
demonstration opportunity or that the demonstrator has the
opportunity to accept or reject a given demonstration based
on the time or day it is scheduled to be performed, or on
any other basis the demonstrator desires. As indicated in
discussing factor (A), the record indicates that the
demonstrators are in control of the demonstrators' work
schedules. No evidence presented suggests that Tasters
controls the demonstrators' work schedule. Indeed, the only

Therefore, we conclude that the Board's determination that
factor (G) indicates employee status is unreasonable. The
evidence inarguably tilts more to independent contractor
status.
D. Factor (M): Expenses
Tasters challenges the Board's conclusion that factor (M)
indicates employee status. Fact.or (M), with our emphasis,
asks the Board to determine "whether the individual
accounts for his or her own expenses or is paid by the
employer for expenses." In making its determination, the
Board placed great emphasis on Tasters' ability to "approve
or disapprove questionable costs." The Board's decision,
while factually correct in that the demonstrators do run their
invoices for incidental expenses through Tasters, and
Tasters subsequently approves or denies reimbursement,
overlooks the critical fact that it is the broker--not
Tasters-that actually pays for the incidentals. A plain
reading of factor (M) does not support the Board's focus on
Tasters' ability to authorize or disapprove reimbursement
for certain expenditures. The statute expressly indicates that
the focus is to be on who pays the expenses. Tasters asserts
that since neither Tasters nor the demonstrator pays the
incidental expenses, this factor should, at worst, be deemed
inapplicable. [13] We agree and accordingly
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conclude that the Board's determination that this factor
indicates employee status is unreasonable.
E. Factor (0): Investment
In a similar vein, Taster challenges the Board's
determination that factor (0) indicates employee status.
Factor (0) requires that the Board decide "whether the
individual has a real, essential, and adequate investment in
the business or has a lack of investtnent and depends on the
employer for such facilities." The Board concluded that
because the necessary equipment can be purchased for
approximately fifty to two hundred dollars, and most of the
equipment can be used in the home as well as on the job,
the cost of equipment cannot be viewed as a meaningful
business investment.
The evidence indicates that 92% of Tasters' demonstrators
make less than six hundred dollars per year performing
demonstrations for Tasters. Therefore, an investment of
fifty to two hundred dollars in comparison to such a
minimal annual business income is both "real" and
"adequate." It is also important to note that although the
investment--when viewed from the individual demonstrator
standpoint-may seem minimal, if Tasters were required to
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provide the necessary equipment to its approximately 2,000
demonstrators, the outlay would be gargantuan. Moreover,
if a demonstrator did not invest in the equipment, he or she
would be unable to perfonn any demonstrations, excepting
the comparatively few "band-out only" demonstrations,
since Tasters does not provide equipment. Thus, the
investment is "essential" to the demonstrator's ability to
perfonn the job.
The second portion of factor (0), stated with our emphasis,
questions whether the individual "has a lack of investment
and depends on the employer for such facilities." As
previously noted, Tasters provides no equipment or
facilities to demonstrators. While the demonstrators rely on
Tasters to dispense infonnation regarding available
demonstrations along with the corresponding payment
checks, they apparently depend on Tasters for little else.
Accordingly, we hold that factor (0) supports only a
detennination of independent contractor status and the
Board's decision to the contrary is unreasonable. [14)
FACTORS
INDICATING
INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR STATUS THAT WERE

DETERMINED TO BE OF "MINIMAL SIGNIFICANCE"
Tasters argues that the Board unreasonably determined that
three factors indicating independent contractor status, D, H,
and N. [IS] were only minimally significant. In reaching its
determination. Tasters claims that the Board unreasonably
interpreted and applied the pertinent factors.

A. Factor (N): Tools
In effect, Tasters maintains that the Board relied on
parochial generalizations to determine that factor (N) was of
only minimal significance. In its determination, the Board
stated that "these 'tools' [i.e., the equipment used by the
demonstrators] are not the kind associated with an
independent business venture. 11 Factor (N), however, onJy
requires that the Board ascertain "whether the individual
furnishes his or her own tools or is furnished tools and
materials by the employer." The inherent nature or purpose
of the tools is not mentioned. While the Board conceded
that
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the demonstrators furnished their own tools, thereby
satisfying factor (N), the Board effectively undercut any
marginal advancement Tasters may have made by
additionally concluding, without any basis in the statute,
that the tools involved in a demonstration are not the right
type of tools for purposes of the statute.

independent contractors. Although not explicit in its

reasoning, we note that the Board apparently concluded that
tools generally associated with household use-e.g., frying

pans, aprons, and spatulas-were not worthy of the same
status accorded those tools associated with construction
worlc-e.g., saws, hammers, and power drills-even though
the latter can also be frequently found in household settings
as well as on certain job sites. This court can discern no
legal distinction between the two varieties of tools. We
reject the Board's rationale that the character of the tools
typically used in a demonstration renders this factor of only
minimal significance and instead conclude that this factor
must properly be weighed equally with the other factors in
the final analysis.
B. Factor (H): Outside Employment
Tasters contests the weight accorded by the Board to factor
(H). Factor (H) focuses on "whether the individual is free to
work when and for whom he or she chooses, or is required
to devote full-time to the business of the employer, and is
restricted from doing other gainful work.'' The Board,
acknowledging that demonstrators fulfilled the independent
contractor prong of this factor, [ 16) detennined that because
"the very nature of Tasters' business" makes it impossible
for anyone to be a full-time demonstrator, the factor was
only minimally significant. Tasters denies that an individual
cannot be a full-time demonstrator and, moreover, claims
that the Board unreasonably added a criterion, that the
individual work full-time, which is not found in the
statutory language.
The Board has not provided us with any legislative history
to support its position that the statute is only minimally
significant except in situations where the independent
contractor works full-time. "In examining the statute, we
assume that its language 'was used advisedly by the
Legislature,' and should be 'interpreted and applied
according to its usually accepted meaning.' 11 Fussell v.
Department of Commerce, 815 P.2d 250, 254 {Utah
App.1991) (quoting West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d
445, 446 (Utah 1982)). The language of factor (H) does not
so much as hint that individuals must be engaged in
full-time work in order for this factor to be fully applicable.
Had the Legislature intended such a restriction, it could
have easily stated its intent in this long and detailed
statutory provision.
By creating stricter requirements than the statute
contemplated, the Board has wrongly encroached upon the
Legislature's domain. Accordingly, we hold that the Board's
attempt to read in additional requirements is in error. Factor
(H) must be accorded equal weight in making the ultimate
detennination.

Tasters asserts that the statute does not authorize the Board
to unilaterally decide which tools arc typically used by
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C. Factor (D): Assignment of Services
Tasters also claims the Board unreasonably read into factor
(D), concerning "whether the individual's services may be
assigned to others or must be rendered personally," the
requirement that this practice-assignment of services-be
engaged in frequently in order to be significant The Board
concluded that although a demonstrator may assign
responsibility for a demonstration, they do so only
infrequently; thus, the factor was held to be only minimally
significant As previously sta~ this expansive approach
on the part of the Board is in error. The Board has not
pointed this court to any legislative indication that this
restriction was to be imposed. As the demonstrators satisfy
the plain

Pagel7
meaning of the independent contractor prong of factor (0),
we hold that the Board's action in deeming this factor to be
only minimally significant was unreasonable.

LEGISLATIVE
DISCRETION

MINIMIZATION

OF

AGENCY

Upon our review of the record, we conclude that a number
of the Board's findings of fact are not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record. Moreover, the properly supported :findings and the
undisputed facts of record do not reasonably and rationally
support the Board's determination that an employment
relationship exists between Tasters and the demonstrators.
We hold that factors A, B, D, E, G, H, I, L, M, N, 0, Q, S,
and T support independent contractor status, while only
factors C, ~ P, and R indicate employee status. [18) We
recognize that in instances where there is a more even split
between the factors supporting independent contractor
status and those supporting employee status, it may be
necessary to remand in order to allow the Board to carefully
balance the factors in making the ultimate determination of
whether individuals are independent contractors or
employees. However, no such exercise is necessary here
because the balance of factors so overwhelmingly compels
a detennination that the demonstrators are independent
contractors. The Board's decision is therefore reversed.

BILLINGS and GARFF, JJ., concur.
APPENDIX

We would be remiss if we did not touch upon the Board's
contention that the factors laid out in section 35-4-22(j)(S)
are merely illustrative rather than mandatory considerations,
leaving it considerable discretion in detennining employee
or independent contractor status. The contention is wholly
untenable. Quite to the contrary, we believe the Legislature
made a conscious decision to remove much discretion from
the Board in dealing with these issues.
Originally, the Legislature had outlined a very general

"ABC" test as the basis for determining employee or
independent contractor status; this was later revised to an
"AB" test. [I 7] When this section was again changed in
1989 to a specific twenty factor test, each with two
contradictory components, the conclusion is inescapable
that the Legislature intended to remove much of the
subjectivity and discretion that the Board previously
exercised under the fonner tests. We see no reason why the
Legislature would have enacted a specific twenty factor test
if it wished the Department to continue exercising the
nearly unbridled discretion that it previously possessed
under the prior statutory scheme. There is no indication that
the Legislature intended its amendment to somehow be a
more verbose recitation of precisely the same regime which
bad previously been in effect. On the contrary, the
Legislature clearly intended the new provision not to be a
mere set of advisory or illustrative guidelines, but rather to
be a less subjective, more precise framework to be
meticulously followed.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22(j)(5) (Supp.1989) provides as
follows:
Page28
Services performed by an individual for wages or under
any contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied, are
considered to be employment subject to this chapter, unless
it is shown to the satisfaction of the commission that the
individual is an independent contractor. The commission
shall analyze all of the facts in Subsections (A) through (T)
under the common-law rules applicable to the
employer-employee relationship to determine if an
individual is an independent contractor. An individual is an
independent contractor if the weight of the evidence
supports that finding. The following factors are to be
considered if applicable:
(A) whether the individual works his or her own schedule
or is required to comply with another person's instructions
about when, where, and how work is to be performed;

(B) whether the individual uses his or her own methods and
requires no specific training from the purchaser, or is
trained by an experienced employee working with him or
her, is required to take correspondence or other courses,
attend meetings, and by other methods indicates that the
employer wants the services performed;
(C) whether the individual's services are independent of the
success or continuation of a business or are merged into the
business where success and continuation of the business
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depends upon those services and the employer coordinates
work with the work of others;
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same time or usually works for only one employer;

(D) whether the individual's services may be assigned to
others or must be rendered personally;
(E) whether the individual has the right to hire, supervise,
and pay other assistants pursuant to a contract under which
the individual is responsible only for the attainment of a
result or the individual hires, supervises, and pays worlcers
at the direction of the employer;
(F) whether the individual was hired to do one job and has
no continuous business relationship with the person for
whom the services arc performed or continues to work for
the same person year after year;
(G) whether the individual establishes his or her own time
schedule or does the employer set the time schedule;
(H) whether the individual is free to work when and for
whom be or she chooses, or is required to devote full-time
to the business of the employer, and is restricted from doing
other gainful work;

(R) whether the individual has his or her own office and
assistants, holds a business license, is listed in business
directories, maintains a business telephone, or advertises in
newspapers or does not make services available except
through a business in which he or she bas no interest;
(S) whether the individual may not be fired or discharged
as long as he or she produces a result which meets contract
specifications or may be discharged at any time; and
(T) whether the individual agrees to complete a specific
service, and is responsible for its satisfaction or is legally
obligated to perform the service, or may terminate his or her
relationship with the employer at any time.

Notes:
[1] Approximately 450 ofthc 2,000 individuals reside in

Utah.

(I) whether the individual uses his or her own office, desk,
telephone, or other equipment or is physically within the
employer's direction and supervision;

[2] Some 80% of the jobs are filled by demonstrators who
solicit a demonstration opportunity from Tasters.

(J) whether the individual is free to perform services at his
or her own pace or performs services in the order or
sequence set by the employer;

[3] If an individual bas not performed a demonstration in
over a year, that individual's name is automatically dropped
from Tasters' computer list of available demonstrators.

(K) whether the individual submits no reports or is required
to submit regular oral or written reports to the employer;

(4] Occasionally, a broker will request a training session
when a new product is being introduced. In such a
circumstance, Tasters will arrange the session but ordinarily
it is run completely by the broker. Demonstrators are not
required by Tasters to attend the training session, but if a
demonstrator attends, he or she is paid by the broker-not by
Tasters.

(L) whether the individual is paid by the job or on a
straight commission or is paid by the employer in regular
amounts at stated intervals;
(M) whether the individual accounts for his or her own
expenses or is paid by the employer for expenses;

(N) whether the individual furnishes his or her own tools or
is furnished tools and materials by the employer;

(0) whether the individual has a real, essential, and
adequate investment in the business or has a lack of
invesbnent and depends on the employer for such facilities;
(P) whether the individual may realize a profit or suffer a
loss as a result of services performed or cannot realize a
profit or loss by making good or poor decisions;

(Q) whether the individual works for a number of persons
or finns at the

[5] We refer throughout this opinion to Utah Code Ann. §
35-4-220)(5) (Supp.1989). This section has been recodified
and is now found at Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22.3(3)
(Supp.1992).
[ 6] The Internal Revenue Service, applying precisely the
same test, detennined that Tasters' demonstrators were not
employees but independent contractors, for purposes of
income tax withholding and social security deductions.
[7] Section 35-4-22(j)(5) is set forth in its entirety in the
Appendix to this opinion.
[8] The Board, in its first decision, determined that factors
A, B, G, I, K., and R indicated employee status whereas
factors D, E, L, S, and T indicated independent contractor
status. The Board found factors C, F, H, I. M, N, 0, P, and
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Q to be inapplicable. Upon remand, the Board changed its
classification of factors C, E, H, J, M, N, 0, P, Q, S, and T.
In its second decision the Board found that factors ~ B, C,
G, K, M, 0, P, and R indicated employee status, while
factors D, H, L, N, and Q indicated independent contractor
status. The Board detennined that factors E, F, I, J, S, and T
were inapplicable.

[9] As a result of its argument, Tasters disputes-on one
ground or another-the Board's classification of twelve
factors: A, B, C, E, G, I, J, M, 0, P, S, and T. Tasters
additionally argues that factors D, H, N, and Q, which the
Board detennined indicated independent contractor status,
were unreasonably found to be of only minimal
significance.
(10] It should be noted that each factor is composed of two
distinct parts separated by the word "or." Under this
disjunctive framework, an affirmative response to the first
part of a factor indicates independent contractor status
whereas an aff11'11lative response to the latter portion of a
factor indicates employee status.
(11] We note that this scenario is consistent with
independent contractor status, as exemplified by the classic
independent contractor, the plumber. If an individual called
a plumber to fix broken pipes, and the plumber did not
properly repair the plumbing or overcharged for the
completed work, the individual would not "fire" the
plumber-the individual would simply not call that plumber
again. This is precisely how Tasters handles unsatisfactory
demonstrators.

~

[ 12] This list was brought to the attention of the Board
when it was attached to two questionnaires completed by
Tasters' demonstrators, yet other demonstrators responding
to the questionnaire did not attach it. The Board had mailed
these questionnaires to an apparently random sample of
demonstrators to solicit information regarding the operation
ofTasters.

affirm the Board's detennination on this factor. See State v.
Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App.1992) (declining to
consider arguments which were not adequately briefed).
[16] The evidence indicates that demonstrators, in addition
to working for Tasters, are free to work for whomever they
choose. In fact, a number of demonstrators have separate
full-time jobs.
[17] The original "ABC" test, adopted in 1981, stated that
services performed were deemed to be employment unless
it was shown that
(A) The individual has been and will continue to be free
from control or direction over the performance of those
services, both under his contract of hire and in fact;
(B) The service is either outside the usual course of the
business for which the service is performed or that the
service is performed outside of all the places of business of
the enterprise for which the service is performed; and

(C) The individual is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession, or
business of the same nature as that involved in the contract
of service.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-220)(5) (Supp.1985). This section
was later amended to delete subsection (B), with what had
been (C) becoming (B), resulting in the "AB" test See Utah
Code Ann. § 35-4-22(j)(5) (Supp.1987).
[18] The remaining factors, F and J, are properly
determined to be inapplicable to this case.

[13] As noted previously, all expenses of demonstrating
except those for disposable products used in the
demonstration are borne solely by the individual
demonstrator.
[14) Tasters also challenges the Board's fmding that factors
(P) and (C) indicate employee status. Upon review of the
evidence, we cannot say that the Board's determination in
these respects is unreasonable. Thus, we leave the Board's
decision with respect to these two factors undisturbed.
[15) Tasters apparently also wished to argue that factor (Q)
was unreasonably determined to be of minimal significance,
yet except for one sentence stating this intent, the brief is
devoid of any support for its position. Accordingly, we

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Code

35A-4-204 Definition of employment.
{1) Subject to the other provisions of this section, "employment'' means any service performed
for wages or under any contract of hire, whether written or oral, express or implied, including
service in interstate commerce, and service as an officer of a corporation.
(2) "Employment'' includes an individual's entire service performed within or both within and without
this state if one of Subsections {2){a) through (k) is satisfied.
(a) The service is localized in this state. Service is localized within this state if:
{i) the service is performed entirely within the state; or
(ii) the service is performed both within and without the state, but the service performed without
the state is incidental to the individual's service within the state, for example, is temporary or
transitory in nature or consists of isolated transactions.
(b)
(i) The service is not localized in any state but some of the service is performed in this state and
the individual's base of operations, or, if there is no base of operations, the place from which
the service is directed or controlled, is in this state; or
(ii) the individual's base of operations or place from which the service is directed or controlled
is not in any state in which some part of the service is performed, but the individual's
residence is in this state.
{c)
{i)
{A) The service is performed entirely outside this state and is not localized in any state;
{B) the worker is one of a class of employees who are required to travel outside this state in
performance of their duties; and

(C)
(I) the base of operations is in this state; or
. {II) if there is no base of operations, the place from which the service is directed or
·.
controlled is in this state.
{ii) Services covered by an election under Subsection 35A-4-310(3), and services covered by
an arrangement under Section 35A-4-106 between the division and the agency charged
with the administration of any other state or federal unemployment compensation law,
under which all services performed by an individual for an employing unit are considered
to be performed entirely within this state, are considered to be employment if the division
has approved an election of the employing unit for whom the services are performed,
under which the entire service of the individual during the period covered by the election is
considered to be insured work.
(d)
(i) The service is performed in the employ of the state, a county, city, town, school district, or
other political subdivision of the state, or in the employ of an Indian tribe or tribal unit or an
instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing which is wholly owned by the state or
one of its political subdivisions or Indian tribes or tribal units if:
(A) the service is excluded from employment as defined in the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act, 26 U.S.C. 3306(c){7);
(B) the service is not excluded from employment by Section 35A-4-205; and
(C) as to any county, city, town, school district, or political subdivision of this state, or an
instrumentality of the same or Indian tribes or tribal units, that service is either:
(I) required to be treated as covered employment as a condition of eligibility of employers in
this state for Federal Unemployment Tax Act employer tax credit;
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(II) required to be treated as covered employment by any other requirement of the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act, as amended; or
(Ill) not required to be treated as covered employment by any requirement of the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act, but coverage of the service is elected by a majority of the
members of the governing body of the political subdivision or instrumentality or tribal unit
in accordance with Section 35A-4-310.
(ii) Benefits paid on the basis of service performed in the employ of this state shall be financed
by payments to the division instead of contributions in the manner and amounts prescribed
by Subsections 35A-4-311(2)(a) and (4).
(iii) Benefits paid on the basis of service performed in the employ of any other governmental
entity or tribal unit described in this Subsection (2) shall be financed by payments to the
division in the manner and amount prescribed by the applicable provisions of Section
35A-4-311.
(e) The service is performed by an individual in the employ of a religious, charitable, educational,
or other organization, but only if:
(i) the service is excluded from employment as defined in the Federal Unemployment Tax Act,
26 U.S.C. 3306(c)(8), solely by reason of Section 3306(c)(8) of that act; and
(ii) the organization had four or more individuals in employment for some portion of a day in
each of 20 different weeks, whether or not the weeks were consecutive, within either the
current or preceding calendar year, regardless of whether they were employed at the same
moment of time.
(f)
(i) The service is performed outside the United States, except in Canada, in the employ of an
American employer, other than service that is considered employment under the provisions
of this Subsection (2) or the parallel provisions of another state's law if:
(A) the employer's principal place of business in the United States is located in this state;
(B) the employer has no place of business in the United States but is:
(I) an individual who is a resident of this state;
(II) a corporation that is organized under the laws of this state; or
(Ill) a partnership or trust in which the number of partners or trustees who are residents of
this state is greater than the number who are residents of any one other state; or
(C) none of the criteria of Subsections (2)(f)(i)(A) and (B) is met but:
(I) the employer has elected coverage in this state; or
(II) the employer fails to elect coverage in any state and the individual has filed a claim for
benefits based on that service under the law of this state.
(ii) "American employer'' for purposes of this Subsection (2) means a person who is:
(A) an individual who is a resident of the United States;
(B) a partnership if 2/3 or more of the partners are residents of the United States;
(C) a trust if all of the trustees are residents of the United States;
(D) a corporation organized under the laws of the United States or of any state;
(E) a limited liability company organized under the laws of the United States or of a state;
(F) a limited liability partnership organized under the laws of the United States or of any state;
or
(G) a joint venture if 2/3 or more of the members are individuals, partnerships, corporations,
limited liability companies, or limited liability partnerships that qualify as American
employers.
(g) The service is performed:
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(i) by an officer or member of the crew of an American vessel on or in connection with the
vessel; and
(ii) the operating office from which the operations of the vessel, operating on navigable waters
within, or within and without, the United States, is ordinarily and regularly supervised,
managed, directed, and controlled within this state.
(h) A tax with respect to the service in this state is required to be paid under any federal law
imposing a tax against which credit may be taken for contributions required to be paid into a
state unemployment fund or that, as a condition for full tax credit against the tax imposed by
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, is required to be covered under this chapter.
(i)

(i) Notwithstanding Subsection 35A-4-205(1)(p), the service is performed:
(A) as an agent-driver or commission-driver engaged in distributing meat products, vegetable
products, fruit products, bakery products, beverages other than milk, or laundry or dry
cleaning services, for the driver's principal; or
(B) as a traveling or city salesman, other than as an agent-driver or commission-driver,
engaged on a full-time basis in the solicitation on behalf of and the transmission to the
salesman's principal, except for sideline sales activities on behalf of some other person, of
orders from wholesalers, retailers, contractors, or operators of hotels, restaurants, or other
similar establishments for merchandise for resale or supplies for use in their business
operations.
(ii) The term "employment" as used in this Subsection (2) includes services described in
Subsection (2)(i)(i) performed only if:
(A) the contract of service contemplates that substantially all of the services are to be
performed personally by the individual;
(B) the individual does not have a substantial investment in facilities used in connection with
the performance of the services other than in facilities for transportation; and
(C) the services are not in the nature of a single transaction that is not part of a continuing
relationship with the person for whom the services are performed.
0) The service is performed by an individual in agricultural labor as defined in Section 35A-4-206.
(k) The service is domestic service performed in a private home, local college club, or local
chapter of a college fraternity or sorority performed for a person who paid cash remuneration
of $1,000 or more during any calendar quarter in either the current calendar year or the
preceding calendar year to individuals employed in the domestic service.
(3) Services performed by an individual for wages or under any contract of hire, written or oral,
express or implied, are considered to be employment subject to this chapter, unless it is shown
to the satisfaction of the division that:
(a) the individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation,
profession, or business of the same nature as that involved in the contract of hire for services;
and
(b) the individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the means of
performance of those services, both under the individual's contract of hire and in fact.
(4) If an employer, consistent with a prior declaratory ruling or other formal determination by the
division, has treated an individual as independently established and it is later determined that
the individual is in fact an employee, the department may by rule provide for waiver of the
employer's retroactive liability for contributions with respect to wages paid to the individual prior
to the date of the division's later determination, except to the extent the individual has filed a
claim for benefits.
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35A-4-208 Wages defined.
(1) As used in this chapter, "wages" means wages as currently defined by Section 3306(b),
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, with modifications, subtractions, and adjustments provided in
Subsections (2), (3), and (4).
(2) For purposes of Section 35A-4-303, ''wages" does not include that amount paid to an individual
by an employer with respect to employment subject to this chapter that is in excess of 75%
of the insured average fiscal year wage, rounded to the next higher multiple of $100, during
the fiscal year prior to the calendar year of the payment to the individual by the individual's
employer on or after January 1, 1988.
(3) For the purpose of determining whether the successor employer during the calendar year has
paid remuneration to an individual with respect to employment equal to the applicable taxable
wages as defined by this Subsection (3), any remuneration with respect to employment paid to
the individual by a predecessor employer during the calendar year and prior to an acquisition is
considered to have been paid by a successor employer if:
(a) the successor employer during any calendar year acquires the unemployment experience
within the meaning of Subsection 35A-4-303(8) or 35A-4-304(3) of a predecessor employer;
and
(b) immediately after the acquisition employs in the successor employer's trade or business an
individual who immediately prior to the acquisition was employed in the trade or business of
the predecessor.
(4) The remuneration paid to an individual by an employer with respect to employment in another
state, upon which contributions were required of the employer under the unemployment
compensation law of that state, shall be included as a part of the taxable wage base defined in
this section.
(5) As used in this chapter, "wages" does not include:
(a) the amount of any payment, including any amount paid by an employer for insurance or
annuities, or into a fund, to provide for a payment, made to, or on behalf of, an employee or
any of the employee's dependents under a plan or system established by an employer that
makes provision for:
(i)
(A) the employer's employees generally;
(B) the employer's employees generally and their dependents;
(C) a class or classes of the employer's employees; or
(D) a class or classes of the employer's employees and their dependents; and
(ii) on account of:
(A) sickness or accident disability, but, in the case of payments made to an employee or any
of the employee's dependents, Subsection (S)(a)(i) excludes from wages only payments
that are received under a workers' compensation law;
(B) medical or hospitalization expenses in connection with sickness or accident disability; or
(C) death;
(b) any payment on account of sickness or accident disability, or medical or hospitalization
expenses in connection with sickness or accident disability, made by an employer to, or on
behalf of, an employee after the expiration of six calendar months following the last calendar
month in which the employee worked for the employer;
(c) the payment by an employing unit, without deduction from the remuneration of the individual
in its employ, of the tax imposed upon an individual in its employ under Section 3101,
Internal Revenue Code, with respect to domestic services performed in a private home of the
employer or for agricultural labor;
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(d) any payment made to, or on behalf of, an employee or the employee's beneficiary:
(i) from or to a trust described in Section 401 (a), Internal Revenue Code, that is exempt from
tax under Section 501 (a), Internal Revenue Code, at the time of the payment, except for
a payment made to an employee of the trust as remuneration for services rendered as an
employee and not as a beneficiary of the trust:
(ii) under or to an annuity plan that at the time of the payment is a plan described in Section
403(a), Internal Revenue Code;
(iii) under a simplified employee pension, as defined in Section 408(k)(I), Internal Revenue
Code, other than any contributions described in Section 408(k)(6), Internal Revenue Code;
(iv) under or to an annuity contract described in Section 403(b), Internal Revenue Code, except
for a payment for the purchase of the contract that is made by reason of a salary reduction
agreement whether or not the agreement is evidenced by a written instrument;
(v) under or to an exempt governmental deferred compensation plan as defined in Section
3121(v)(3), Internal Revenue Code; or
(vi) to supplement pension benefits under a plan or trust described in Subsections (5)(d)
(i) through (v) to take into account a portion or all of the increase in the cost of living,
as determined by the Secretary of Labor, since retirement, but only if the supplemental
payments are under a plan that is treated as a welfare plan under Section 3(2)(B)(ii) of the
Employee Income Security Act of 1974; or
(e) any payment made to, or on behalf of, an employee or the employee's beneficiary under a
cafeteria plan within the meaning of Section 125, Internal Revenue Code, if the payment
would not be treated as wages under a cafeteria plan.
Amended by Chapter 12, 2005 General Session
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35A-4-508 Review of decision or detennination by division --Administrative law judge Division of adjudication - Workforce Appeals Board - Judicial review by Court of Appeals
-- Exclusive procedure.
(1)

(a) A review of a decision or determination involving contribution liability or applications for
refund of contributions shall be made by the division in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter.
{b) The division in conducting the review may in its discretion:
(i) refer the matter to an administrative law judge;
{ii) decide the application for review on the basis of any facts and information as may be
obtained; or
(iii) hear argument or hold an informal hearing to secure further facts.
_(c} After the review, notice of the decision shall be given to the employing unit.
{d) The decision made pursuant to the review is the final decision of the division unless, within 10
days after the date of notification or mailing of the decision, a further appeal is initiated under
the provisions of this section.
(2)

(a) Within 10 days after the mailing or personal delivery of a notice of a determination or decision
rendered following a review under Subsection (1), an employing unit may appeal to the
Division of Adjudication by filing a notice of appeal.
(b) The administrative law judge shall give notice of the pendency of the appeal to the division
and any parties entitled to notice as provided by department rule. The administrative law
judge shall receive into the record of the appeal any documents or other records provided
by the division, and may obtain or request any additional documents or records held by the
division or any of the parties that the administrative law judge considers relevant to a proper
determination of the appeal.
(c) After affording the parties reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing, the administrative law
judge shall make findings and conclusions and on that basis affirm, modify, or reverse the
determination of the division.
(d) The parties and the division shall be promptly notified of the administrative law judge's
decision and furnished a copy of the decision and findings.
(e) The decision of the administrative law judge is considered to be a final order of the
department unless within 30 days after the date the decision of the administrative law judge
is issued further appeal is initiated under this section and Chapter 1, Part 3, Adjudicative
Proceedings.
(3)
(a) The director of the Division of Adjudication shall assign an impartial, salaried administrative
law judge selected in accordance with Subsection 35A-4-502(4}(a) to hear and decide
referrals or appeals relating to claims for benefits or to make decisions affecting employing
units under this chapter.
(b) All records on appeals shall be maintained in the offices of the Division of Adjudication. The
records shall include an appeal docket showing the receipt and disposition of the appeals on
review.
(4) The Workforce Appeals Board may review and decide an appeal from a decision of an
administrative law judge issued under this chapter.
(5)

(a) The manner in which disputed matters are presented, the reports required from the claimant
and employing units, and the conduct of hearings and appeals shall be in accordance with
Page 1
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rules prescribed by the department for determining the rights of the parties, whether or not
the rules conform to common-law or statutory rules of evidence and other technical rules of
procedure.
(b) When the same or substantially similar evidence is relevant and material to the matters in
issue in more than one proceeding, the same time and place for considering each matter
may be fixed, hearings jointly conducted, a single record of the proceedings made, and
evidence introduced with respect to one proceeding considered as introduced in the others,
if in the judgment of the administrative law judge having jurisdiction of the proceedings, the
consolidation would not be prejudicial to any party.
(6)

(a) Except for reconsideration of any determination under Subsection 35A-4-406(2), any right,
fact, or matter in issue, directly passed upon or necessarily involved in a determination or
redetermination that has become final, or in a decision on appeal under this section that
has become final, is conclusive for all the purposes of this chapter as between the division,
the claimant, and all employing units that had notice of the determination, redetermination,
or decision. Subject to appeal proceedings and judicial review as provided in this section,
any determination, redetermination, or decision as to rights to benefits is conclusive for all
the purposes of this chapter and is not subject to collateral attack by any employing unit,
irrespective of notice.
(b) Any findings of fact or law, judgment, conclusion, or final order made by an unemployment
insurance hearing officer, administrative law judge, or any person with the authority to make
findings of fact or law in any action or proceeding before the unemployment insurance
appeals tribunal, is not conclusive or binding in any separate or subsequent action or
proceeding, between an individual and the individual's present or prior employer, brought
before an arbitrator, court, or judge of this state or the United States, regardless of whether
the prior action was between the same or related parties or involved the same facts.

(7)
(a) Any decision in the absence of an appeal as provided becomes final upon issuance and
judicial review may be permitted only after any party claiming to be aggrieved has exhausted
the party's remedies before the department as provided by this chapter.
(b) The division is a party to any judicial action involving any decisions and shall be represented
in the judicial action by any qualified attorney employed by the department and designated by
it for that purpose or at the division's request by the attorney general.
(8)

(a) Within 30 days after the decision of the Workforce Appeals Board is issued, any aggrieved
party may secure judicial review by commencing an action in the court of appeals against the
Workforce Appeals Board for the review of its decision, in which action any other party to the
proceeding before the Workforce Appeals Board shall be made a defendant.
(b) In that action a petition, that shall state the grounds upon which a review is sought, shall
be served upon the Workforce Appeals Board or upon that person the Workforce Appeals
Board designates. This service is considered completed service on all parties but there shall
be left with the party served as many copies of the petition as there are defendants and the
Workforce Appeals Board shall mail one copy to each defendant.
(c) With its answer, the Workforce Appeals Board shall certify and file with the court all
documents and papers and a transcript of all testimony taken in the matter together with
its findings of fact and decision, in accordance with the requirements of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

~
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(d) The Workforce Appeals Board may certify to the court questions of law involved in any
decision by the board.
(e) In any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of the Workforce Appeals Board
as to the facts, if supported by evidence, are conclusive and the jurisdiction of the court is
confined to questions of law.
{f) It is not necessary in any judicial proceeding under this section to enter exceptions to the
rulings of the division, an administrative law judge, Workforce Appeals Board and no bond is
required for entering the appeal.
(g) Upon final determination of the judicial proceeding, the division shall enter an order in
accordance with the determination. In no event may a petition for judicial review act as a
supersedeas.
(9) The procedure provided for hearings and decisions with respect to any decision or
determination of the division affecting claimants or employing units under this chapter is the
sole and exclusive procedure notwithstanding any other provision of this title.
Amended by Chapter 13, 1998 General Session

(ii

~
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63G-4-401 Judicial review - Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, except in actions where
judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available,
except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter or any
other statute states that exhaustion is not required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or all
administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public
benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
(3)

(a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30 days after the
date that the order constituting the final agency action is issued or is considered to have been
issued under Subsection 63G-4-302(3)(b).
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents and shall
meet the form requirements specified in this chapter.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session
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630-4-404 Judicial review-Type of relief.
(1)

(a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the district court or the review
of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award damages or
compensation only to the extent expressly authorized by statute.
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
{i) order agency action required by law;
{ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings.
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are reviewable by a higher court,
if authorized by statute.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session
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(ii)

Services will be excluded under Section 35A-4-204 if the service meets the
requirements of this rule. Special scrutiny of the facts is required to assure that the
form of a service relationship does not obscure its substance, that is, whether the
worker is independently established in a like trade, occupation, profession or
business and is free from control and direction. The factors listed in Subsections
R994-204-303(1 )(b) and R994-204-303(2)(b) of this section are intended only as
aids in the analysis of the facts of each case. The degree of importance of each
factor varies depending on the service and the factual context in which it is
performed. Additionally, some factors do not apply to certain services and,
therefore, should not be considered.
(1) Independently Established.
(a) An individual will be considered customarily engaged in an independently
established trade, occupation, profession, or business if the individual is, at the
time the service is performed, regularly engaged in a trade, occupation, profession,
or business of the same nature as the service performed, and the trade,
occupation, profession, or business is established independently of the alleged
employer. In other words, an independently established trade, occupation,
profession, or business is created and exists apart from a relationship with a
particular employer and does not depend on a relationship with any one employer
for its continued existence.
(b) The following factors, if applicable, will determine whether a worker is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade or business:

(i) Separate Place of Business. The worker has a place of business separate from
that of the employer.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(ii) Tools and Equipment. The worker has a substantial investment in the tools,
equipment, or facilities customarily required to perform the services. However,
tools of the trade" used by certain trades or crafts do not necessarily demonstrate

11

independence.
(iii) Other Clients. The worker regularly performs services of the same nature for
other customers or clients and is not required to work exclusively for one employer.
iv

(iv) Profit or Loss. The worker can realize a profit or risks a loss froin expenses and
debts incurred through an independently established business activity.
(v) Advertising. The worker advertises services in telephone directories,
newspapers, magazines, the Internet, or by other methods clearly demonstrating
an effort to generate business.
(vi) Licenses. The worker has obtained any required and customary business,
trade, or professional licenses.
(vii) Business Records and Tax Forms. The worker maintains records or
documents that validate expenses, business asset valuation or income earned so
he or she may file self-employment and other business tax forms with the lntemal
Revenue Service and other agencies.
(c) If an employer proves to the satisfaction of the Department that the worker is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession
or business of the same nature as the service in question, there will be a rebuttable
presumption that the employer did not have the right of or exercise direction or
control over the service.
(2) Control and Direction.
(a) When an employer retains the right to control and direct the performance of a
service, or actually exercises control and direction over the worker who performs
the service, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to
the manner and means by which that result is to be accomplished, the worker is an
employee of the employer for the purposes of the Act.
(b) The following factors, if applicable, will be used as aids in determining whether
an employer has the right of or exercises control and direction over the service of a
worker:
(i) Instructions. A worker who is required to comply with other persons' instructions
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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about how the service is to be performed is ordinarily an employee. This factor is
present if the employer for whom the service is performed has the right to require
compliance with the instructions.
(ii) Training. Training a worker by requiring or expecting an experienced person to

work with the worker, by corresponding with the worker, by requiring the worker to
attend meetings, or by using other methods, indicates that the employer for whom
the service is performed expects the service to be performed in a particular method
or manner.
(iiij Pace or Sequence. A requirement that the service must be provided at a pace

or ordered sequence of duties imposed by the employer indicates control or
direction. The coordinating and scheduling of the services of more than one worker
does not indicate control and direction.
(iv) Work on Employer's Premises. A requirement that the service be performed on
the employer's premises indicates that the employer for whom the service is
performed has retained a right to supervise and oversee the manner in which the
service is performed, especially if the service could be performed elsewhere.
(v) Personal Service. A requirement that the service must be performed personally
and may not be assigned to others indicates the right to control or direct the
manner in which the work is performed.
(vi) Continuous Relationship. A continuous service relationship between the worker
and the employer indicates that an employer-employee relationship exists. A
continuous relationship may exist where work is performed regularly or at
frequently recurring although irregular intervals. A continuous relationship does not
exist where the worker is contracted to complete specifically identified projects,
even though the service relationship may extend over a significant period of time.
(vii) Set Hours of Work. The establishment of set hours or a specific number of
hours of work by the employer indicates control.

~

(viii) Method of Payment. Payment by the hour, week, or month points to an
employer-employee relationship, provided that this method of payment is not just a
convenient way of paying progress billings as part of a fixed price agreed upon as
the cost of a job. Control may also exist when the employer determines the method
of payment.
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DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES
Field Audit Determination
Hearmgs Offic~ Decision.

Appellant

FUR BREEDERS AGRICULTURAL
COOPERATIVE
8700 S 700 W
SANDY UT 84070

EMPLOY.ER NO: C 4-002614-0
HEAR,INGS OFFICER DECISION;

Stephen Hingham provided a personal service for a wage which is subject to
Unemployment Insurance Contributions.
Officers provided a personal service for a wage which is ~bject to
Unemployment Insurance Contributions,

CASE msTORY: .
Issues to be Reviewed:

35A4208

35A-4-204
.

Service for a Wage
.
Contract oflfrre/Iodependent Contractor
.

The original Field Audit detennination held that Officers provided a personal service for a wage which
constituted employment.
HEARINGS OFFICER REVIEW:
For the review of this case the Hearings Officer consulted with Dale Chrisensen, Financial Officer and
Scott Rawlings, Legal Counsel, for Fur Breeders Agricultural Cooperative (Appellant). Kenneth
Hansen, Coordinator for UPD, Heather Lyn Drips, UPD Detective, Zach Bench, UPD Detective. also
participated in the hearing, This detennination is based on the Hearings Officer's consultation with
these individuals in conjunction with a review of do~uments from the original audit investigation.
Findings of Fact

Fur Breeders Agricultural Cooperative (Appellant) is a farmer cooperative that mixes feed and sells
supplies to the fur bl'eeding industry. The Appellant hires contracted off-duty peace officers (Officers)
to provide s~urity and law enforcement presence for their property. A Field Auditor representing the
Department conducted an audit on the Appellant for the years 2014 and 2015. The Field Auditor
determined the Officers were misclassified and should have been reported as employees for State
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Un~mployment Insurance. The Field Auditor also determined that Stephen Hingham should have been
reported as an employee. Stephen Hingham perfonned lawn mowing and weeding services for the
employer. The Appellant appealed the Field Auditor•s detennination regarding the Officers and Stephen
Hingham.

~

Stephen IDnghan.t
Stephen Hingham was a high school student that approached the Appellant looking for work mowing
· lawns. The Appeilant hired Mr. Hingham to mow the lawn and do some weeding. The )awn mower
was supplied by the Appellant. Mr. Hingham supplied some small hand tools. He was paid a set fee
each time the lawn was mowed. The Appellant paid Mr. Hingham monthly for his services. The
Appellant does not know ifMr. Hingham does lawn services for other clients. There is no evidence he
advertises his services to the public. Mr. Hingham set his own schedule and mowed the lawn at his
convenience. The Appellant did not give Mr. Hingham any training with regards to his work. Mr.
Hingham was not required to perform the job personally. The Appellant was only intereste·d in the final
resu1t of the lawn being mowed once a week. After Mr. Hingham graduated from High School, he was
hired as a part time employee by the Appe11ant As an Cf!1p1oyee, he provided services as a forklift
operator inside the Appellant's facilities.

Officers
Officers used by the Appellant are employees of the Unified Police Department ({JPD). UPP has a
program within their department for Officers searching for secondary enJJ)loyment. UPD Officers
seeking part time jobs outside of the department must coordinate through the Secondary Employment
Coordinator. The Appellant contacts the Secondary Employment Coordinator (Coordinator) for UPD
and specifies when and where they need Officers. The Coordinator lists the job in the UPD software
system. Many of these secondary jobs are considered by UPD to be contract work UPD's secondary
employer agreement states: "It is the responsibility of the employer to maintain all Federal and State Tax
records in accordance with City, State, and Federal guidelines for each officer employed!' Officers
access the system twi~e a month and submit their name for jobs they are interested in worldng. Officers
are not guaranteed any job because the software system controls who gets the work. Officers are
assigned tbe jobs and receive their schedule from the UPD Coordinator. UPD determines the hourly pay
Officers received for these jobs. The Appel1ant receives an invoice fromlJPD listing the individual
Officers that provided security services for them. The Appellant issues individual checks to the
Officers. The Appellant sends the checks to the UPD Coordinator to distribute to the Officers. The
Appel~ant issues the Officers a 1099 at the end of the year for their services.

Officers use their UPD uniforms .and police vehicles when providing services for the Appellant. They
also use guns1 handcuffs, radios and bullet proof vests. Some of the equipment is purchased by them
and some of it is the property of UPD. The Appellant is charged a fee by UPD for the use of the car and
gas. UPD expects the Officers to respond to any emergency ca11G if they are needed while working these
part time jobs. The Officers work for several different companies through UPD's secondary
employment system; Officers have not obtained business licenses, liability insurance, or Workers
Compensation insurance with the intent of being independent,
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The Appellant gives general instructions to the Officers regarding the security detail, The Officers are
expected to adhere to UPD's secondary employment policy, Officers are tr~ined by UPD on how to
handle various incidei;lts and threats. The scheduling is handled by UPD•s software system. If an
Officer scheduled to work for the Appellant is unable to work the shift, the T)PD Coordinator mu.st
approve the replacement. The Appellant does no\ know in advance who uPD schedules to work the
see1.1rity assignment. The Appellant l\lld their staff have very little interacijon with the Offi~ during
their shift. The UPJ:) Coordinator is the liaison between the Appellant and the Officers.

Hearings Officer Assessment
_Stephen Hingham .
The Hearings Officer finds no dispute Stephen Hingham was compensated for rus mowing services.
This constitutes a wage pursuant to Section 35A4-208 of the Employment Security Act. ·
Pursuant to Section 35A-4-204 of the Employment Security Act, it must be shown to the satisfaction of
the Department that an individual is both customarily engaged in an-independently established business
and free from C?ntrol and direction in· order to be considered legitimately independently established ..
35A-4-204. Definition of employment.

~

(1) Subject to the other provisions of this section, "employment" means any service performed for
wages or under any contract of hire, whether written or oral, express or hnplied, including service in
interstate commerce, and service as an officer of a corporation.
(3) Services perfonned l;>y an individual for wages or under any contract of hire, written or oral,
express or implied, arc considered to be employment subject to this chapter, unless it is shown to the
satisfaction of the division that:
(a) the individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupatiQn,
profession, or business of the same nature~ that involved in the contract of hire for service~; and
(b) the individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the means of
performance of those services, both under the individual's contract of hire and in fact.

~

The Hearings Officer finds there is no evidence Mr. Hingham was engaged in a business activity
providing lawn care services. Mr. Hingham did not have a significant investment in yard maintenance
equipment. Mr. Hingham bad no ongoing expenses relating to his. lawn care services. There was no
evidence Mr, Hingham provided lawn care setVices for other clients on a regular basis. Mr. Hingham
did not advertise his services to generate clients. The Appellant1 s association with M.r. Hingham
resembles part time employment rather than an employer/ independent contractor relationship. The
Appellant did not demonstrate a leve] of control and direction over Mr. Hingham's lawn services that
would indicate employment However, the independent contractor test is conjunctive and both the (a)
and the (b) portion of the test must be met for Mr. Hingham to qualify as an independent contractor.
Therefore, Mr. Hingham does not meet the requirements tp be an independent contractor for State
Unemployment Insurance pwposes.
The Hearings Officer finds Stephen Hingham was not customarily engaged in an independently
established business activity. The Departmenfs original determination that payments to Stephen
Hingham were subject to Unemployment Insurance, was correct.
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Officers
The Hearings Officer finds the Officers performed a service for the Appellant and were paid a wage for
those services. The Appellant issued the Officers a 1099 at the end of the year for the services
perfonned for their business. The Officers meet the definition of employment. The Hearings Officer

must next address whether the Officers meet the requirements of independent contractors as outlined jn
· the Utah Employment Security Act and Utah Administrative Code.
R994-204-303.

.Factors for Determining Independent Contractor Status•

. Ser.vices will be excluded under Section ·35A-4-204 if the service meets the
requirements of this rule. Special scrutiny of the facts is required to assure that the form
of a service relationship does not obscure its substance, th.at is, w.hether _the worker is

~dependently e~tablished in a like trade, occupation, profession or business and is free
from control and direction. The factors listed in subsections R994-204-303(1)(b) a.nd
R994-20~3O3(2)(b) of this section are intended only as aids in the analysis of the facts of
each. case. The degree of importance of each factor varies depending on the service and
the factual context in which it is perfonned: Additionally, some factors do not apply to
certain services and, therefore. should not be considered.
i

(1)

i

Independently Established.

<i;

-~
i

(a)
An individual _will be considered customarily engaged in an ~depend~tly
established trade, occupation. profession. or business if the individual is, at the time the
service is performed; regularly engaged in a trade, occupation, profession, or business of
the same nature as the service performed, and the trade, occupation, profession, or
business is established independently of the alleged employer. In other words> an
independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business is created and exists
apart from a relationship with a particular employer and does not depend on a
relationshjp with any one employer for its continued existence.
~

The following factors, if applicable, will determine whether a worker is
customan1y engaged in an independently established trade or busmess:
(b) ·

(i)

. Separate Place of Business. The worker bas a place of buslness separate

from that of the employer.
(ii)
Tools and Equipment. The worker bas a substantial investment in the tools,
equipment, or facilities customarily required to perform the services. However, "tools of
the tra.de" used by certain trades or crafts do not necessarily demonstrate independence.
(iii)
Other Clients. The worker regularly perfonns services of the same nature
for other customers or clients and is not required to work exclusively for one employer.

(iv)
Profit or Loss. The worker can realize a profit or risks a loss from expenses
and debts incurred through an independently established pusiness activity.

(v)
Advertising. The worker advertises services iu telephone directories,
newspapers, magazines, the Internet, or by other methods clearly demonstrating an effort
to generate business.
·
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(vi)
Licenses, The worker has obtained any required and customary business,
trade, or professional licenses,

(vii)
Business Records and Tax Forms. The worker maintains records or
documents that validate expenses, business asset valuation or income eamed so he or she
may file self-employment and other b1isiness tax fonns \\~th the Internal Revenue Service
and other agencies.

·

(c)
If an employer proves to the satisfaction of the Department that the worker
is customarily engaged in an independently established trade. occupatio11t profession or
business of the same nature as the service ill question, there. will be a rebuttable
pres,ump1ion that the employer did not have the right of or exercise direction or control
· over the service.
·
(2)

Control and Direction.

(a)
When an ~mployer retains the right to ~ontrol and direct the performance of
a service, or actually exercises control aod direction over the worker who pelforms the
servic~, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the manner
and means by which that result is to be accomplished, the worker is an employee of the
employer for the purposes of the Act.
(b)
The following factors, if applicable,. will be used as aids in determining·
whether an employer bas the right of or exercises control and direction over the service of
a worker:

Instructions. A worker whQ is required to comply with -other persons'
instructions about how the service is to be perfonned is ordinarily an employee. This
factor is present if the employer for whom the service is performed has the right to
require compliance with the instructions.
(i)

(ii)
Training. Training a worker by requiring or expecting an experienced
person to work with the worker, by corresponding with the worker, by requiring the·
worker to attend meetings, or by using other methods, indicates that the employer for
whom the service is performed expects the service to be performed in a particular method

or manner.
(iii)
Pace or Sequence. A requirement that the service must be provided at a
pace or ordered sequence of duties imposed by the employer indicates control or
direction. The coordinating and scheduling of the services of more than one worker does
not indicate control and direction.

(iv) · Work on Employers Premises. A requirement that the service be performed
on the employer's premises indicates that the employer for whom the service is performed
bas retained a right to supervise and oversee the manner in which the service is
performed, especially if the service could be perfonned elsewhere,

(v)
Personal Service. A requirement that the service must be performed
personally and may not be assigned to others indicates the right to control or direct the
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manner in which the work is perfonned.
{vi)
. Continuous Relationship. A continuous service relationship between
the worker and tho employer indicates that an -employer-employee relationship
exists .. A continuous relationship may exist where work is perfonned regular1y or

at frequently recurring although irregular intervals, A continuous relationship
does not exist where the worker is contracted to complete speci~ca.Uy identified
projects, even though the service relationship may extend o~er {l significant period
of time.
(vii)
Set Hours of Work. The establishment of set hours or a specific
number of hours of work by the employer indicates control.

(viii) Method of Payment. Payment by the hour, week, or month points to
an employer-employee relationship. provided that. this method of payment is not
just a convenient way of paying progress billings as part of a fixed price agreed
upon as the cost of a job. Control may also exist when the employer determines
the method of payment.
The Officers do not operate an 4ldependent business activity for the purpose of part time security
work. The Officers depend on th~ relationship with UPD for their secondary employment jobs.
UPD provides the Officers with schedules, uniforms, insurance, vehicles, and determines their
hourly pay, The Officers do not have an investment in their secondary employment jobs, None
of the_ Officers have obtained business licenses with the intent of providing security services
apart from UPD 's secondary employment system. Officers have no special investment in
· equipment or tools that are separate from the equipment and tools they need as employees of
UPD. The UPl) Coordinator handles the financial aspects of the jobs witb the AppeilB:flt
Officers are not a'ble to realize a profit or suffer loss as they do not make decisions regarding
their rate of pay or negotiate financial matters with the Appellant
The Hearing Officer finds Officers have. not created an independently established trade,
occupation, profession, or business apart from UPD•s secondary employment department.
Officers do not qualify as independent contractors while working security jobs for the Appellant.
Since the independent contractor test is conjunctive, the control and direction portion of the test
will not be addressed in reference to these individuals.

CONCLUSION
The Field Audit detmnination holding Officers perfonned a service for a wage constituting

employment subject to unemployment i,nsurance coverage> pursuant to Sections JSA-4-208 and
35A-4-204 of the Utah Employment Security Act, is affitmed.
The Field Audit det'e.rminatioo holding Stephen Hin~am perfonned a service for a wage
constituting employment subject to unemployment insurance covera.ge, pursuant to Sections
35A-4-208 and 35A-4-204 of the Utah Employment Sec~ty Act, is affirmed.
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Fur Breeders Agricultural Cooperative

C 4-0026 J4-0

· APPEAL RIGJITS: The following decision will become final unless, within fifteen (15) days
from the date of mailing, further written appeal is made setting forth the groimds upon which the
appeal is made, the relief requested, and the date the appeal is made. Mail appeals to Utah
Department of Workforce Services, Appeals Section, P.O. Box 45244. Salt Lake City, UT
84145..0244; FAX BQJ .. 526◄9242.

Susan Cottam
··
Hearings Officer
DEPARTM:BNT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES

Date T.ssued and Mailed:

7/20/2016
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Before the Department of Workforce Services
Unemployment Compensation Appeals
~

DIVISION OF ADJUDICATION

In the Matter of the
Claim of
Fur Breeders Agricultural Coop

for
Unemployment Insurance ~enefits

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
Hearings conducted by telephone from the office of the Administrative
Law Judge located at 140 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on October 5,
2016; Sf!Ille being pursuant to the Notice of the Administrative Law Judge·ofthe
Department of Workforce Services.
Before HON. GARY GIBBS
Administrative Law Judge
APPEARANCES:
Christopher Falco
General Manager

Employer

Eileen Rivera

Fur Breeders Agricultural Coop
Claimant

Department of Workforce
Services

R. Scott Rawlings
General Counsel
Fur Breeders Agricultural Coop

Mark Peterson
Auditor
Department of Workforce
Services

Dale Christenson
CFO
Fur Breeders Agricultural Coop

Eddie Rjchmond
Field Audit Supervisor
Department of Workforce
Services
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Ken Hansen
Detective and Secondary Employment Coordinator
Unified Police Department
Harry Souvall
Chief Legal Counsel
Unified Police Department
Reported by Tina Hunter
(
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2

8Y THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Yes this is Judge Gibbs with the ])epartment of Workforce
Services with the state of Utah. Could 1 speak with Chris Falco please?

~

3

4
5
6

FEMALE

Yeah, hold on please.

JUDGE

Thank you.

FALCO

Hello.

JUDGE

Yes this is Judge Gibbs with the Department of Workforce Services. Could I speak with
Chris Falco please?

FALCO

Titls - this is he.

JUDGE

Mr. Falco I'm calling for the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Hearing and I need to call
the Department of Workforce Services representative to bring theµi into the hearing with

7

8

ii>

9

10
II
12
1)
14
15

16
17
18
19

®

us and then we'll begin so, hold on just a moment.
~

FALCO

Okay.

PETERSON

Hello.

JUDGE

Alright, uh, Mr. Falco I have on the line with us from the Department of Workforce
Services Ms. Eileen Rivera and Mr. Mark Peterson and, uh, Ms. Rivera I have Chris
Falco from theAppellant on the line with us. Mr. Falco do you have anyone else present
with you?

20
21

22
23

24
25
26
27

28
29

FALCO

Um, I think is the attorney on line?

30
31

SOUVALL

Yes. This is Harry Souvall. I'm the Chief Legal Counsel for Unified Police Department.

32

JUDGE

Okay.

SOUVALL

And we have sitting in my peer Ken Hansen with the Unified Police, Scott Rawlings, our
attorney, and Dale Christenson, our controller.

~

~

33

34
35
36
37
38

JUDGE

I'm sorry. I'm trying to write these names down. I didn't have these names prior to the
hearing so, I'm trying to write them down. So, 1 have Mr. Souvall, um, and tell me the,
one at a time, the names of the other individuals that are present with you.

41
42

SOUVALL

Okay. Ken Hansen with Unified Police.

43

JUDGE

Okay.

SOUVALL

It's S-E-N on Hansen.

39
40

~

<fuJ

44
45

~

2
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of the testimony of the Appellant I'll take testimony from the Department witness. I'll
place Mr. Peterson under oath, ask him questions. Ms. Rivera would have the right tq ask
questions•followed by Mr. Falco as well. Mr. Falco any questions about how we will
proceed with the testimony portion of the hearing?

2

3

4
5
6

FALCO

Yeah I just have one. We had the previous hearing and we were told in that hearing that
the only thing that would be submitted in evidence would be the tape recordings of that
hearing to make sure that everything was on the record. I'm wondering why we're
having a second hearing I guess.

JUDGE

We're having a second hearing because you filed an appeal of that determination and,
um, you have the right to file an appeal. Once you file an appeal of the hearing officers
determination - that was not a formal administrative hearing that was held with the
hearing officer. That was just an administrative hearing that, uh, the Department has
decided to have in-between the auditors Decision and the Administrative Law Judge who
holds a formal administrative hearing. It's just another, uh, line of appeal that the
Department has allowed appellant's and parties to - to have. So, this is a formal
administrative hearing that's required by law. What you went through before was not.

FALCO

So, is that tape then_ not part of this hearing at all or does ...

JUDGE

That is not part of this hearing. This is a (unintelligible) hearing. I will take all new

7
8

GP>

9
IO
11
12
13
14
15'

16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24

25
26
27

evidence and make a - a Decision of - of my own. Um, you can provide any and all of
the same evidence or testimony that you provided, uh, to the hearing officer, um, but at
this point-that's not made a part of this record since this is a (unintelligible) hearing.

RAWLINGS

Judge, this is Scott Rawlings. I - what troubles me though is that we were advised at that
prior hearing that it was a recorded record and because of that we brought two employees
that provide the service that are licensed officer with Unified Police and I think they're
testimony was valid and I think it was a reasonable assumption because we were told it
was a recorded record that would bear - come part of, uh, this matter. But both people
aren't here. I'm wondering if we are prejudice by that

JUDGE

Well, if you need to get them here or if you feel like you need them as a witness I can
continue the hearing for - for another time, but I wanna go ahead and take care of what
we can today. Uh, that - that hearing officers recording is - I - I've never had that as
part of the record as an Administrative Law Judge. Uh, if- if she told you that I don't
know - I'm not sure why. She'll have to answer to that as to why she told you that.
Maybe she believed that that was the case, but it's never been a part of- of the record.
Um, so, again, if you want additional witnesses because you believe that that would be
part of the record then, uh, we can continue the hearing until you can get them. If you
can get them on - this is - this is a telephone hearing. I can contact them wherever
they're - they're located and conference them into the hearing and take their testimony if
it's what you feel is necessary. Um ...

28
29
30
31
32

33
34

35
36
37
38
39

40
41

42
43

44
45

5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

109

/IS

FALCO

I don't know that that's a possibility, but I think I concur with your assessment by telling
you what we can and then if it. ..

JUDGE

Okay.

FALCO

... becomes problematic then maybe we'll have that portion to be continued to a...

2

ti

3

4
5
6
7
8

~

JUDGE

Okay.

FALCO

... (unintelligible) in the future.

JUDGE

Well, yeah. Just make sure you address that before the end of the hearing if you-if you
want that to make place, if you want a continuous I'll consider that at that time and, uh, and, uh, we can go fon.Yard at that time and make that - I'll make that detennination. So,
Mr. Falco any other testimony that - or sorry, any other questions that you have about
how we will proceed with the testimony portion of the hearing?

FALCO

No. I think that's all.

JUDGE

Alright. Ms. Rivera any questions about how we will proceed with the testimony portion
of the hearing?

RIVERA

No.

JUDGE

No. One other thing, the only thing that I - I think the hearing officer could have may be
- be in referring to that her Decision is part of the record as-as you know it's part of the
documents that are included in the Exhibit, but, uh, to - to this point I've never had the
actual transcript or recording of that prior proceeding as part of this hearing, but, uh, I'll
address with the Department, uh; after this hearing just to make sure that that's clear, uh,
moving forward. So, I'm gonna go through the documents that were used in the original
Department Decision which I may use in making niy Decision as well: Both parties here
received copies of the documents along with the Notice ofa Hearing. They're marked as
Exhibits on th~ bottom center portion of the documents. They're marked as Exhibits I
through 97. Mr. Falco, did the Appellant receive a copy of the documents?

9

10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17

18

~

i;

(9

20
2(
22
23

24
25
26
27

28
29

30
31
32

33
34
35
36
37

~

FALCO

Yes.

38
39

JUDGE

Ms. Rivera does the Department have a copy as well?

40

RIVERA

Yes.

JUOGE

Alright. Before going through them, uh, I wanna place the, um, parties under oath, uh,
that will be testifying, um, beginning with Mr. Falco. Mr. Falco, do you solemnly swear
or affirm that the testimony you will give will be the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth?

®)

~

<iJ

41

42
43
44
45

(iJ
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FALCO

Yes.

JUOGE

Please state your full name for the record.

FALCO

Christopher Paul Falco.

JUDGE

Mr. Falco, what is your job title or position with the company?

10
11

FALCO

Uh, General Manager.

12

JUDGE

Alright. I wanted to verify the Appellant's mailing address with the Unemployment
Insurance Division and I have 8700 South 700 West in Sandy 84070, is that correct?

FALCO

That's correct.

JUPGE

Alright. I'll place the other witnesses under oath as we take their testimony. Mr.
Peterson, do you solemnly swear or affinn that the testimony you will give will be the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

PETERSON

Yes.

JUDGE

Please state yol:lf full name for the record.

PETERSON

Mark Allen Peterson.

JUDGE

Mr. Peterson what is your job title or position with the Department of Workforce

2
3

4
5

6
7
8
9

@

@

13
14

@
'

15
16
17
18
19

20
21

22
@

23

24

25
26
27
@

@

Services?

28
29

30

PETERSON

An Auditor.

31
32

JUDGE

Alright, thank you. I'm gonna go through the documents. I will identify them for the
record and give them an Exhibit Number. Exhibit Number 1 is, uh, a copy of an audit.
Notice, uh, worksheet from the Department of Workforce Services to the Appellant and
that's marked as Exhibit Number 1. Exhibit Number 2 is entitled Tax Return Report and,
uh, Mr. Peterson for sake of efficiency these reports that, uh, begin with Exhibit Number
2, and, uh, 1ook similarly that have the Utah Department of Workforce Servic~s logo at
the top, and that are reports, were you the one who compiled these reports?

40

PETERSON

Yes.

41
42

JUDGE

Thank you. That's Exhibit Number 2, Exhibit Number 3 is, uh, also a tax return report
continued. Beginning with Exhibit Number 3 are 1099 summary reports - I'm sorry that
is, uh, marked as beginning at Exhibit Number 4 and this continues on to Exhibit' s 5, 6,
7,8,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,20, AndbeginningwithExhibitNumber21

33
34

35
36
37

38
@

39

43
~

44
45
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are entitled Include Exclude report and this is Exhibit Number 21, 22, 23, 24. Exhibit
Number 25 begins a new Include Exclude report for the year 2015 and so that begins on
Exhibit Number 25. It goes to Exhibits 26 and 27. Exhibit Number 28 is a payroll
adjustment report. Exhibit Number 29 that report continues with, uh, - and Exhibit
N\IIIlber 30 is entitled Summary Disbursement report and that begins on Exhibit Number
30 continues on to-Exhibit 31, 32, 33, 34 and, uh, 35 and 36. Exhibit 37 is identified, uh,
as an audit conclusion report and that's marked as Exhibit Number 37. Exhibit 38 is
another report, audit report, from the Department of Workforce Services identified as
Form 81 in the upper left hand portion of the document and that's marked as Exhibit
Number 38. Going on to Exhibit Number 39 and beginning with what's marked as
Exhibit Number 40 are entitled, um, Status Questionnaire for Workers. This begins with
Exhibit Number 40 and these Status Questionnaires, uh, run through what's marked as
Exhibit Number 71. Exhibit, uh, 72, 73, 74, 75, and 76 is Mr. Peterson's written
determination in this matter and, uh, Mr. Peterson did you prepare what's marked as
Exhibit's 72 through 76?
·

2

3
4
5
6
7

8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

PETERSON

Yes.

JUDGE

Thank you. Exhibit's 77 and ·18 are the Appellant's appeal letter of the Department's
original Decision. Exhibit' s 79 and 80 is, uh, correspondence it looks like between the
Department and the Appellant to - just the fax (unintelligible) information. Beginning
with Exhibit Number 81 is the Hearing officer's written determination. This goes on to
Exhibit's 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, and 87, and then beginning with Exhibit Number 88 is the
Appellant's appeal letter of the Department's Decision that runs through Exhibit Number
97 that includes the envelope the appeal letter was, uh, mailed in. Mr. Falco do you have
any objection to any of the documents being entered into the Hearing record?

22
23
24

25
26
27
28

FACLO

Nope.

JUDGE

And Ms. Rivera any objection to any of the documents being entered into the Hearing

~

29 ·

30
31

record?

32

33
34

RIVERA

No.

35
36
37
38

JUDGE

Then I'll receive them into the Hearing record and we'll proceed with the testimony
portion of the Hearing. Mr. Falco who will be providing testimony first for the
Appellant?

39

FALCO

That'd be me.

40
. 41

JUDGE

Alright. I need any others who will be providing testimony or may be providing
testimony I need for them to, uh, leave the room or not be on the line to listen to your
testimony at that time, uh, as you provide your testimony, but, uh, have them remain
available to testify and then we'll bring them back into the Hearing once-·one at a time
as we need their testimony. Those who are definitely not going to testify can stay.

42

43
44

45

~
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FALCO

Okay and Dale probably stay right. (Unintelligible) are probably gonna say the same
thing so.

RAWLINGS

Be Mr. Hansen.

JUDGE

Okay. So Mr. Hansen will be leaving. Let me know when he's gone.

9

FALCO

He's gone.

10
II

JlJDGE

Alright. Thank you. Mr. Falco, uh,just to begin with can you, uh,just briefly summarize
the nature of the Appellant's business for me?

FALCO

Uh, we manufacture animal feed and deliver it to our and supplies to our ranchers that are
basically the owners of the coop.

JUDGE

Okay.

FALCO

And all of them are typically mink ranchers here in the state of Utah and southern Idaho.

JUDGE

Okay and the Department, uh, - the individual's with whom the Department made a
detennination to be, uh, considered employees that subjected the Appellant to unemploy
- unemployment contributions are listed in the records here that we've gone through on
Exhibits-it's the include, exclude list that begin on Exhibit 21 through - it's marked as
Exhibit Number 27. In looking at that list of, uh, workers that were included, that were
designated as the security officers, did each one of those individuals provide services to,
uh, the - to your organization in the years 2014 and 2015 as security officers?

FALCO

Um, I would have to look up which years that they were here. I'm sure that some of
them were not here both years.

JUDGE

And I'm not asking whether they were there for both years, but for either year that the
designated on these reports. I just need to know if you're - ifthere were any of these
individuals the Department found to be security officers during these years if you are
contesting that and - and - and believe that some of them never provided any services
for your organization in those years that are list ...

FALCO

There was a 1099 issued on them. They provided service for the I 099.

JUDGE

Okay and did the organization, uh, your organization pay them for the services that they
provided?

42
43
44

FALCO

Obviously if we issued a 1099 we did.

45

JUDGE

Okay and, um, did they provide services as security officers then?
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FALCO

Um, we consider it more of a police presence in the area.

JUOGE

Okay. So, generally if - if police are - are providing services they're paid by the police
department or the organiz.ation they- they work for. Why were you paying them if they
were acting as police officers?

FALCO

We asked for some additional police coverage because we had been struck by Animal
Rights terrorist groups in the past. We had~ building burn down in 1-997 and we had
AFL writings on our buildings in '94. We had, uh, mink release-or research ranch in
early 2000. And so, we have had additional police presence on the property, um, for the
last, uh, several years off and on and around the parameter.

~

10
11
12
13
14

JUDGE

Okay, but do you know why the police didn't-didn't do that as part of their job duties as
police officers?

FALCO

Well, we - we asked for additional police coverage because, uh, the Unified Police is the
one that does most of this thing. We're county on a island all by itself so, we're not part
of Sandy City, we're not part of Midvale so, we're basically county. Midvale uses the
Unified Police, but they're also contracted with Midvale. So, we don't get a lot of police
coverage because of the situation with our property.

15

(i)

16

17
18
19

20
21

22

~

JUDGE

Okay. So, did the Unified Police require you to pay them for their services then?

FALCO

Yes if we wanted some additional coverage during offliours they asked us - they wanted
to bill us by hourly. They charged us by hour.

JUDGE

Okay and so, when you paid. these individuals did you pay them directly or did you pay
the Unified Police Department?

FALCO

Um, we paid the individuals directly. They provided a list of the people who- ~at were
assigned and asked us to write the checks to them.

JUDGE

Okay. Uh, so, when did this, uh, arrangement- this first begin this arrangement between
your company and - and Unified Police Department to provide these additional services?

FALCO

You know I'd have to look up the exact year when it started.

38
39
40

JUDGE

Okay.

4)

FALCO

Like I said we've used 'em off and on for several years.

JUDGE

So, all of the workers that provided these services did they all go through - did you go
through the U - Unified Police Department to obtain the services of all of these
individuals?
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24
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FALCO

Um, the Unified Police officers are the - or Unified Police Department are the ones that
assign the officers. They have their own system that, uh, Ken Hansen can describe to
you. We have no - no idea which officers would be assigned or who would be over here.

JUDGE

But I guess - I guess my question was did you ever contact individuals individually and
ask them to provide services as security or a police ...

FALCO

Well, we went through the Unified Police.

JUDGE

Okay.

)3
14

FALCO

We wanted, uh, police car presence if possible.

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

JUDGE

Okay. Alright and, um, is it your understanding that were- ~ere there any individuals
that provided security or police presence to your knowledge that were not employees of
the Unified Police Department?

FALCO

Uh, we, in the past, have used a security finn off and on.

JUDGE

But I mean of these individuals that are included in this audit for the years 2014 and 2015
that are included in the act - include, exclude list. Are you aware of anyone that was not
an employee of the Unified Police Department?

FALCO

No.

JUDGE

Okay. Um, what determined or how was it detennined how much, uh, they would be
paid?

30
31

FALCO

They had a set rate of $30 dollars an hour.

32

JUDGE

When you say they who do you mean?

33
34

FALCO

Unified Police.

JUDGE

Okay.

FALCO

That we contact and told us that that was their rate.
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JUDGE

Okay and, um, to your knqwledge - now the Utah Employment Security Act and - and
the rules pertaining to the t,ct give some guidelines in determining whether or - whether
or not someone is an indeP,endent contractor or an employee and, uh, with respect to the
rules that pertain to the Adt that gives these guidelines I'll be asking you questions, uh,
about these specific areas that the rules pertaining to the Utah Employment Security Act,
uh, they should be looked ~tin deter - making this determination. Now I understand that
11
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some may be more relevan than others, some may not be relevant at all, but I'm going to
go through them. I'll - asjthe Judge I need to determine whether or n<;>t it's relevant or
not, uh, but I wanna ask you about each of these points and, uh, and then we'll gQ from
there. But, uh, to your kriowledge do - did any of these individuals, um, while they
provided services for yourlorganization; to your knowledge, did any of them have any
sep~ate place of business fuch as a separate office space or - or a store front for which
they provided security services or security officer services?

2
3

4
5

6
7
8
9

FALCO

Um, Ken should be able !~testify to that. I ~uldn 't be aware of that other than the fact
that they all work for the lnified Police and I would a assume that they had space there.

JUDGE

Okay. I was asking more about an independent business rather than their employment
relationship with Unified Piolice Department. Are you aware ofthey-whetherthey had,
um, any other place of business.
-

10

(ii

11
12
13
14
15
16

FALCO

We didn't - we didn't

)ally interact with the officers so, I wouldn't be aware of

anything.

17
18

JUDGE

Okay. Now did the o cers carry fireanns when they provided services to your
organization?

FALCO

Um, I assume so. Like Is ·d they were here usually in off hours so, I'd never really saw
them very often.

JUDGE

Okay. Are you aware of any tools or equipment or supplies· or facilities that the
1
individual workers were quired to pay for themselves in order to provide their services
to your organization?

29
30

FALCO

Um, Ken- Ken would have to probably do that.

31
32
33

JUDGE

Okay.

FALCO

Answer that que - can answer 'cuz, um, like I said ...

19

20
21
22
23
24

2s
26
27

r1

28

34
35

(iJ

JUDGE

Well, no ...

FALCO

... we want - we just w ted a police presence ...

39

JUDGE

Okay.

40
41

FALCO

... around our area.

JUDGE

When they provided their services were they wearing Unified Police Department, uh,
uniforms or were - did tliey wear something else?

36
37
38

42
43

44
45

I

12

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

116

/'42

Gat

I

I

@

FALCO

Um, our - our understanding would be is that they would be in uniform and with a police
car, but I'm not sure if it was required by Unified Police that they keep their uniform on.

JUDGE

Okay. Alright, um, did your organization prevent them or prohibit the workers from
providing similar services to other organizations?

2
3
4
5
@

(j

6
7

FALCO

Nope as far as I know they do it for other organizations.

8
9
10

JUDGE

And do you have any firsthand or personal knowledge as to whether any of the workers
actually did provide similar services to other organizations or other clients?

11
12
13

FALCO

Other than Ken's testimony in the last meeting I really ...

14

JUDGE

Okay.

16
17

FALCO

... have no personal knowledge of it.

18
19
20
21

JUDGE

Okay. Alright. Uh, do you have any knowledge as to whether or not these individuals
can experience a profit or a loss in providing ser - their services to your company?

FALCO

Um, I suppose they're always at risk at loss if we were not to pay them, but as most
independent contractors would be, but other ...

JUDGE

Is there a risk that you wouldn't pay them?

FALCO

Well, hopefully not, but, you know ...

28
29

JUDGE

Okay.

30

FALCO

... if I wouldn't.

32
33

JUDGE

Alright.

34

FALCO

But that would be an area for Ken to talk about not me.

35
36

JUDGE

Well, I - I'm just asking you the questions and, uh, I under - I understood if, uh, if you
don't - if you can't answer it or don't have the knowledge to answer it I understand that
so.:.

FALCO

My dad was a prunt contractor so, his only risk at loss was when people didn't pay him
so.

JUDGE

But didn't he as a paint contractor have to pay for- have his own expenses, uh, and that
- if his income didn't exceed his expenses he would experience a loss that way?

15
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@

@
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FALCO

No ...

3

JUDGE

Even if they did pay.

4
5

FALCO

... he - he billed all that to his customers.

7
8

JUDGE

Okay.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

FALCO

.I mean to me ·that's the way a lot of hourly people do it.

mDGE

But it - it needs to be a distinction because any - even an employee if, uh, if the
employer doesn't pay them ifit's clear employment, employee relationship they're not
paid, uh, they experience I guess y~u could ex- but I'm talking about, um, a profit or a
loss because they are an independent business with expenses and - and, uh ...

FALCO

My dad was an independent business person and his only way of suffering loss was if
they didn't get paid by their customer.

JUDGE

Alright. Do - to your knowledge did any of the individuals advertise their services as an
independent contractor security officer or police presence?

22

FALCO

Like I said we wanted a police presence so, the advertisement to us was their police car..

23
24

JUDGE

Any other form of advertisement as an independent contractor that you 're aware of?

25
26

FALCO

That would l;,e Ken's area again that he would have to answer not me.

27
28

JUDGE

Um, okay. You mean Ken Hansen?

30
31

FALCO

Yeah.

32

JUDGE

Okay. I thought you said Ken (unintelligible) and I was confused.

33
34

FALCO

Oh no. Ken Hansen.

JUDGE

Okay. Alright, um, to your knowledge did any of these individuals have a business
license to operate a business as a - a security firm or a sec.urity officer?

FALCO

Again, we were asking for a police presence so, to us having a police, um, license was
enough for us.

JUDGE

Yeah, but that's not...

FALCO

We don't...
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JUDGE

... that's not the questi<;m.

FALCO

... we don't routinely ask people that we do business with to provide 'em with - send us a
copy of their business license so, you would have to ...

JUDGE

So, your answer is you don't know?

FALCO

A separate business license or not.

JUDGE

Okay.

FALCO

Our - the only thing that we were concerned about was that they were license police
officers.
·

JUDGE

Okay. Um, do you have any knowledge as to whether the individuals kept, um, records
for tax purposes, um, in order to file their taxes, uh, as an independent contractor or as a
self-employed Qr - or - or a business?

FALCO

Um, when you receive a I 099 you gotta be able to file your tax return. As a tax preparer
any time you receive a 1099 it's gotta be reported so, you - uh, obviously they had to
have some kind of records or documentations.

JlJDGE

But do you have any personal knowledge of that whether they were keeping any records
for - for tax purposes other than the 1099 you're talking about?

FALCO

Uh, preparing truces in the past with other people I would assume that any in - any

2

3

4
~

6

@
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8
9

@

@

10
11
12
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14
15
16
17
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19
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@

22
23

24
25

26
@

@

@

individual that receives any kind of 1099 would keep tax records to file taxes.

27

28
29
30
31

JUDGE

I'm not asking for assumptions though. I'm asking for any personal knowledge and I
understand that you may - you may argue that ...

32

FALCO

I didn't interact with ...

34

JUDGE

... how ...

35
36

FALCO

I didn't interact with any of these individuals that, um, had the police presence here so, I
wouldn't know.

JUDGE

0 kay and that's all I need. If you don't know that's al1 I need to know. And I understand
what ma - may not be like~y that you would know, but if you did know I would wanna
know that so.

FALCO

I don't know.

JUDGE

Alright. When, uh, these individuals provided services, uh, to your organization were

33
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they required to follow instructions about how to provide these services from your
organization?

2
3

FALCO

Nope.

6
7
8

JUDGE

Okay and did they receive any training on how to provide the security officer or - or
police services to your company?

9

FALCO

No not from our company.

WOGE

Um, were they required to perfonn their jobs in eme - any certain pace or sequence with
the, uh, Appellant, the company tell them where they needed to be, where they needed to
move throughout the time they provided the services and so forth?

4

s

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

FALCO

No.

JUDGE

Okay and, um, okay. Was there any understanding as to whether the individuals needed
to provide the service themselves or if they were ill could they have someone substitute
for them?

FALCO

Again since we didn't know who was assigned we wouldn't know. We just asked for
certain hours of off coverage when we weren't around on a random basis. So, our
assumption would be is that somebody would be here, but since we had no control over
who we don't know how that would work. You'd have to ask Ken how that would work.

JUDGE

But I'm asking from the Appellant's point - from your company or your organizations
point .of view, um, when you entered into an agreement to have individuals provide a
service through the Unified Police Department were you -was it -was there any kind of
place in that if that person couldn't make a shift that they themselves could have someone
come in or would it have to be another Unified Police Department employee to come in
and provide that service?

FALCO

No there's nothing from us. As a matter of fact if they ...

JUDGE

Okay.

FALCO

... missed a day we probably just wouldn't have got the billing for that day, but no three
was nothing required by us.

IDDGE

Okay. So, who was it that- that billed you or you received a invoice or billing from to
detennine who worked and who needed to be paid? How did you know that?

FALCO

The Unified Police Department provided us with the name.

JUDGE

Okay.
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FALCO

And the hours.

JUDGE

Okay. Um, did the same individuals provide services 'on a regular basis or was it, uh,just
here and there as needed throughout the year?

FALCO

It was here and there as needed and as far as I know not an indi - single ·individual
provided, uh, the majority of the service.

nJDOE

I'm sorry you said a single individual. I'm ...

FALCO

No. As far as I know not a single.

JUDGE

Okay - okay. Now who or what detennined the hours that these individuals worked?

FALCO

Um, at first we would give_ some random hours and days and then the Unified Police said
they had some type of program that could do some random hours and days for us so, we
kinda turned it over to them.

JUDGE

Okay. Alright. So, were there certain - did - did the Appellant, did your organization
need 24 hour a day services?

23
24

FALCO

No. This was mostly when no one was around the property.

25
26

JUDGE

Okay-okay.

27

FALCO

And, you know, none- none of the other businesses near us were open at the time either
so.

30
31
32

JUDGE

Okay. Um, generally when these individuals provided these services were they also on
duty being paid by Unified Police Department?

33

FALCO

Um, you'd have to ask him that question ...

34
35

2

@

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

JO

11
@

@

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
@
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22

28
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@

@

JUDGE

Oh okay.

36
37
38

FALCO

... but my understanding was that this would be off duty hours for them.

39

JUDGE

Okay. Alright, um, and, um, you indicated they were paid by the hour, correct?

FALCO

Yeah. We were billed by the hour, yes.

JUDGE

Okay. Alright. Um, any other testimony that you would like to provide as to whether or
not these individuals are independent contractors or - or employees?

40
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FALCO
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

We don't feel like we had any control over them, which would be one of the main
criteria's and we also fee] like, um, they didn't meet most of the guidelines provided by
Workforce Services. Um, so we don't see where the logic is that they were employees,
but, um, the other - the other issue, I guess, I'd bring up is the other ben - benefit was
th~, um, several businesses around - all of the businesses around us would have been
closed at the time also and they probably benefitted by having additional police presence
in this area.

JUDGE

Alright. Any other testimony you'd like to provide?

FALCO

Um, I think that's it for now.

JUDGE

Alright. Ms. Rivera, questions for Mr. Falco?

RIVERA

Yes. Thank you. Uh, Mr. Falco, did you enter into a written contract for these security
services?

FALCO

Um, I believe everything when we first started was verbal.

RIVERA

So, you did not, um ...

FALCO

'Cuzit was random and off and on we didn't necessarily consider a contract necessary. I
guess if it was on a set schedule and a set amount of times and hours we'd probably
wanted a contract, but we didn't, uh, push for a contract because it was such a random
basis.

~

I)

JO
11
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13
14
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16
17
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20
21

22
23
24

25
26
27
28

JUDGE

Excuse me.

29
30

FALCO

Some- sometimes we weren't using 'em and sometimes we were so.

3I

RIVERA

@

Okay. If you could, uh, reference Exhibit 88. If you could go there for me please. Uh,
this appears to be, uh, an agreement. Did you sign on page 89 - 88, uh, kinda outlines ...

32
33

FALCO

I think this was an agreement that was provided by the Unified Police Officers
organization that when they testi fled in their last meeting that they do provide contracts to
·many of their other peop]e, but we did not sign this contract when it was during the audit
time period. This con - we didn't have this contract, but it's one that they testified that
they provide to other individuals.

40

RIVERA

In - individuals or other companies re ...

41
42
43

FALCO

Other companies or whatever. You'd have to ask K~n more about it.

44

RIVERA

So, you ...
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FALCO

(Unintelligible) 88.

RIVERA

Even back in, uh, - so, this has been revised as 2010. So, no time between 2010 and
today have you ever- have you- had you seen this policy depart-Unified, uh, Police
Department, uh, police officer, uh, agreement, had you seen one of these?

FALCO

I hadn't seen one, no. Like I said we were doing it on such a random and sporadic basis
that, um, we didn't, as far as I know, have a co:p.tract with them, a written contract, but no
I haven't seen one.

RIVERA

So, the Unified Police Pepartment never provided you one of, uh, this document then.
That's what you' re stating, correct?

2
3

4
5
6

@

7
8
9
JO

11
@

12

13
14

~FALCO

15

Correct I don't see a signed document in here by me so, and I don't recall signing one
so.

16
~

17

RIVERA

You don't recall ever having read this agreement?

18
19

FALCO

No, uh-uh. What's that? Not until I saw it in this Exhibit.

21
22

JUDGE

To your knowledge did anyone else for the organization sign such a document?

23

FALCO

I would have to check around. To my knowledge no. I mean I would assume if someone
signed it we would have a signed copy in your Exhibit.

26
27
28
29

JUDGE

Well, the Department wouldn't have it unless you gave it to us so, um, she's just asking,
and - and I'm asking, whether or ·not you have any knowledge as to whether the
AppeIJant, anyone for the Appellant, signed such an agreement.

30
31

FALCO

No.

32
33

RIVERA

So, your arrangement with U - uh, Unified Police Department was strictly verbal? You
just called 'em up and requested additional security for your property?

FALCO

We requested it - additional police presence, yeah, and especially in high time - high
risk times we would ask for additional and low risk times we'd probably not have as
much coverage.

RIVERA

Um, then did the police department explain to you how they would be sending their
police officers?

FALCO

Um, they just said they would have a police presence here when we requested it. That's
all they told us. That's all we wanted.

RIVERA

And they told you how much it - that cost would be?
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FALCO

Yes.

RIVERA

And it was Unified Police Department that did the billing so you would know who to
make the checks out to and for the amount, correct?

FALCO

Correct.

®'

RIVERA

Then I guess we've got questions for Mr. Ken Hansen. Um, did the police departmentaccording to that Exhibit on 88 - Number 88 the police -um, I'm a little surprised they
wouldn't have outlined what that relationship would be between your company and those
police officers.

@

3

4
5
6
7

8
9

10
11
12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

FALCO

Like I said it's probably a question for Ken because, like I said, alls we would ask them is
a police presence, um, and since it was such a random - on a random basis then I am
assuming that that's the reason they didn't present us with a standard contract. I don'tyou'd have to ask Ken that.
@

RIVERA

Okay. I guess I won't have any additional questions until we have - speak with Mr.
Hansen.

21
22
23

JUDGE

Alright Mr. Falco any other testimony that you would like to provide?

24

FALCO

That's it for now I gu~ss.

JUDGE

Alright. Would you like Mr. Hansen to provide testimony next then?

FALCO

I would think he'd be -yeah, I think he'd be ...

JUDGE

Uh-huh. Why don't you bring - let's bring him back into the Hearing and I'll take his
testimony.

SOUVALL

This is Harry Souvall and I just wanted to ask a couple of questions. Uh, this is Harry
Souvall by the way and I just.may wanna ask a couple of questions of Officer Hansen
following up from any other questions asked.

20
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32
33

34
35

@

36
37

JUDGE

Well, again that ques - those questions need to be asked by Mr. Falco. He's the
designated representative. I just want one person asking questions. If you wanna ...

SOUVALL

Well, I'm - I'm here as the representative for the witness, not for Mr. Falco.

JUDGE

Okay. Alright. I'll give you an oppoFtunity to do that.

SOUVALL

Thank you.
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JUDGE

You're welcome.

3
4

HANSEN

Hansen is present.

s

JUDGE

Alright Mr. Hansen, this is Judge Gibbs. I'd like to go ahead and take your testimony.
Mr. Hansen, do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you will give will be the
whole truth and nothing but the truth?

HANSEN

I do.

JUDGE

Please state your full name for the record.

HANSEN

Kenneth William Hansen.

JUDGE

Mr. Hansen, what is your job title or position?

HANSEN

I'm a Detective with Unified Police Department. I am the Secondary Employment
Coordinator.

JUDGE

Okay and, um, can you describe to -to me the relationship between the Unified Police
Department and the - this organization the Fur Breeders Agricultural Cooperative with
respect to having police officers provide some services to the Fur Breeders Association?

@
2

6
7
8
9
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14
15
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17
18
19
20
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23
24

HANSEN

Although I wasn't the Secondary Employment Coordinator when this started, um, the re

- I think the relationship was based - it was - my - looking back when it first started it

25
26
27

appeared to be kind of a seasonal arrange - ar - uh1 relationship, and as I recall, uh, based
on the narrative on the job description it was based on a threat of, uh, vandalism, um, uh,

28

coming from animal rights groups.

29

JUDGE

And what is the Unified Police Department's role in having security or extra police
present around the Appellant's facility? What role does the Unified Police Department
play in connection with the individuals that actually provide the services?

HANSEN

Well, our role is - is strictly as a law enforcement presence. Um, a, uh, - as usual tQ
preserve life and property.

37

JUDGE

38
39
40
41

Um, but why - why is the Unified Police Department involved rather than just the
Appellant, the company or organization, contacting th~se officers individually and asking
them to provide security officer duties or services?

HANSEN

It's the policy of Unified Police Department that all secondary employment gq through
the Secondary Employment, um, Coordinator. They have to complete some, uh,
paperwork to be approved to do that. They also have to use our Secondary Employment
System ·called Power Detail, uh, that requires them to agree, uh, to certain, uh, crjteria
before they can get int~ that system, but, uh, UPD it kinda functions as a clearing house
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and we do this to avQid corruption and to make the distribution to off duty employment
fair for everyone.

2,.
3

4

JUDGE

Okay. So, um, so the- Mr. Falco had indicated that at some point the organization had
contacted the Unified Police Department asking for additional police presence there for
the reasons that you also described. So, why isn't it the case that the Unified Police
Department just doesn't send their officers there as part of their primary duties and - and
just, uh, proli - provide that police presence rather than calling it secondary employment
and having the Appellant pay these officers directly?

HANSEN

Well, Judge we don't - I - I don't think we have the - the luxury of doing that for any
particular business just, um, because of the - the cost of- of doing police work. We just
- we can't assign, uh, on duty police officers, uh, to abusiness by a - or any kin<;l of a,
you know, maybe more than a day or two.

JUDGE

Okay. Um, when the officers provided services to the Appellant, um, were they wearing
Unified Police Department's unifonns?

HANSEN

Required on the job description in our Power Details program to - to wear a Unified
Police Department.

JUDGE

Okay and so, while they were providing these services to the Appellant, um, is it the case
that Unified Police Department was not al~o paying them for that same time?

HANSEN

No. They're only paid their-when they go through our system and when they sign up to
be in.our system they have to - to agree that the relationship, um, although arranged by
UPD the arrangement is actually between the Employer and the officer. Uh, UPD
doesn't, uh, doesn't pay them, uh, for that work.

JUDGE

Okay. Um, are officers, according to Unified Police Department, are officers able to
provide services as an officer or a security officer to anyone they want or ~o they have to
go, according to Unified Police Department policy, have to go through your - your
program that the Unified - the Secondary Employment Program with your department?

HANSEN

Yes. In order to maintain the service, uh, that I'd talked about. ..

JUDGE

Okay.

HANSEN

... they have to go through that system and that - that system unless they're grouped
separately, urn, like at hospitals and - and such where they're regular, uh, employees, uh,
twice a month they, uh, they can sign up for one job for the, um, the two weeks after that
initial two weeks. For example, on October Ist they can sign up for one job between, um,
October 16th and the end of October, October 31 5', just as - as an example. They're all
secondary employment. It's coordinated, uh, through the Seconqary Employment
Coordinator, uh, just because of the fairness issue and past issues with favoritism and
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police secondary employment
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JUDGE

Okay. So, what if one of these officers, and that - that are involved here, um, what if
they knew of a private company that wanted security officer services and, uh, could he or
·she just provide those services understanding they would not be representing the Unified
Police Department, they'd be wearing another uniform or plain clothes or whatever,
could they contract with an independent business just to provide security officer services?
Uh, if they did that would -uh, they'd be violating our policy.

Okay. Um, okay. Even though they would be off duty and they wouldn't be wearing or
representing the department in any way if they wanted to ser - they - according to the
Employer's policy they're not allowed to do that?

HANSEN

JUDGE

22

23

No because they're· still acting, um, you know, - their a law enforcement officer
(unintelligible) certified; but they're all - they also have to be working for a police
department or a law enforcement agency. So, um, becal:15e they're - they're essentially
an off duty officer the):"re still representing UPD so that is something they can't do.
. Okay- okay. Um, any, um, tools or equipment or supplies, firearms, or protective gear,.
anything that they use when they prov~ded services to the Appellant? Do you know if the
officers are required to pay for those themselves or has someone else already purchased
those?

24

HANSEN

Well, at UPD we don't have what's called a quarter master system. They receive, um,
about $700 dollars a year, however, the officer's - it's up to them to pay for their
equipment. Some officers purchase their own side arms, um, but they purchase their own
body armor, um, you know, any- any extra stuff. Then $700 dollars, whatever it is, it's
like $45 dollars a paycheck it doesn't really go a long way. So, officers will have like
additional lights and body annor, their own weapons. So, some of the equipment they
have is purchased, um, like most of it is purchased by them. They do receive a- a - it's
not a reimbursement or a quarter master system, but they do receive so much a year to
pay for the uniforms.

JUDGE

So, is the $700 dollars, uh, that you indicated likely insufficient to pay those cost, is that
the purpose of that $700 dollars is to pay for uniforms, weapons, tools, whatever they
need to provide their services?

39
40

HANSEN

Well, it- it pays - I mean the department will issue you a weapon. Most officers ...

41

JUDGE

Okay.

HANSEN

... have their own - own - own weapons. It - the thing that it probably doesn't cover,
um, - doesn't appear to be covering is - are things - expensive things like body armor,
uh ...
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3

JUDGE

Okay.

4

HANSEN

... you know, a pair - a pair of boots could be $200 and $250 dollars, body armor is a
thousand, um, a side arm is anywhere from about 450 to 600.

JUOGE

Okay.

HANSEN

There's a lot of equipment like lights and such that they purchase on their own.

JUDGE

But I would take it that, uh, with respect to the individual officers that are at issue in this
case, that you would not have any firsthand knowledge as to specifically any equipment
that they had purchased on their own?

s
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HANSEN

JUDGE

22
23
24

25

I don't and it would be difficult because ofthe way Power Detail System works. There's
no guarantee that the same officer will ever work here. Um, it's because of the one job,
uh, rules that we have for the one job they can get that day. A lot of times an officer, um,
won't be able to get the same job for, you know, maybe months at a time. So, it would be
a lot_ of different officers that usually work at.the different, uh, locations.

ii

(j

Okay. To your knowledge, um, I know you have -you indicated that this is policy that,
uh, they cannot independently go out and, uh, enter into a contract to provide security
officer services. Do you know if that's, uh, not just the Unified Police Department
policy, but do you know if that's against the law for, uh, an employee active police
officer to do?

i)

I believe, um, state statutes says, and I know Harry can maybe help me with this, but I've
been working a little bit on this, the state statute said that law enforcement can't get a
private security license. I know they can't be, uh, private security agents. So, I think
that, um, they can't reaily be private security ...

Cl)

26
27
28

HANSEN

29

30
31
32

JUDGE

Okay.

33
34
35

HANSEN

... and I - and I don't - and maybe can Harry - Harry can help me with this, but I don't
believe that by our policy they can ~e private security.

JUDGE

Okay.

HANSEN

And, uh,just to go along with that I don't know of any, um, any of my officers that, um,
that function that way.

JUDGE

Okay. Alright.

HANSEN

They may work as law enforcement officers, um, for a private security company if they
need that kind of a - a - an issue, but they can't - I don't think they can own or be a - a

w
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- own a private ~ecurity company.
2
3

JUDGE

Okay. Um, so do these - the individuals that provided services at - at this, uh, company
or this organization did they, to your knowledge, also provide similar services for other
companies?

HANSEN

Yes they do. Most of them, um, work for, uh, different companies, um, that - that well, I'll give you an example, like, um, a construction company that's building a
building. We have officers that work at, uh, like the Marathons and all of the different
races for different companies. We have a Jot of, um, a lot ofissu.es where- I don't-you
probably wouldn't find one officer here that doesn't work for another comp - another,
uh, employer.
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JUDGE

Okay, but you're saying th~t they, uh, they cannot independently do their own thing, but
- as far as security, but, uh, they could work for another security company?

HANSEN

Well, no they ...

JUDGE

Okay.

HANSEN

But it's all coordinated through me. For example, um ...

JUDGE

Okay.

HANSEN

... example, All State called me and said we have a, um, a client who's an attorney who's
been threatened by one of the customers because of a claim declination.

JUDGE

Okay.

jo

HANSEN

31
32
33
34
35

And they - officer there so, a national security co~pany going through me, uh,
coordinated that so we could use an officer to help that.

JUDGE

Okay - okay. Alright, um - alright, um, let me see here. Mr. Falco, do you have any
questions for Mr. Hansen? Mr. Falco are you there?

36

FALCO

Uh, no I don't really have any questions for him. I, you know, I know that the police
officers that were here at our last Hearing did talk about some of their expenses that they
did incur and I don't know if the Judge feels that's important enough to maybe try to
contact them and have them give further testimony to that or not.

40
41
42

JUDGE

Well, we'll face that, uh! a litt]e later on, but do you have any other questions_ for him?

43

FALCO

No, not rea1ly.

JUDGE

Okay. Uh, Mr. Souvall, uh, do you have questions for Mr. Hansen?
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SOUVALL

Just a few ~o clarify.

JUDGE

Okay.

SOUVALL

Um, uh, Detective Hansen, um, when, uh, - just lo sort of exp]ain a little bit better the
process here. Officers volunteer for, uh, secondary employment opportunities do they
not?

10
11

HANSEN

They do.

12
13
14
15

JUDGE

Okay. I can't have you asking lead - leading questions even though ...

SOUVALL

Okay, um ...

16
17
18

JUDGE

Okay.

SOUVALL

Alright I'll rephrase it.
opportunities?

HANSEN

Yes.

SOUVALL

Do these officers have the ability to say they don't wanna work a secondary employment
opportunities even if they've worked 'em in the past?

HANSEN

Yes. They- they can, uh, cancel from jobs or not sign up, but, um, it's up to them arid
then some of our jobs have back up officers. So, if that officer chooses not to go to that
job then there-there's another officer usually available or they call me and I try and find
somebody.

SOUVALL

Does Unified make any money on the, uh, amount of money that officers are paid by
third parties? Unified as in an organization.

34
35

HANSEN

No they don't.

36

SOUVALL

So, this is a pass through entity if somebody, uh, schedules - so, basically then it is
Unified is the scheduling entity and then officers volunteer to do shifts, is that correct?

HANSEN·

That's true and they - and they understand that when they do their secondary
employment request and when they - when they get into the Power Detail software
program they also, um, have to agree to that before they can proceed into the system.

SOUVALL

Okay. Um, uh, no further questions.

JUDGE

Alright. Going back to your testimony, um, Mr. Hansen we have a document, um, that is
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Do officers, uh, volunteer for secondary employment
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marked as Exhibit's 88 and 89 that, uh, is entitled, uh, Secondary Employment Employer
Agreement. Uh, to your knowledge did this organization, uh, Fur Breeders Agricultural
Cooperative, did they sign such, uh, an agreement with the Unified Police Pepartment?

@
2

3
4
5
@

HANSEN

Um, Judge I wish I could help you with that, but they were, um, already on the system
when I started the job, but I - I - I would assume the - pre - previous person before me
had them sign some kind of an agreement. Um, I've been looking for it so far I haven't
been fo\l-it hasn't been found, but-but knowing the person who worked there-in this
job before me, um, I'm - I would think it would exist ~d. - and this agreement has
changed over time and essentially it's an agreement that basically, and - and the most
informed part, is the person who employs these officers needs to know that if there's an
emergency or something close by that the officer will have to leave once they get called
out. But I....,. I'l1 continue to search to see if there is one. I've been looking for it, but that
was prior to my time at this job.

JUDGE

Okay. Alright. Uh, Mr. Falco any other questions for Mr. Hansen?

FALCO

No.

JUDGE

Alright. Ms. Rivera, questions for Mr. Hansen?

RJVERA

Yes. When you, um, - on occasion do you ever reaffinn with the companies that contact
the Unified Police Department to remind them that this is a secondary employment
agreement?

SOUVALL

I'm gonna object to the question to the extent it's calling for a lead or conclusion as to
employment status.

29

JUDGE

No I think she's just a - well, she can ask them if...

30
31

SOUVALL

(Unintelligible) secondary employment contract. I don't think we should read too much
into that other than, you know, uh, what it is. I just don't want it to appear by answering
a question regarding secondary employment that that means more than it does.

JUDGE

No I under~tand that. I ...

37
38

SOUVALL

Okay.

39
40

JUDGE

I'm the one that makes that determination, but if-if they were to - to - to tell - he can
ask whether or not they tell an organization that or remind an organization. That does not
require me to make a - a legal conclusion from that. So ...

SOUVALL

No I just thought that the officer to be asked to make a legal conclusion on the status.
That's ...
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JUDGE

I understand that. She's just asking whether or not he - he tells them that.

SOUVALL

Okay.

JUDGE

Not whether or not he's made it a legal conclusion if that's the case. So, I can allow the
question.

HANSEN

Can I repeat the questions as I think it - it ...

JUDGE

Or Ms. Rivera why don't you just repeat the question?

RIVERA

On occasion since you came in - bow long have you - well, let me back up. How long
have you been, um, serving as the Secondary Employment Officer?

HANSEN

Since August of 2012.

RNERA

August of 2012. So, the arrangement between Fur Breeders, uh, Agricultural
Cooperative and the Unified Police Department that arrangement of having extra police
coverage, uh, started before you came on in 2012, correct?

HANSEN

Yes.

RIVERA

So, um, since you can't find a contract with them my question was, on occasion, um, with
- especially with companies tI:iat have had this arrangement for a...

JUDGE

Why did you ask specifically with this company since that's the one we're dealing with
in this Hearing?

RIVERA

Might you have ever gone over those, uh, conditions especially when an - if an
emergency arises that the officer has to leave? Meaning if you can't find a contract how
do you know that Fur Breeders understands the obligation of a police officer needing to
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leave?

HANSEN

Uh, when I - when I setup - I hope this answers your question correct1y, but when I
setup jobs I do the agreement one time. I - I place it on an electronic file and, uh, usually
I - and that's - that's where it ends.

RIVERA

But are - so, how do you know that Fur Breeders understands that that officer may have
to leave at any time? What if they're understanding totally different?

HANSEN

Well,.that would require me to read minds and that - I'm - I'm really busy so I don't
have that time.

RIVERA

Oh. Okay. Um, so it is correct then - so, police officers - is my understanding correct
that they are really a police officer 24/7? They have scheduled hours of duty, but in case
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of an emergency they can be called out at any time?
2

3
4

HANSEN

(Unintelligible). Their - they-they - they take their (unintelligible) home when they
become police officers.

RIVERA

Can a police officer, um, take a part time job, um, as a shoe salesman in a department
store or something without going through your Secondary Employment?

HANSEN

Well, we have two different, uh, criteria. We have the -the Secondary Employment that
has to do with them acting in - in a law enforcement capacity where they might -they're
- they might be in a position where they're protecting property and lives and, um, then
there's also the - the· secondary employment where they might be, you know, working for, uh, a different entity like - like perhaps a, um, you know, a shoe store or maybe
they're a plumber or a carpenter and that - that's kind of- that's on, uh, - we capture
that infonnation, uh, but most of the information that we capture is on secondary ··
employment where the officers function as a law enforcement officer.

RNERA

Did the services that Fur Breeder, uh, requested was it solely in the nature of security ofa
police security nature?

HANSEN

Well, I think the best way to answer that is it- because of the nature particularly of this
business it is a law enforcements presence.

RIVERA

Okay. I don't think I have any other questions then.

JUDGE

Alright. Any other testimony from the Appellant, Mr. Falco?

FALCO

No not really.

JUDGE

Alright. Ms. Rivera does the Department have any testimony_the Department would like
to provide?

RIVERA

-(Unintelligible). No - no.

JUDGE

Alright. Going back to the issue of, uh, whether or not the Appellant wanted additional
witnesses to be available that they understood did not need to be available today. Uh,
Mr. Falco, does the Appellant want to continue the Hearing to obtain additional
testimony from anyone else?

FALCO

Um, you know I feel like there's been enough evidence to show that we don't meet the
criteria's outlined by the guidelines. I don't see any reason to bring them in. I guess it
would be whether Judge you feel like you needed to find out if they were at risk, at loss,
and whether they spent some of the stuff or their tax forms. I. guess that-that'd be up to
your determination I guess.
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HANSEN

Judge can I - if-if there is a question about the lost part of this we do have employers
who once in a while do not pay the officers. So, there is a risk.

JUDGE

Okay. Um, I don't believe I have any questions for them on - on that issue of- of the
lost. I mean I understand it's a given that a client or someone can - cannot pay someone
so, I understand that. Um, did you want them - it's up to the Appellant whether you
want to - feel like you wanna call any ...

FALCO

I think we're fine.

II
12

JUDGE

Okay. Um, any- alright then would the Appellant like to make a final statement?

13

FALGO

Um, I guess my feeling would be we could have avoided all this if we had a proper
(unintelligible) by an audit. I know when I worked for the state as an audit department
that, uh, as an auditor that we would have to meet with management and go over our
findings with them and explain exactly the criteria and why we didn't meet that criteria.
Um, that never occurred in this case. We don't feel like we met the criteria. These
officers didn't meet the criteria. There's no explanation never really given other than to
send us their pamphlet that had the guideline on it. Um, I feel that was totally
inappropriate. I feel bad that this has come this far, but we don't feel these officers we
had any control over them nor do they meet the guidelines therefore we're appealing it. I
guess that'd be my only comment.
·

24

JUDGE

Okay. Ms. Rivera, any final statement?

25
26

RIVERA

Yes. Um, the Unemployment Security Act gives certain exemptions to types of services.
Um, commissioned only license, real estate agents, insurance agents to be as an example,
but there is absolutely no exemption for security guards. Um, then the only other
exemption that an individual can have is if they are established in their own business and
they're providing a business service. They can be a sole proprietor, they could have their
own corporation or a limited liability company, but they provide a business service and
that's where we have our AD test, our independent contractor test. In order for someone
to be correctly classified as an independent contractor that individual had to take steps of
his own initiative to set himselfup in business and there's certain criteria's that we look
at to see if they have taken such steps and where they have an investment, a substantial
investment, in their business. Some business may not require a substantial investment,
but Fur Breeders they went through certain steps and - and to establish being in a
business, a cooperative. Um, and they've got a business license. They've got a place of
business. They may - they do some type of advertising to let their customers or clients
know what services they have available for them. They, um, they have to have all types
of insurances. Liability insurances, workers comp coverage for their workers. They take
affinnative steps. They have to have a business license to operate. They have taken
many steps to establish that they are an entity and a - or a business that provides a
service. Well, likewise with anyone that they hire to provide a service for them. The
Employment Secwity Act puts in everybody who perfonns a personal service for

2

3

4
5
6
7
8
9

10

14
15

16
17
18
19

20
21

22

of

23

27
28

29

30
31
32

33
34
35
36
37
38

39

40
4)·

42
43
44
45

30

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

remuneration an employment unless if they're exempt by law and as there's no exempt
for security guards you have to look at whether or not they meet the independent
contractor test. In this case the Fur Breeders really want a police presence. The police
department has established this Secondary Employment arrangemeat-wltere their off duty
co - police officers can engage in security activities to be paid directly by the company
requesting that service,.~ut thes~ individuals are not established in a business. In fact, the
testimony given today said they are prohibited from having a security company or acting
in a security capacity without going through their - the Secondary Employment. So, they
do not - these officers cannot have a business o( their own to provide security, uh,
services on their own. Um, it's sad that the Fur Breeders Association did not understand
what these officers can or cannot do and there is statute, there is law, that outlines what is
permissible and what is not. The fact that they failed to put 'em on payroll and paid
them, um, Mr. Falco is absolutely correct he does have to issue a 1099 ifhe doesn't issue
it there'll be a (unintelligible) for these individuals, um, but did he issue a 1099 ...
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JUDGE

No.

RIVERA

... correctly? It's the Department's position they did not. So, and I know in reading
through his, uh, appeal his - his wanting us to, um, think that we should, uh, abide by
IRS. IRS rules (unintelligible) are the minimum standard. Every state can have more
restrictive statutes, but they can never have - be more relaxed than what the Federal
Statutes are. So, the I)eparbnent of Workforce Services, by statute, has determined that
the only exemption for individuals they have to be established in their own business and
the fact that they may spend, um, - by the testimony we heard today what they spent for,
um, body armor or extra lights is for their duties as a police officer, peace officer, not
what they're doing for the security, additional side jobs that they do as security. So, the
Department stands by its original detennination. It was correctly and accurately done in
that these gentleman do not qualify to be independent contractors. They provided a
pers.onal service. Um, it may be too bad that there wasn't that clear understanding
between the police department and the Fur Breeders on the nature of their services, but
their services were as a police officer, wearing police officer's unifonn, using police
officers equipment. None of that equipment, the car, definitely was not something that
the officer provided and - and, uh, used and I'm sure he didn't have to put his own gas in
to go to that place. So, the Department stands by the Decision that was made by its
auditor. Thank you.

JUDGE

Alright. We'll close the Hearing at this time. I wanna thank the parties for participating
in the Hearing and I'll issue a written Decision and send you a copy of my Decision. If
you've not received the Decision within two weeks feel free to call the appeal's office
and let them know. We wanna make sure you receive the Decision received in a timely
manner. Thank you again for participating. We'll close and I'll get that De~ision out as
soon as possible.

RIVERA

Thank you.
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JUDGE

You're welcome. Goodbye.

3

RIVERA

Goodbye.

4
5

FALCO'

Thanks. (END OF HEARING)
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APDEC

DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES
APPEALS UNIT
Decision of Administrative Law Judge

Appellant
FUR BREEDERS AGRICULTURAL COOP
8700 S 700 W
SANDY UT 84070-2520

CASE NO:

16-A-05377-T

EMPLOYER NO:

002614-0

APPEAL DECISION: The officers are considered to be employees and not independent contractors.•
The Appellant is subject to unemployment insurance contributions.
CASE HISTORY:

Appearances:
Issues to be Decided:

Appellant/Department
35A-4-204(l) - Contract of Hire
35A-4-204(3) - Independent Contractor
3SA-4-208
- Service for a Wage

The Department's original decision found police officers to have provided a service for a wage under a·
contract of hire and were employees and not independent contractors subjecting the Appellant tq

unemployment insurance contributions.
APPEAL RIGHTS: This decision will become final unless, within 30 days from October 12, 2016,
further written appeal is received by the Workforce Appeals Board (PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City, UT
84145-0244; FAX 801-526-9244; or online at http://www.jobs.utah.gov/appeals) setting forth the grounds
upon which the appeal is made.
·

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The Appellant manufactures and distributes animal feed to fanners who raise animals for their fur. The
Appellant has had concerns about threats of destruction of its property from individuals who may be
against the fur industry. The Appellant desired to have security and a greater police presence around its
facility during times when the AppelJant was not present. The Appellant contacted the Unified Police
Department (UPD) requesting additional police presence around its facility. The Unified Police·
Department has a secondary employment program that coordinates secondary employment for its police
officers. According to UPD policies it prohibits police officers from working outside the UPD providing'
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security services outside the secondary employment program. The UPD agreed to assist in th&
scheduling of police officers to provide a police presence and security at the Appellant's facility. During
the years 2014 and 2015, the individuals listed on Exhibits 21 through 27 of the hearing record as being
included as employees provided services to the Appellant as police officers or security officers. The
Appellant paid the officers directly after the Appellant provided the names and times the officers provided
the services to the Appellant. The UPD set the fee for the officers' services at $30 per hour, which the
Appellant-paid.
·

~

r-:-----1 ~

All of the officers were employees of the UPD. The UPD pays officers $700 per year for them ·to
purchase any tools or equipment or supplies needed to provide services as a police officer. Often this
amount is not sufficient to cover all costs and the officers at times may purchase items using their owtj
money. The officers also provided services to other companies through the UPD secondary employment
program.

:

j

/

!

· The officers enroll in the secondary employment program with the UPD in order to be available for
secondary jobs and indicate when they would be available to provide these services. The UPD woulq
then schedule the officers according to the Appellant's needs.
When the officers provided the services to the Appellant they wore UPD uniforms and drove a UPO
vehicle.
·
The Appellant did not require the officers to follow any instructions as to how to provide their services:
... ,
The Appellant provided no training and did not require them to perform their services in any certain pace
or sequence. The officers provided services on an as-needed basis.
· ··

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Section 35A-4-204 of the Utah Employment Security Act defines employment. This section st~te~,jn
. ..
part:

(I)
Subject to the other provisions of this section, "employment" means any service
performed for wages or under any contract of hire, whether written or oral, express or
implied, including service in interstate commerce, and service as an officer of a
corporation.
The Unemployment Insurance Rules provide:
R994-208- l 02.

Wages Include.

Wages include the following:
(l)

Payments for Personal Services.

All payments by the hour, by the job, piece rate, salary, or commission are wages.
The evidence presented during the hearing established that all of the law enforcement officers provideq ~
service to the Appellant and were paid for the services by the Appellant. The Utah Employment Security
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Act indicates this constitutes employment. It must be detennined whether this employment is covered
employment under the Utah Employment Security Act or exempt under any provision of the Act. Th~
Administrative Law Judge could not find no specific provision in the Act or the rules pertaining ther~fc;i
that would exclude the services of law enforcement officers under the present circumstances. Th~
Administrative Law Judge will analyz~ whether the services should be exempt under the indepena6h\t
contractor provisions of the law and rules.
·
The Unemployment Insurance Rules further provide:
R994-204-301.

Independent Contractor Services.

{l) An independent contractor is a worker who is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same nature as
the services perfonned, and the individual providing the services must be free from the
employer•s control and direction while performing services for the employer. A worker
must clearly establish his or her status as an independent contractor by taking steps that
demonstrate independence indicating an informed business decision has been made.
(2) Payments to or through another entity for personal services performed by a
worker is exempt from employment if the personal services meet the provisions of Section
35A-4-204(3).
R994-204-302.

Independent Contractor Determination.

(I) The Department will determine the status of a worker based upon infonnation
provided by the employer, the worker, and any other available source.
(2) If a worker files a claim for benefits and the Department, as the result of an audit,
investigation, or declaratory ruling, has made a detennination that the worker is an
independent contractor and his or her services for an employer are ~xempt from coverage,
any earnings from those services for that employer will be excluded from the claimant's
monetary detennination. The claimant may protest the monetary determination by filing
an appeal as provided in R994-204-402.
R994-204-303.

Factors for Determining Independent Contractor Status.

Services will be excluded under Section 35A-4-204 if the service meets the
requirements of this rule. Special scrutiny of the facts is required to assure that the form of
a service relationship does not obscure its substance, that is, whether the worker is
independently established in a like trade, occupation, profession or business and is free
from control and direction. The factors listed in subsections R994-204-303(1)(b) and
R994-204-303(2)(b) of this section are intended
as aids in the analysis of the facts of
each case. The degree of importance of each factor varies depending on the service and
the factual context in which it is performed. Additionally, some factors do not apply to
certain services and, therefore, should not be considered.

onfr
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Independently Established.

(a) An individual will be considered customarily engaged in an independently
established trade, occupation, profession, or business if the individual is, at the time the
service is perfonned, regularly engaged in a trade, occupation, profession, or business of
the same nature as the service performed, and the trade, occupation, profession, or business
is established independently of the alleged employer. In other wordst an independently
established trade, occupation, profession, or business is created and exists apart from a
relationship with a particular employer and does not depend on a relationship with any one
employer for its continued existence.
(b) The following factors, if applicable, will determine whether a worker is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade or business:
(i) Separate Place of Business. The worker has a place of business separate from
that of the employer.
(ii) Tools and Equipment. The worker has a substantial investment in the tools,
equipment, or facilities C\lstomarily required to perfonn the services. However, tools of
the trade" used by certain trades or crafts do not necessarily demonstrate independence.
11

(iii) Other Clients. The worker regularly performs services of the same nature for
other customers or clients and is not required to work exclusively for one employer.

(iv) Profit or Loss. The worker can realize a profit or risks a loss from expenses and
debts incurred through an independently established business activity.
(v) Advertising.
The worker advertises services in telephone directories,
newspapers, magazines, the Internet, or by other methods clearly demonstrating an effort
to generate business.
(vi) Licenses. The worker has obtained any required and customary business, trade,
or professional licenses.
(vii) Business Records and Tax Fonns. The worker maintains records or documents
that validate expenses, business asset valuation or income earned so he or she may file
self-employment and other business tax forms with the Internal Revenue Service and other
agencies.
(c) If an employer proves to the satisfactio~ of the Department that the worker is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or
business of the same nature as thy service in question, there will be a rebuttable
presumption that the employer did not have the right of or exerdse direction or control over
the service.
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Control and Direction.

(a) When an employer retains the right to control and direct the performance of a
service, or actually exercises control and direction over the worker who performs the
service, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the manner
and means by which that result is to be accomplished, the worker is an employee of the
employer for the purposes of the Act.
G.i

(b) The following factors, if applicable, will be used as aids in determining whether
an employer has the right of or exercises control and direction over the service of a worker:
(i) Instructions. A worker who is required to comply with other persons'
instructions about how the service is to be perfonned is ordinarily an employee. This
factor is present if the employer for whom the service is performed has the right to require
compliance with the instructions.
(ii) Training. Training a worker by requiring or expecting an experienced person to
work with the worker, by corresponding with the worker, by requiring the worker to attend
meetings, or by using other methods, indicates that the emp1oyer for whom the service is
performed expects the service to be performed in a particular method or manner.
(iii) Pace or Sequence. A requirement that the service must be provided at a pace or
ordered sequence of duties imposed by the employer indicates control or direction. The
coordinating and scheduling of the services of more than one worker does not indicate
control and direction.

(iv) Work on Employer's Premises. A requirement that the service be perfonned on
the employer's premises indicates that the employer for whom the service is perfonned has
retained a right to supervise and oversee the manner in which the service is performed,
especially if the service could be performed elsewhere.
(v) Personal Service. A requirement that the service must be perfonned personally
and may not be assigned to others indicates the right to control or direct the manner in
which the work is performed.

(Ji

(vi) Continuous Relationship. A continuous service relationship between the worker
and the employer indicates that an employer-employee relationship exists. A continuous
relationship may exist where work is performed regularly or at frequently recurring
although irregular intervals. A continuous relationship does not exist where the worker is
contracted to complete specifically identified projects, even though the service relationship
may extend over a significant period of time.
(vii) Set Hours of Work. The establishment of set hours or a specific number of hours
of work by the employer indicates control.
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(viii) Method of Payment. Payment by the hour, week, or month points to an
employer-employee relationship, provided that this method of payment is not just a
convenient way of paying progress billings as part of a fixed price agreed upon as the cost
of a job. Control may also exist when the employer detennines the method of payment.
The Appellant has the burden of proof in establishing the officers were customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business of law enforcement or security during
the same time they provided these same services to the Appellant. The evidence must show the officers
made an informed business decision to be independently established as a business, trade, occupation, or
profession. The Appellant has not met its burden. The evidence presented during -the hearing
established that all of the officers were employees of the UPD. The evidence established the UPD
prohibited the officers from providing law enforcement or security services outside of its secondary
employment program. No evidence was presented that demonstrated any of the officers had their own
security or law enforcement business. During the hearing the Appellant's own witness testified that the
officers establishing their own security officer business may be contrary to the law. There was no
evidence presented the officers had any separate place of business. The evidence did not establish the
officers made a substantial investment in tools, equipment, or supplies necessary in providing their
services. The UPD provided the vehicle and paid the officers $700 a year to assist in the purchase of tools
or equipment or supplies necessary to provide law enforcement or security services. There was no
evidence presented that any of the officers advertised their services as independent contractors providing
law enforcement or security services. There was no evidence any of the officers had business license
demonstrating an informed business decision to be independently establfshed as a security officer or law
enforcement individual. In fact, it would seem contrary to law for there to be an independently
estab1ished law enforcement business as opposed to a strictly security services business. While the
officers may have provided services for other clients, the testimony and evidence in the heari11g
established this could only happen through the UPD's secondary employment program. Thi~
demonstrates a clear lack of independence: Since the officers were not required to make a substantid.~
investment in order to provide their services. Any risk of financial loss appeared to be minimal and nof tq
be a significant factor in determining whether or not they were independently established. AI!
individuals who provide a service are always at risk they may not be paid for their services, but ~~ii
independently established trade, occupation, or profession or business may have additional ris~ .O:f
financial loss that have not been established by the Appellant. The Administrative Law Judge finds th~r~
is simply an insufficient amount of evidence to establish under the Utah Employment Security Act and
rules pertaining thereto that the police officers were independently established in their owri tract_~~
occupation, profession, or business. Their main occupation or profession was as a police officer worki~~
for the UPD and it has not been demon.strated they were customarily engaged in an independen.tf:i
established business.

~

!h~

t~e

The Administrative Law Judge finds there was not that level of control in and of itself to cause
working relationship to be an employer/employee relationship. However, the Appellant must establisfi
independence and lack of control and since the Appellant has not established the officers ~e/¥,
··independently established, the-Administrative Lav/Judge must find.they are·considered to-be employe~?
under the Utah Employment Security Act and the Appellant is subject to unemployment insuranc~
contributions.
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DECISION AND ORDER:
The Department representative's decision finding officers to have provided a service for a wage and wer~
employees and not independent contractors subjecting the Appellant to unemployment insurance
contributions pursuant to Sections 35A-4-204 and 208 of the Utah Employment Security Act is affirmed~

ary S. Gibbs
Ad · istrative Law Judg~
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVIC·E~

Date Issued and Sent:

October 12, 2016

GSG/kf

cc:

April Larsen
DWS Field Audit
140 E 300 S
Salt Lake City UT 84111
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WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD
Department of Workforce Services
Division of Adjudication

Fonn BRDEC

FUR BREEDERS AGRICULTURAL
COOPERATIVE
Employer No. 002614-0
Case No. 16-B-00534-T
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE
SERVICES

DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOAR]):
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affinned.
Services performed by off-duty police officers constitute employment subject to coverage.
IDSTORY OF CASE:
In a decision dated October 12, 2016, Case No. 16-A-05377-T, the Administrative Law Judge
affirmed a Department decision finding off-duty police officers to be employees and not
independent contractors, and to have provided a service for a wage under a contract of hire
pursuant to §§35A-4-204(1), 204(3), and 208 of the Utah Employment Security Act.

JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The Workforce Appeals Board has authority to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision
pursu~t · to §35A-4-508(4) and (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Utah
Administrative Code (1997) pertaining thereto.
EMPLOYER APPEAL FILED: November 11, 2016.

ISSUE BEFORE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD AND APPLICABLE PROVISION
OF UT Afl EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT:
Were the services performed by off-duty police officers on behalf of the Employer considered
employment subject to unemployment insurance coverage pursuant to the provisions of §§35A-·
4-204(1 ), 204(3), and 208?

._FACTUAL FINDINGS:
The Workforce Appeals Board adopts in full the factual findings of t~e Administrative Law
Judge.
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REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Appellant is a cooperative that manufactures animal feed and delivers it to constituent
members who are primarily mink ranchers. Throughot,1t the years the cooperative has had its
property damaged by animal rights groups. In an effort to protect its interests, the Appellant paid
off-duty officers of the Unified Police Department (UPD) to provide security for its property.
UPD, does not have the resources to accommodate requests for private security while
simultaneously fulfilling its mission to ensure public safety. It is a violation of UPD policy for
an off-duty officer to independently arrange for, and provide, off duty police-like functions for
remuneration. Nevertheless, UPD allows its off-duty officers to accept secondary employment if
it retains a measure of control over the process to avoid corruption and ensure that opportunities
are equitably distributed. With th~se goals in mind, UPD maintains a secondary employment
program that functions as a clearinghouse to match qualified off-duty officers with acceptable
jobs. The secondary employment program is strictly voluntary, and UPD receives no
compensation for the officer) services.
The Appellant participated in the secondary employment program during the relevant time
period. Off-duty officers perfonned services for the Appellant that directly benefitted it.
Although UPD sets the hol.ll'ly rate for the secondary employment program, the general nature of
the work, the hours, and the dates of service were set by the Appellant. The Appellant directly
paid the officers for their services.
The Department and the Administrative Law Judge found the off-duty officers were in covered
employment for unemployment insurance purposes.

The record shows the officers provided services to the Appellant for a wage under a contract of
hire--albeit not a written contract. However, the Appellant contends the services .were perfonned
as independent contractors and therefore not subject to unemployment insurance contributions.
Law Governing the Independent Contractor Analysis

On appeal to the Board, the Appellant asserts, "The only crucial test for an independent
contractor relationship .. .is whether [the Appellant] exercises any control, issues instructions as
to how the service is to be performed, or otherwise dictates the means and methods of
performing any such services."
The Appellant has incorrectly stated the relevant law. The Employment Security Act requires
the demonstration of two elements for workers to be considered independent contractors. First,
workers must be independently established in their own businesses. Second, workers must be
free from the employer's control and direction. These elements are conjunctive and both must be
proven. If the Appellant fails to establish either element, then the officers perfonned services in
covered employment subject to unemployment insurance contributions.
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The burden of proof to demonstrate the officers were independent contractors lies with the
Appellant. "Utah law presumes that individuals performing services for wages are employees
'unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the division that [the individual was independently
established and free from control and direction].'" Petro-Hunt, LLC v. Dep't of Workforce Servs.,
197 P.3d 107, 114 (Utah App 2008).

~

Independently Established Trade or Business

The \).llemployment insurance rules list seven factors to aid in the determination of whether
workers are independently established in their own business. These factors are "intended only as
aids in the analysis of the facts of each case. The degree of importance of each factor varies
depending on the service and the factual context in which it is performed." See Rule 994-204303. Some factors do not apply to certain services. The seven factors are:
Rule 994-204-303. Factorsf()r Determining Independent Contractor Status

(b) The following factors, if applicable, will determine whether a worker is

customarily engaged in an independently established trade or business:
(i) Separate Place of Business. The worker has a place of business separate from
that of the employer.

The Appellant argues the separate place of business factor is not applicable because the "law
enforcement services were unique and could only be perfonned at [its] premises." It
alternatively contends this factor weighs in its favor because "each officer maintains their own,
separate residence at which and presumably each officer retains [business records and tools]."

This factor is not so rigid as to require an employer to demonstrate the workers established their
own physical office space or place of business. Rather, it probes into whether the worker can
perform the service at a location of their choice and who is responsible for providing that
workplace. Here, the officers provide security services at the Appellant's property. Guarding
property and deterring vandals does not allow for a choice of worksites. Because the security
services had to be performed at the Appellant's property the officers did not have the option to
perform their services elsewhere-whether they were independent contractors or not. As a
result, this factor is in~pplicable here.

~

1

The Appellant's argument the officers have a separate place of ~eusiness because they are
assumed to have a residence is not persuasive. The service at issue was not performed from the
officers' residences and no evidence was presented to show they maintained a separate place of
business there.
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(ii) Tools and Equipment. The worker has a substantial investment in the tools,

equipment, or facilities customarily required to perform the services. However,
"tools of the trade" used by certain trades or crafts do not necessarily
demonstrate independence.
The record shows UPD issues its officers a service fireann and a $700 per year stipend to cover
additional equipment such as body armor, lights, boots, or a more desirable weapon. The
Appellant's witness, Mr. Hansen, testified many officers pay for equipment out of their own
pocket when they exceed the $700 allotment. It was unclear from the testimony whether police
unifonns are also purchased from this stipend or whether there was a separate dedicated
allotment for this purpose.

GI

~

The Appellant asserts the Administrative Law Judge "did not take adequate consideration [of]
the out-of-pocket expenses advanced by UPD officers" to perform their services. Aside from the
new evidence the Appellant presents on appeal regarding various uniform types and their
laundering requirements, it points to the 9fficers presumed expenditure of fun9s on body annor,
boots, and improved firearms as evidence under this factor.
The Appellant did not meet its burden of proof on this issue. The witnesses were not able to
identify whether any of the officers included in the audit purchased equipment with their own
funds. Even if the Appellant had proven the officers made such purchases, the result here
probably would not change because this factor requires the officers to have made a substantial
investment in tools and equipment for the purpose of providing services in their allegedly
independently established business. lf equipment was acquired for the purpose of providing
duty security through the secondary employment program, then this factor would weigh towards
independence. On the other han9, if equipment was obtained for the purpose of performing onduty police work, and only incidentally used for off-duty activities, then it is less likely there was
a substantial investment in tools and equipment.

off-

This principle is demonstrated in the recent case of Needle Inc. v. Dep't of Workforce Servs.,
2016 UT App 85 (Utah Ct. App. 2016). 1n Needle the Utah Court of Appeals found the workers
did not make a substantial investment in tools and equipment when they purchased computers
and internet service before the employment and not in relation to the service performed for the
purported employer. The Court foµnd:
[C]omputers and internet access are now common appurtenances of most citizens'
daily lives, used for shopping, schoolwork, social connection, and entertainment,
including online interaction. As a consequence, it w~ not error for the Board to
conclude that the acquisition of a computer and internet access was not a
"substantial investment" in the tools of a trade. This is particularly so where [the
employer] offered testimony that the [employees] work was itself "very part-time"
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and where [the employer] presented no evidence that the (employees] had acquired
wither computers or internet access for reasons other than [their] personal use.
Although body annor is not a "common appurtenance of most citizens' daily lives," the r~asoning
in Needle is pertinent. Under this factor, the substantial investment in tools or equipment is to be
made in furtherance of the alleged business. No evidence was presented here the officers made
any equipment purchases beyond their allotted $700. The Appellant only assumes they did.
Moreover, even if they had, no evidence demonstrates any such Pl.I!Chases were made with the
provision of services for the Appellant in mind. Rather, any amounts beyond the stipend would
most likely be spent with an eye to ensuring the officers' safety and convenience in their primary
occupation as UPD officers-not in furtherance of the sporadic service provided for ·the
Appellant.
The Appellant has not met its burden of proof to demonstrate the officers made a substantial
investment in tools and equipment in order to perform services for an independently established
business. This factor weighs in favor of employment.
(iii) Other Clients. The worker regularly performs services of the same nature for

other customers or clients and is not required to work exclusively for one
employer.
An independently established business generally will not have only one client. The Court of
Appeals has provided guidance on the application of this factor. In Needle, the employer
complained the Board ignored evidence the workers were not "required to work exclusively for
[it)." The court was not persuaded:
~

(The "other clients") factor [also] requires mQre than just the ability to wor~
for someQne other than the employer; the rules require that a worker's
"independently established trade . . . is created and exists apart from a
relationship with a particular employer and does not depend on a
relationship with any one employ.er for its continued existence." Utah Admin.
Code R994-204-303(1)(a); see also Leach v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n,
123 Utah 423, 260 P.2d 744, 748 (Utah 1953) (stating that an ''independently
established business must exist independent of the services under consideration in
the sense that it is the whole-of which the particular service is a part"). In this
regard, it is not sufficient that a worker is merely "free to perform work for other
clients"~ rather, the worker must actually "'regularly perform□' work for other
clients," and the other work must be of the "'same nature"' as that provided in the
employment relationship at issue. Evolocity Inc. v. Department of Workforce
Servs., 2015 UT App 61, ~~ 14-15, 347 P.3d 406 (quoting Utah Admin. Code
R994-204-303(l)(b)(iii)). For example, in Evolocity, we concluded it was not
error for the Department of Workforce Services to determine that the claimant
"did not perform work for clients other than Evolocity" where there was no
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evidence that her short-term, part-time work for the United States Census Bureau
was "of the same nature as the work she performed- for Evolocity" and where,
even though the claimant was 0 free to work for other clients," there was no
evidence that she was "regularly perform[ing]" work for others. Id. (citation and
internal quotatipn marks omitted); see also Petro-Hunt LLC v. Department of
Wor/iforce Servs., 2008 UT App 391, ii~ 26-27, 197 P.3d 107 (concluding that this
factor weighed in favor of employment where the employee "did not have any
other clients besides Petro-Hunt" and where her employment contract also
contained a non-compete clause "which [the employee] believed prevented her
from performing similar services to any other client for a period of 12 months").
Thus, [the employer] must shc;,w that the (worker] provided services of a
similar nature to other clients in order to establish that this factor weighs in
favor of independence. [Emphasis added]

Mr. Hansen testified "most"· of the officers at issue provided similar security services for
construction companies and events such as marathons. However, he admitted none of the
officers do so through their own independently established busin~ss. Instead, all these activities
come through the secondary employment program.
further testified the officers would be
prohibited from providing these services for clients through their own independently establish~d
business by UPD policy and perhaps even by a state statute prohibiting law enforcement officers
from obtaining a private security license. Nevertheless, the officers provided similar services qf
the same nature for other clients. As a result, this factor weighs in favor of independence.

He

(iv) Profit or Loss. The worker can realize a profit or risks a loss from expenses
and debts incurred through an independently established business activity.
The Appellant argues the officers can experienc~ a loss if it de.cided not pay them. It f.iSSerts the
loss would be represented by the "personal time invested that may not compensated."
In Needle, the Court of Appeals held the following with respect to this factor:

The Board seemed to interpret this faCrtor to require that the profit or loss must be
tied to expenses or debts incurred through the business activity. In other words, it
reasoned that it is not enough for a worker to be able to realize a profit or suffer a
loss in earnings simply through perfonning more or less piecework of this kind.
Rather, the profit or loss must occur as a consequence of expenses or debts related
to the independent business activity. Our case law supports this interpretation. For
example, in Evolocity, we decli_ned to disturb the Board's determination that the
employee could not realize a profit or loss where she incurred no debts or
expenses related to her work and where she could not "increase the amount she
was paid" because she was paid 11 a set salary every two weeks." Evo/ocity Inc. v.
Department of Workforce Servs., 2015 UT App 61, ~1 18-19, 347 P.3d 406.
Similarly, in Petro-Hunt, we concluded that because ''all the money" the alleged
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employee received "was pure profit with no accompanying risk of loss," PetroHunt had failed to show that the Board erred when it detennined that this factor
11
weighed in favor of employment." Petro-Hunt LLC v. Department of Workforce
Servs., 2008 UT App 391,, 28, 197 P.3d 107. Thus, unless an employer is able
to show that there is a risk of loss that accompanies the potential for profit,
this factor cannot support a determination of independence. [Emphasis added]
Here, the Appellant does not correctly distinguish between the ever-present risk of non-payment
and losses. If the officers were not paid for their services, then they would certainly be deprived
of money they are owed. However, any traditional employee who is paid by the hour runs this
risk of non-payment. But the· unemployment rules are focused on the risk specific to
independent operators in the marketplace; namely, the losses arising from expenses and debts
accumulated from business activity. This risk is a part of capitalism and is more probative of an
entity's independence than the chance of not receiving a paycheck. The Appellant asserts the
nature of the service provided does not lend itself to losses. This is not a convincing argument.
Even a service-oriented business will be at some risk of loss from ·expenses ranging from the
acquisition and maintenance of knowledge to the various supplies generally necessary to conduct
business.
The Appellant has failed to demonstrate the officers were subject to any losses beyond the
chance they might not receive a paycheck in a timely manner. The officers risked no losses in
their alleged venture. This factor weighs in favor of employment.
(v) Advertising. The worker advertises services in telephone directories,
newspapers, magazines, the Internet, or by other methods clearly demonstrating
an effort to generate business.

The Appellant argues the secondary employment program thrives by "word of mouth"
advertising. Additionally, its witness, Mr. Falco, testified the officer's advertising consistec;i of
"their police car."

Businesses compete for the attention of prospective customers in an increasingly distracted and
noisy society. An independently established business will rarely have no advertising or
marketing of any kind. The Appellant's arguments on this factor miss the mark. The rule
examines the worker's efforts to advertise their alleged business. No persuasive evidence was
introduced to show any of the officers engaged in any form of advertising. The Appellant may
well have heard of the secondary employment program through word of mouth, but this is not
relevant to whether the individual officers took steps to advertise their purportedly independent
business. The testimony regarding the qfficers' police cars amounting to advertising is similarly
unconvincing. A UPD vehicle is not an advertisement for the individual behind the wheel. The
Appellant has failed to demonstrate the officers advertised their services by a method intended to
generate business. This factor weighs in favor of classifying the officers as employees.
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(vi) Licenses. The worker has obtained any required and customary business,
trade, or professional licenses.
·
The Appellant argues this factor leans towards independence because the officers were certified
police officers "which is the very licensure contemplated" by the unemployment rules.

It is undisputed the officers were duly trained and certified to be police officers. However, it is
their service as an allegedly independent business that is at issue. The Appellant has failed to

~

demonstrate that having police officer certification is required or customary for a non-municipal
business operating in this field. In fact, Mr. Hansen testified quite the opposite is true when he
stated police officers are prohibited by UPD policy and state statute from independently
providing security services. It stands to reason that if employment as a police officer disqualifies
one from operating an independent business, then police certification is not necessary or
customary licensure for a business owner seeking to operate in this market. Additionally, then~
is no evidence the officers obtained a business license. Although not dispositive, such licenses
are usualJy required by municipalities and are commonly obtained by a truly independently
established business. In total, this factor weighs toward employment.

(vii) Business Records and Tax Forms. The worker maintains records or
documents that validate expenses, business asset valuation or income earned so
he or she may file self-employment and other business tax forms with the Internal
Revenue Service and other agencies.
The Appellant argues this factor points to independence because' the officers are "issued an
annual IRS- I 099 form which in and of itself is a business record." It also argues the officers
have residences where "presumably each officer retains his/her own secondary employment
records.,,
The Appellant's argument regarding form 1099 is without merit. Although this form is
commonly associated with independent contractor relationships, the employer issues the
document and it is not necessarily iadicative of the workers' efforts to keep business records.
This reasoning has been upheld by the Court of Appeals in Needle. The Court found:
... [T]he Board's reasoning seemed to be that while 1099 forms do support
independence, they are not determinative, particularly where the decision to
provide a 1099 form (rather than a W-2, for instance) has not been shown to have
been made by the [workers] themselves and where there is no other evidence of
documentation, record maintenance, or filings consistent with the operation of an
independent business. The plain language of the rule asks whether the worker
"maintains records" in order to "file self-employment and other business tax
forms with the [IRS] and other agencies." Id. ( emphases added). [The employer]
offered testimony that its [workers] were provided 1099 forms and that it did not
know whether its [workers] actually maintained records to track business
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expenses for the purpose of filing "self-employment and other business tax
fonns." Thus, other than the passive receipt of the employer-generated I099
forms, there was no substantial evidence that the advocates 11 file[d] or
maintain[ed] records as a business or pa[id] taxes as a business."
Consequently, [the employer's] contentions-that the Board misinterpreted this
factor and that its detennination that the factor weighed against independence was
not supported by substantial evidence-are without merit. We therefore decline to
disturb the Board's detennination on this factor.

Here, as in Needle, no evidence was introduced to demonstrate the officers maintained any sort
of business records. There was also no evidence regarding whether the filings they made with
the IRS are consistent with those expected from an independently established business. Passive
of receipt of a 1099 does not by itself satisfy this factor. The Appellant's assertion the officers
"presumably" maintained records at their residences is pure speculation without basis in the
record. This factor weighs in favor of employment.
After carefully weighing all the above factors, the officers are not independently established in
their own businesses. The independent contractor test involves more than just counting up the
elements for and against independence. Rather, the substance of the service relationship is
examined. Considering the nature of the services performed, the weight of the factors goes
toward classifying the officers as employees because on balance the service lacks the
characteristics of an independently established business.
The Appellant has not met its burden in the first prong of the two-part test for independent
contractors. If the Appellant fails to establish either prong, then the officers cannot be
considered independent contractors. As a result, the officers are employees for unemployment
insurance purposes.
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that if one of the two prongs of the independent contractor
test is not established, then there is no need to analyze the remaining prong. Petro-Hunt, LLC v.
Dep't of Workforce Servs., 197 P.3d 107, 116 (Utah App 2008). The Appellant failed to prove
the officers had an independently established business. Consequently, the Board will not address
the issue of control and direction nor the Appellant's arguments directed to this prong.
The Appellant provided much new evidence for the first time on appeal.
The time to have provided this evidence was at the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge.
Prior to the hearing the parties were sent a notice of hearing that inc]uded the following
instructions:
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READ THE GUIDE TO THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS
PROCESS online at jobs.utah.gov/appealprepare.html YOU WILL BE
RESPONSIBLE FOR KNOWING AND FOLLOWING THE
INFORMATION.

ABOUT THE HEARING: The hearing is your opportunity to present ALL
testimony and evidence on the issues. The appeal decision will be based solely
on the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing. A written decision will
be sent to you after the hearing. If you file a further appeal of that decision, you
will generally not be allowe4 to present new or additional testimony and
evidence.

DOCUMENTS: Included with the notice of hearing are documents marked as
exhibits that IDf:lY be made part of the hearing record. Read the documents
prior to the hearing and have them with you at the time of the hearing.
Employer representatives: Ensure that the employer received a copy of the
Notice of Hearing and all documents.
If you have additional documents you want to be considered, you must mail,
fax or hand deliver the documents to the Appeals Unit and all other parties
at least three days prior to the hearing. The documents should only be
printed on one side and not stapled to other documents. The Appeals Unit will
not forward your documents to the other party. Include the appeal case number
on any documents you send in. Documents not provided timely may not be
considered by the judge.

WITNESSES: Before you ask witnesses to participate in the hearing, be sure
you need their testimony. The best witness saw the events and circumstance
you want to explain to the judge. When a witness testifies about what

someone else said happened, this is "hearsay" and is not very helpful in
proving your case. You must arrange for the witness to be available at the time
of the he¥ing. Provide the name and telephone number of your witness(es) to
the Appeals Unit prio~ to the hearing. Essential witnesses who refuse to testify
may be subpoenaed. See the Guide to the Unemployment Insurance_ Appeals
Process online at jobs.utah.gov/appeals/appealprepare.html for further
details.
~

IF YOU HA VE ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE HEARING,
READ THE GUIDE TO THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSUR,ANCE
APPEALS
PROCESS
located
online
at
jobs.utah.gov/appeals/appealprepare.html, or call the Appeals Unit at 801526-9300 or 1-877-800-0671.
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The online Guide advises parties how to prepare for a hearing and says,

in part:

Preparation for the Hearing

The hearing before the ALJ is your only chance to present everything relevant
to the case. A record of the hearing will be made, and the ALJ may consider
only the evidence introduced during this hearing. Further review and decisions
on appeal are limited solely to the evidence introduced at this hearing.
Take time to prepare for your hearing. Know the issue or issues involved.
Obtain documents that help prove your facts and provide them to the ALJ and
opposing party. Also, be sure to line up witnesses which support your side of
the case. To help you remember what you want to present at the hearing, you
may prepare a simple chart or written summary With the key infonnation you
want to present.
Prepare all evidence and be ready to explain company records, abbreviations,
technical terms, and/or symbols. Do not rely solely upon written statements of
witnesses as part of your evidence presentation. (See Witnesses and
Subpoenas.)
Prepare Facts

Facts, not conclusions, are the basis of a good case. Be prepared to answer the
questions 9f who, what, when, where, and why. Saying that an employer is
unfair or that an employee is _unsatisfactory is a conclusion. Prepare facts that
prove the point you wish to make, and present evidence and witnesses that will
verify the facts asserted at the hearing.
Witnesses and Subpoenas

If you need witnesses to help you present your case, contact them immediately
to arrange for their appearance. Be sure they are available to participate in the
hearing by telephone. If they are not available to participate, you may be able to
reschedule the hearing. If the witnesses must participate by telephone at another
location, have those numbers available for the ALJ.
Essential witnesses refusing to participate in the hearing or provide essential
documents may be ordered or subpoenaed. A subpoena is a paper which orders
the person to participate in the hearing an<;l/or provide records. You must ask the
ALJ to issue a subpoena at least 3 days prior to the day of the hearing. You must
provide the mailing address of the person you want to subpoena. If a fax number
is avai Iable, provide that also. Have this information when you call the Appeals
Unit.
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Before you ask witnesses to come to the hearing, be sure you need their
testimony. The best witnesses are those who were personally involv~d in the
events and circumstances which are being explained to the ALJ. When a
witness testifies about what someone else said happened, this is "hearsay"
and is not very helpfl,11 in making a decision. "Hearsay" is also any statement,
whether oral or in writing, made by a person who does not personally appear to
testify under oath in the hearing. Hearsay is admissible in the hearing, but is not
persuasive if contested.
~

No finding of fact or decision may be based solely on uncorroborated, hearsay
evidence. Hearsay evidence carries less weight and credibility than does
firsthand testimony, especially if the other party disputes that information. You
should have the witnesses themselves who made the statement and/or
observations available to testify during the hearing and try not to rely upon
documents or witnesses who have no firsthand knowledge of events. [Emphasis
in original]
The Administrative Law Judge also told the parties, at the beginning of the
hearing, to be sure to present all the evidence they wanted to be considered
during the hearing and that the hearing was the only opportunity they would
have to present evidence.
Department rules provide:

R994-508-305. Decisions of the Board.

(2)
Absent a showing of unusual or extraordinary circumstances, the Board
will not consider new evidence on appeal if the evidence was reasonably
available and accessible at the time of the hearing before the ALJ.

~

The reason for this rule is that an appeal to the Board is an appeal on the record. That means that
the Board reviews the evidence before the Administrative Law Judge and not new evidence.
Providing evidence after the hearing deprives the other party of the opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses and provide rebuttal evidence, if available. The right of cross-examination and the
right to rebut evidence are important due process rights that must be protected.

Courts and administrative bodies are charged with the responsibility of resolving disputes
between individuals. Parties to a lawsuit or administrative procedure have the right to know that
the dispute will reach finality at some point in time. To ensure that the rights of all parties are
protected, courts and administrative bodies set trials and hearings so that the parties might fully
present any and all evidence and arguments in support of their position. After the hearing or trial
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no new evidence can be accepted except under unusual circumstances as explained in the rule
mentioned above. Although the Board understands that to an inexperienced party the rules seem
overly technical, those rules are necessary. Many if not most losing parties would want a new
hearing to try and present a "better" case. If the Board granted those requests it would
unnecessarily delay and burden the hearing process.
Department rules provide:

R994-403-116e.
Information. ·

Eligibility

Determinations:

Obligation

to

Provide

( 1)
The Department cannot make proper detenninations regarding eligibility
unless the claimant and the employer provide correct information in a timely
manner. Claimants and employers therefore have a continuing obligation to
provide any and all information and verification which may affect eligibility.
(2)
Providing incomplete or incorrect information will be treated the same as
a failure to provide information if the incorrect or insufficient information results
in an improper decision with regard to the claimant's eligibility.

R994-508-109. Hearing Procedures.

~

(9) . . . A party has the responsibility to present all relevant evidence in its
possession. When a party is in possession of evidence but fails to introduce the
evidence, an inference may be drawn that the evidence does not support the
party's position.
Utah appellate courts have consistently upheld the Board's refusal to accept new evidence on
appeal. In Salt Lake Donated Dental Servs. v Dept· of Worlcforce Servs., 2001 UT App 7, the
employer submitted affidavits to the Board after the Board had issued its decision. The Board
refused to consider the affidavits. The Court of Appeals upheld the Board's decision to not
consider the affidavits stating:
Our supreme court has cited with approval a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit holding that a federal agency did not abuse its discretion in "refusing to
consider new evidence on a petition for reconsideration, because 'if a party were free to reshape
its case, so long as it did so within 20 days after a decision, the administrative process might
never end."' Western Water, LLC v. Olds, 2008 UT 18, ~ 31, 184 P.3d 578 (quoting Toledo,
Peoria & W. Ry. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 462 F.3d 734, 753 (7th Cir. 2006)).
·
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Accordingly, while this is not precisely the situation addressed by rule 994-508-305(2) we do not
consider the untimely affidavits in determining whether the Board's decision was supported by
substantial evidence.

i'

Gt

In Swenson, v Dept' of Workforce Servs., 2012 UT App 25 the Court of Appeals took issue with
the Board's relian~e on evidence that was not presented to the ALJ or given to the parties prior to
the :Soard making its determination about the timeliness of Swenson's appeal. However, we do
not reach the issue of whether the Board improperly relied on this new evidence becaus~ it made
sufficient findings regarding the filing of Swenson's appeal independent of the new evidence.
Furthermore, those independent findings reasonably and rationally support the Board's
determination that ·good cause did not excuse Swenson's untimely appeal.
In Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P2d 63 (Utah 1989) the claimant was discharged
for allegedly testing positive for marijuana at work. The employer failed to provide a copy of the
test results during the hearing claiming it was trying to protect the claimant's confidentiality.
The Administrative Law Judge allowed benefits and Grace provided a copy of the test results
with its appeal to the Board. The Board refused to consider the test results on appeal. In
upholding that decision, the Court of Appeals held:
it is undisputed that Mr. Goodale was discharged solely because he tested positive
for illegal drugs whi1e on duty. It reasonably follows that the test results were
crucial to Grace Drilling's burden of establishing that Mr. Goodale was
discharged for "just cause." Grace Drilling was given two opportunities to present
the results and lay the appropriate foundation for receiving them into evidence.
Grace Drilling declined on both occasions, and its post-hearing confidentiality
justification s1mply is not persuasive as the appeal referee could have taken the
appropriate precautions to protect the confidentiality of the report.

ca

~

In short, the test results were clearly available at the time of the hearing and the
Board so noted. The Board declined to consider the test results stating to do so
would have deprived Mr. Goodale of the opportunity to rebut or cross-examine.
We agree. Elementary fairness in unemployment compensation adjudications .
includes a party's right to see adverse evidence and be afforded an opportunity to
rebut such evidence. See, e.g., Lanier-Brugh, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 761 P.2d
572, 575-76 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Grace Drilling argues that Mr. Goodale could
be given an opportunity to challenge the results if the matter were merely
remanded to the appeal referee to take additional evidence. However, we do not
believe granting parties "three bites at the apple" is consonant with efficient
administrative procedure. Grace Drilling had ample opportunity to present its case
and failed to meet its burden. We hold the Board did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to consider the test results.
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Here, the new evidence presented by the Employer on appeal was available at the time of the
hearing. The Employer has not presented any evidence of extenuating circumstances that would
warrant accepting this new evidence now. The new evidence presented by the Employer on
appeal was not considered in reaching this decision.
The Appellant raises other objections and arguments. All have all been considered by the Board
and are found to be without merit.
Where not inconsistent with this decision, the reasoning and conclusions of law of the
Administrative Law Judge are adopted in full.

DECISION:
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge holding that off-duty off-duty police officers are
employees and not independent contractors and to have provided a service for a wage under a
contract of hire for the Appellant, pursuant to the provisions of §§35A-4-204(1 ), 204(3), and 208
of the Utah Employment Security Act, is affinned.
APPEAL RIGHTS:

You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in
\1/riting within 30 days of the date this deci~ion is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. 0. Box 140230, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board, Department
of Workforce Services and any other party to the. proceeding as Respondents. To file an appeal
with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ of
Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah
Employment Security Act; §630-4-401 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief
as required by Rules 9 and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD
Date Issued: December 7, 2016
G H/CN/CE/GG/sp/cp
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